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THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND ITS 
CONSTITUTIONAL TENSION 
Albert D. Braultt 
John A. Lynch, Jr.tt 
Either the judge or the jury must decide facts and, to the 
extent that we take this responsibility, we lessen the jury 
function. Our duty to preserve this one of the Bill of Rights 
may be peculiarly difficult, for here it is our own power 
which we must restrain.! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to trial by jury in a civil case is one of the most re-
vered incidents of American law. The right as embodied in the Sev-
enth Amendment to the United States Constitution2 was long ago 
described by the Supreme Court, per Justice Story, as 'Justly dear to 
the American people" and "an object of deep interest and solici-
tude."3 The right to civil jury trial is provided in the constitution of 
nearly every state,4 including Maryland.5 The court of appeals has 
t B.S., 1955, J.D., 1958, Georgetown University. Partner; Brault, Graham, Scott & 
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tt B.A., 1971, St. Anselm's College; J.D., 1974, LL.M., 1978, George Washington 
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1. GallOway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 407 (Black, J., dissenting). 
2. The Seventh Amendment provides: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of 
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
3. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830). The importance of the 
civil jury to the American people was more recently underscored by then Jus-
tice Rehnquist: 
It is perhaps easy to forget, now more than 200 years removed from 
the events, that the right of trial by jury was held in such esteem by 
the colonists that its deprivation at the hands of the English was one 
of the important grievances leading to the break with England. 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). 
4. See JACK H. FRJEDENTHAL ET AL. CML PROCEDURE § 11.1, at 473 (2d ed. 1993). 
5. See MD. CONST .. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23. The Maryland civil jury provision pro-
1 
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echoed Justice Story's endorsement of the civil jury tria1.6 
Yet, the process by which a group of persons untrained in the 
law are brought to the threshold of their duty-an impartial, rea-
sonable decision based on the law-is fraught with the possibility of 
mistake or mischief.7 Some sort of a corrective device was required. 
vides: "The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the 
several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds 
the sum of five hundred dollars, shaIl be inviolably preserved." Id. This provi-
sion, described by Professor Charles A. Rees as the "principal provision," was 
originaIly adopted in Maryland's 1851 Constitution. See Charles A. Rees, ~ 
served or Pickled': The Right to Trial by Jury After the Merger of Law and Equity in 
Maryland, 26 U. BALT. L. REv. 301, 314 (1997). The civil jury trial provision of 
Maryland's original 1776 Constitution, described by Professor Rees as the "re-
ception provision," survives as Article Five of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. See ilL at 312. This Article provides: 
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of 
England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, 
and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the 
Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by 
experience, have been found applicable to their local and other cir-
cumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the 
Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on 
the first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such 
as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and 
amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State. And the In-
habitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property derived to 
them from, or under the Charter granted by His Majesty Charles the 
First to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore. 
MD. CoNST., DECL OF RIGHTS art. 5. The purpose of adopting the principal 
provision in Maryland's 1851 Constitution was "to safeguard the jury right 
from legislative change or repeal." Rees, supra, at 315. 
6. See Allender v. Ghingher, 170 Md. 156, 167, 183 A. 610,616 (1936) (citing Par-
sons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 446). 
7. Blackstone described these possibilities as they existed in his time: 
Either party may be surprised by a piece of evidence which, had he known of 
its production, he could have explained or answered; or he may be puzzled by 
a legal doubt which a little recollection would have solved. In the hurry of a 
trial, the ablest judge may mistake the law and misdirect the jury; he may not 
be able so to state and range the evidence as to lay it clearly before them, nor 
to take off the artful impressions which have been made on their minds by 
learned and experienced advocates. The jury are to give their opinion instan-
ter, that is, before they separate, eat, or drink. And under these circumstances 
the most intelligent and best-intentioned men may bring in a verdict which 
they themselves upon cool deliberation would wish to reverse. 
3 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 391 (William 
D. Lewis ed., 1922). 
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In the darkest mists of common law practice, this device was the at-
taint, which involved prosecuting the errant jurors for peIjury 
before a new jury of twenty-four individuals.8 For obvious reasons, 
this fell into disuse at an early stage in the development of the com-
mon law.9 The precursor of the modern appeal, the writ of error, 
was unduly cumbersome.1O 
The new trial, venire facias de novo, developed into the principal 
method of correcting errors at trial in English common law prac-
tice. 1I This remedy was used as early as the fourteenth century with 
respect to cases of jury misconduct12 and involving excessive dam-
ages. 13 The utility and desirability of this device was recognized 
early; as opined by Lord Mansfield in Bright v. Eynon, 14 "[ t] rials by 
jury, in civil causes, could not subsist now, without a power, some-
where, to grant new trials."15 The practice, however, was not as com-
mon on the other side of the Atlantic, at least in colonial times and 
shortly thereafter. 16 
Although the right to jury trial in England was central to its 
trial system,17 there does not seem to be any indication in the schol-
8. See ill. at 402.05 (explaining the writ of attaint). 
9. [d. at 390. The new jury's determination was not whether the original jury be-
lieved the verdict they delivered, but whether the verdict was actually correct. 
See WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAw 341 (AL. Goodhart & 
H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956). Jurors who had not made the "correct" de-
termination were sentenced. See ill. The sentence was uniformly applied to all 
convicted jurors-one year imprisonment, forfeiture of goods, infamy, lands 
laid to waste, and wives and children were forced to be turned out. See ill. The 
severity of this device and the increasing judicial character of juries caused it 
to fall into disuse at an early stage in the development of the common law. See 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 390. 
10. See HOLDSWORTH. supra note 9, at 223-24. Almost any error on the record was 
ground for a writ. See ill. at 223. In order for the writ to be granted, there 
must have been an error that was included in the record. See ill. at 215. How-
ever, the record generally only included the arraignment, plea, issue, and ver-
dict-not the most material parts of the trial such as the evidence or jury in-
structions. See id. at 215-16. If parties alleged an error in the trial court's 
decision or any other matter not included in the record, this device was inef-
fective, even if the error was material and erroneous. See ill. at 223. 
11. See William R Riddell, New Trial at the Common Law, 26 YALE LJ. 49, 54 (1916). 
12. See ill. 
13. See ill. at 55. 
14. 97 Eng. Rep. 365 (K.B. 1757). 
15. [d. at 366. 
16. See Renee B. Lettow, New Trial fur Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in 
Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 505, 515 (1996). 
17. See Rees, supra note 5, at 321. However, because acts of the English Parliament 
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arly commentary that the development of a motion for new trial in-
terfered with the prerogatives of the jury as the fact-finder. Indeed, 
Blackstone implied that a new trial enhanced the right to trial by 
jury: 
A new trial is a rehearing of the cause before another jury, 
but with as little prejudice to either party as if it had never 
been heard before. No advantage is taken of the former 
verdict on the one side, or the rule of court for awarding 
such second trial on the other: and the subsequent verdict, 
though contrary to the first, imports no tittle of blame 
upon the former jury, who, had they possessed the same 
lights and advantages, would probably have altered their 
own opinion. The parties come better informed, the coun-
sel better prepared, the law is more fully understood, the 
judge is more master of the subject; and nothing is now 
tried but the real merits of the case. 18 
The notion that granting a new trial does not impair the right to 
trial by jury because it simply results in another jury trial has been 
echoed in the United States. 19 
The civil jury trial provisions of the Maryland Constitution20 
and the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution pre-
serve the jury trial right as it existed in England in the late eight-
eenth century.21 The right to a trial by jury in England was subject 
are not limited by a written constitution, the right to a civil jury trial has been 
limited to certain situations, such as fraud, defamation, malicious prosecution, 
and false imprisonment. See id.; see also RICHARD M. JACKSON, JACKSON'S MACHIN· 
ERY OF JUSTICE 391 (J.R Spencer ed., 8th ed. 1989) (noting the importance of 
the right to trial by jury under English law). 
18. 3 BlACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 391. This notion that a second trial will pro-
duce a better result also seems supported by William Tidd who described or-
dering a new trial as "no more than having the cause more deliberately con-
sidered by another jury." 2 WILUAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF 
KING'S BENCH AND CoMMON PLEAS 904 (Asa I. Fish et aI., eds., 4th ed. 1856). 
19. See, e.g., Marsh v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 175 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1949) ("[A 
motion for a new trial] never supercedes the jury but, as the name states, it 
results in another jury trial."). In Slocum v. New Yom Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 
364 (1913), the Supreme Court stated that following the setting aside of a ver-
dict by the court, the Seventh Amendment required a new trial "with the 
same right to a jury as before." Id. at 380. 
20. See MD. CoNST., DECL OF RIGHTS arts. 5, 23; see also Knee v. Baltimore City Pas-
senger Ry. Co., 87 Md. 623, 624, 40 A. 890, 891 (1898) (discussing the civil 
jury trial provisions of the Maryland Constitution). 
21. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (stating that the purpose of the 
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to the power of the trial court to grant a new trial.22 Thus, the exis-
tence of such a discretionary power in the federal and state trial 
courts today should imply no threat whatsoever to the jury trial. 
Such reasoning, however, glosses too easily over important 
questions relating to advancements in the law of procedure and the 
scope qf jury trials at both the state and federal levels.23 Both fed-
eral and state courts must determine whether jury trial provisions 
preserve specific procedural trappings involved in jury trials con-
ducted over two centuries ag024 or whether they simply preserve the 
"substance" of a civil jury trial, allowing for substantial evolution of 
the procedural context in which the right is exercised. In essence, 
the ultimate question is whether it is necessary to expand the right 
to trial by jury to preserve it. Such questions concerning the protec-
tion required for jury trial have been addressed in the last genera-
tion in the federal system2S and in Maryland26 in the wake of the 
merger of law and equityY In that context, both the Supreme 
Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted approaches that 
strongly protect, perhaps even expand, the right to trial by jury in 
civil cases. To the extent such an approach allows or effects an ex-
pansion of the jury trial right or removes control of such right that 
once existed, it might be called a dynamic approach. 
The Maryland appellate courts have not recently assessed the 
effect of a trial court's exercise of the time-honored power to grant 
a new trial on the right to trial by jury. Two things indicate that the 
time may be right for such an assessment. They are, first, the analy-
Seventh Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial). 
22. See' FLEMING JAMES. JR. ET AL,. CML PROCEDURE § 7.24. at 382 (Little, Brown & 
Co. 4th ed. 1992). 
23. For a discussion of the modem procedural devices available to Maryland trial 
courts, see infra notes .4346 and accompanying text. 
24. See Rees, supra note 5, at 305 (discussing the attempt to pickle, not preserve, 
the jury trial right). 
25. See generally Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (discussing 
the importance of scrutinizing with utmost care any curtailment of the right 
to a jury trial). 
26. See generaUy Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 541, 520 A.2d 724, 728 (1987) (dis.-
cussing the impact of the merger of law and equity on the availability of trial 
by jury). 
27. This was accomplished through the adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 2 and Maryland Rule of Civil Procedure 2-301. Both rules provide that 
there will be one form of action known as the civil action. See FED. R CIV. P. 2; 
MD. R CIV. P. 2-301. 
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sis of the right to civil jury trial in Maryland in Higgins v. BameSZ8 
and, second, the development of a growing body of authority in the 
lower federal courts and some states that a constitutional right to 
jury trial is not always adequately served by a new jury trial in cases 
in which a trial court sets aside a jury verdict. 
This Article explores whether constitutional weight should be 
accorded to a jury verdict vis-a-vis the traditional power of the trial 
judge to grant a new trial. Part II of this Article explores the devel-
opment of the judicial power to grant a new trial at common law 
and in modem Maryland practice.29 Part III examines the right to 
jury trial in Maryland and the effect that the federal approach in 
Beacon Theatres v. Westov~ should have on Maryland courts in de-
fining the scope of the jury trial right.31 In Part IV, this Article con-
siders the emerging authority in the lower federal and state courts 
that increasingly limits a trial judge'S discretion to grant a new 
trial.32 Part V considers whether, in deference to the right to trial by 
jury, Maryland courts should adopt guidelines to restrict the discre-
tion of trial judges to grant a new trial in order to foster judicial 
awareness of the constitutional tension between that power and the 
right to trial by jury.33 This Article concludes that the imposition of 
a modest check on the discretion of trial judges in granting new tri-
als would harmonize both the historical boundaries of the right to 
trial by jury and the advent of contemporary procedural 
frameworks. 34 
II. NEW TRIAL PRACTICE IN MARYlAND 
The motion for new trial in Maryland is governed by Maryland 
Rule 2-533. Under Rule 2-533(a), a party may move for new trial 
within ten days after entry of judgment.35 Rule 2-533(b) requires a 
party to state in writing the grounds advanced in support of a new 
trial,36 but the rule, unlike those of some other states,37 does not 
28. 310 Md. 532, 54~51, 530 A.2d 724, 727-33 (1987) (discussing Maryland's aboli-
. tion of the separation between law and equity and its application to the right 
of trial by jury). 
29. See infra notes 35-391 and accompanying text. 
30. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
31. See infra notes 392-701 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 702-865 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra notes 866-882 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 883-889 and accompanying text. 
35. See MD. R CIV. P. 2-533(a). 
36. See ill. 2-533(b). 
37. See, e.g., UTAH R CIV. P. 59(a). This rule establishes the following grounds for 
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enumerate possible grounds on which a party may seek a new 
triaps Nonetheless, there is a catalogue of recognized bases for the 
grant of a new trial in Maryland.39 That catalogue is similar to the 
bases for a new trial that prevailed in eighteenth century England.40 
Judicial error during the trial pertaining to evidence or instructions 
to the jury, prejudicial occurrences, juror misconduct, newly discov-
ered evidence, and a verdict against the weight of the evidence were 
all bases for new trials in England.41 Likewise, a jurisprudence has 
developed around each of these grounds for new trial under Mary-
land law.42 Procedurally, a court's grant of a new trial may take sev-
eral different forms. Under Rule 2-533(c), the trial court may set 
aside all or part of a judgment, grant a new trial as to all or any of 
the parties, or grant this motion on all or some of the issues if they 
are fairly severable.43 The grant of a new trial as to all issues and 
parties is an interlocutory order and therefore not immediately ap-
pealable.44 Rule 2-533(c) also permits a trial court to direct entry of 
a trial court's grant of a new trial: 
(I) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse 
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which ei-
ther party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever anyone or more of 
the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special ver-
dict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, 
by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such 
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of anyone of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not 
have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have dis-
covered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
Id. 
38. See MD. R CIV. P. 2-533(b). 
39. See infra Part II and accompanying text. 
40. Compare JAMES ET AL., sUfrra note 22, § 7.24, at 382 (discussing the grounds 
under English common law), with infra notes 60-391 and accompanying text. 
41. See id. 
42. For a discussion of these grounds, see infra Part II and accompanying text. 
43. See MD. R CIV. P. 2-533(c). 
44. See Buck v. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 57, 612 A2d 1294, 1297 
(1992) (explaining that an order granting a new trial is not immediately ap-
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judgment as to the remaining parties or issues when granting a par-
tial new tria1.45 The grant of a new trial is appealable from the judg-
ment at the end of the second trial.46 
Alternatively, the trial court may also conditionally rule on a 
motion for a new trial based on a jury's damage award.47 The court 
may condition the grant of a new trial on the plaintiff's refusal of a 
remittitur.48 A plaintiff who has accepted a remittitur may cross-
appeal from the final judgment.49 Although the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has not addressed the issue, it appears that a denial of a 
plaintiff's motion for new trial may not be conditioned on the 
defendant's refusal of an additur. 50 
The grant of a new trial in a jury case undoes the work of one 
jury and often entails judicial reweighing of factual determina-
tions-matters uniquely within the domain of the jury.51 Tradition-
ally, a new trial has been consistent with the right to jury trial 
under the MarylandConstitution52 because the power to grant a 
new trial was part of the common law of England when Maryland's 
first constitution was adopted.53 Yet, the historic right to jury trial 
entails not only the resolution of factual issues by a jury of twelve 
pealable because it is an interlocutory order). 
45. See MD. R CtV. P. 2-533(c). 
46. See Buck, 328 Md. at 57, 612 A.2d at 1297. 
47. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
48. See Turner v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 501~2, 
158 A.2d 125, 129 (1960) (noting that the remittitur is a well-established prac-
tice in Maryland). A remittitur is a reduction in the amount of the verdict 
proposed by the trial court. See BLACK'S LAw DICfIONARY 1295 (6th ed. 1990). 
49. See MD. CODE ANN .. Crs. & JUD. PRoc. § 12-301 (1998). 
50. See Free State Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellis, 45 Md. App. 159, 166, 411 A.2d 1090, 
1094 (1980) (noting that Maryland does not permit additur); Millison v. 
Clarke, 32 Md. App. 140, 143, 359 A.2d 127, 129 (1976) ("While [additur] ap-
pears not to have been recognized in Maryland, courts elsewhere which have 
accepted or rejected it have always done so with the understanding that, 
where the quantum of damages is in dispute, the grant of an additur is an al-
ternative to a new trial and is contingent upon the defendant's acquiescence 
in the augmentation of the verdict."). An additur is an increase in the 
amount of the verdict proposed by the court. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 38 
(6th ed. 1990). 
51. See Fowler v. Benton, 245 Md. 540, 545, 226 A.2d 556, 560 (1967) (stating that 
only the jury has the right and the power to judge the weight of the evi-
dence). For a discussion of how a new trial may infringe on the jury function, 
see infra notes 702-865 and accompanying text. 
52. See MD. CONST., DECL OF RIGHTS arts. 8, 23. 
53. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 22, § 7.24, at 382 (observing that the practice of 
granting a new trial was well-established in late eighteenth century England), 
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individuals but the relationship between judge and jury, including 
the judicial means of remedying an unjust verdict that existed at 
common law. This was described by the Supreme Court in the con-
text of the Seventh Amendment as follows: 
"Trial by jury," in the primary and usual sense of the term 
at the common law and in the American constitutions, is 
not merely a trial by a jury of 12 men before an officer 
vested with authority to cause them to be summoned and 
impaneled ... but it is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in 
the presence and under the superintendence of a judge 
empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise them 
on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) 
to set aside their verdict, if, in his opinion, it is against the 
law or the evidence.54 
Maryland similarly views the right to a jury as a package of procedu-
ral incidents that includes judicial control mechanisms.55 
Maryland views the trial judge's power to grant a new trial as 
the exercise of equitable jurisdiction.56 This view entrusts the trial 
judge with great discretion in disposing of a motion for new trial.57 
This discretion, in turn, mandates a narrow scope of appellate re-
view of a trial court's disposition of such a motion-the abuse of 
discretion standard.58 
Maryland courts have generally refrained from overturning a 
trial courts grant of a new trial except on very specific grounds. A 
jurisprudence has grown up around each of the grounds on which 
a new trial has been granted in Maryland. The case law reflects the 
wide discretion that has been bestowed on trial judges with respect 
to motions for new trial. It is clear from the case law, however, that 
guidelines for the trial court have been established for grounds 
54. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899). 
55. See Turner v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 503, 158 
A2d 125, 130 (1960) (stating "the right to a jury trial is a right to a 'properly 
functioning' jury"). 
56. See Waters v. Waters, 26 Md. 53, 73 (1866) (explaining that a trial judge's 
power to grant a new trial is equitable in nature). 
57. See, e.g., id. (noting that a motion for a new trial is within the "sound discre-
tion of the [c]ourt"). 
58. See Kirkpatrick v. Zimmerman, 257 Md. 215, 217-18, 262 A2d 531, 532 (1970) 
(noting that an appellate court's review of a motion for new trial is based on 
the abuse of discretion standard); see also Greenstein v. Meister, 279 Md. 275, 
295, 368 A2d 451, 463 (1977) (noting that an appellate court does not want 
to disturb the trial judge's discretion in considering a motion for a new trial). 
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other than excessive or inadequate verdicts or for verdicts against 
the weight of the evidence. In a sense, this is ironic in that deter-
mining whether a verdict is against the weight of the evidence, 
more than any other basis for granting a new trial, requires a trial 
court to replicate the fact-finding role of the jury. To appreciate this 
irony, however, one must examine the grounds on which new trials 
have been granted in Maryland and the circumstances under which 
each ground has been used to set aside jury verdicts. 
A. Judicial Error in the Trial 
One ground upon which a court may grant a new trial is for a 
judicial error resulting in prejudice against one of the parties. If the 
trial court has committed a prejudicial error in the course of a trial, 
such as an erroneous ruling regarding the admission or exclusion 
of evidence, the aggrieved party may give the trial court an opportu-
:fiity to avoid reversal on appeal by making a motion for new trial. 
This is an attractive device for litigants in that resorting first to a 
motion for new trial does not prejudice the aggrieved party's ability 
to pursue correction of the prejudicial error on appeaI.59 If the pur-
ported error is prejudicial and the aggrieved party has properly pre-
served it for appellate review, the trial court does not have much 
discretion in whether to grant the new trial.60 If denied, all prejudi-
cial errors and final orders-including the trial court's disposition 
of the motion for a new trial-are reviewable by the appellate 
court.61 
Even if the aggrieved party has not properly preserved the al-
leged error for review, such error may still be the basis of a motion 
for new trial. In disposing of the new trial motion, the trial court 
may consider the failure of the movant to make a timely and 
proper objection.62 If the trial court denies the motion for a new 
trial, appellate review will focus on the trial court's exercise of dis-
59. Under Maryland Rule 8-202 (c) , if a timely motion for new trial has been 
made, the time for filing a notice of appeal does not begin to run until there 
is an order denying such motion. See MD. RULE 8-202(c). 
60. To preserve the error, a party must object to the trial court's decision on the 
record. See Kennedy v. Crouch, 191 Md. 580, 586, 62 A.2d 582, 585 (1948) 
(noting that a timely objection must be made on the record); Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 76 Md. App. 709, 719, 548 A.2d 151, 156 (1988) (noting that 
to preserve an issue for appeal, a timely objection on the record must be 
made). 
61. See B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127, 132-
33,571 A.2d 1213, 1216 (1990) (construing Maryland Rule 8-131 (d». 
62. See Buck, 328 Md. at 62, 612 A.2d at 1299. 
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cretion in denial of a new trial rather than the alleged error that 
served as basis for the motion.63 Such a focus has significant practi-
cal im plications in that the abuse of discretion standard affords a 
heightened level of deference to the trial court. 
B. Prejudicial Occurrence During the Trial 
Another common instance in which a court may grant a new 
trial is to prevent unfair prejudice from circumstances other than 
those involving the trial court's rulings on the law. The most vital 
means of preserving the fairness of trial by jury is to limit the jury 
solely to consideration of the evidence.64 Information other than 
the evidence presented at trial and the trial judge's instruction com-
promises the fairness of the process by which the jury performs its 
function. Although professional ethics precepts proscribe it,65 the 
most often-litigated source of prejudicial or extraneous matter is at-
torney argument to the jury. 
Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has recognized 
abuse of argument as a basis for new trial,66 it has also recognized 
that "[i]f every irrelevant and inconsequent remark made by coun-
sel in arguing a case to a jury were accepted as a ground for a mis-
trial, the hazards, delays, and expense of litigation would indeed be 
endless. "67 Owing its ability to directly observe prejudicial occur-
rences and provide an immediate remedy, the trial court has wide 
latitude in addressing such circumstances.68 
In recent years, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has had oc-
casion to underscore both the breadth and the limits of the trial 
court's discretion in dealing with prejudicial occurrences during the 
trial.69 In Buck v. Cam s Broadloom Rugs, Inc.,7o the plaintiff sought re-
63. See Myerberg, Sawyer & Rue, PA., v. Agee, 51 Md. App. 711, 725-26, 446 A2d 
69, 76-77 (1982). 
64. See Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 138, 383 A2d 389, 396-97 (1978). 
65. See MARYlAND LAWYERS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer Rule 3.4(e) (1998) 
(providing that a lawyer shall not "in trial, allude to any matter that the law-
yer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by ad-
missible evidence"). 
66. See State v. Devers; 260 Md. 360, 374, 272 A2d 794, 801 (1971) (quoting LEWIS 
HOCHEIMER. THE LAw OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 184, at 209-10 (2d 
ed. 1904». 
67. Wolfe v. State ex rel. Brown, 173 Md. 103, 119, 194 A 832,839 (1937). 
68. See Brinand v. Denzik, 226 Md. 287, 292, 173 A.2d 203, 206 (1961). 
69. See Buck v. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 53-62, 612 A2d 1294, 
1295-99 (1992); Medical Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc'y v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 19-24, 622 
A2d 103, 112-14 (1993). For a discussion of Buck, see infra notes 71-96 and ac-
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covery for injuries suffered in an automobile accident with a driver 
for the defendant.71 The defendant's attorney engaged in a strident 
argument to the jury suggesting a conspiracy between the injured 
plaintiff and his doctor "to improperly inflate the medical bills and 
to improperly exaggerate the nature and extent of [the plaintiff's] 
injuries."72 The jury returned a verdict for the plain tiff for 
$3,868.00, an amount considerably less than the medical and other 
special damages.73 In granting a new trial, the trial court concluded 
that improper remarks by the defense counsel "caused or substan-
tially contributed to a verdict that was unreasonably low. "74 On re-
trial, the jury awarded $87,000 to the plaintiff.7s 
Reversing the second jury's verdict, the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland reinstated the first jury's verdict.76 While recogniz-
ing the trial court's traditional discretion in disposing of a motion 
for a new triaJ,17 the court of special appeals concluded without ex-
planation that the second verdict's twenty-three-fold increase "is suf-
ficient to demonstrate that the circumstances in the instant case are 
compelling and, thus, reviewable."78 Therefore, notwithstanding the 
substantial line of case law suggesting that the trial court's disposi-
tion of a new trial may not be reviewable absent extreme circum-
stances,79 the court of special appeals and court of appeals nonethe-
less examined the trial court's exercise of its discretion. 
companying text. For a discussion of Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society, 
see infra notes 98-124 and accompanying text. 
70. 328 Md. 51, 58-59, 612A2d 1294, 1298 (1992). 
71. See id. at 53, 612 A.2d at 1295. 
72. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc. v. Buck, 87 Md. App. 561, 566, 590 A.2d 1060, 
1062 (1991), rerJ'd, Buck, 328 Md. 51, 612 A.2d 1294 (1992). 
73. See id. 
74. Id. at 567, 590 A.2d at 1062 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75. See ill. at 569, 590 A2d at 1064. 
76. See id. at 579, 590 A2d at 1068. 
77. The court of special appeals stated such discretion should not be disturbed 
"unless the court has clearly abused its discretion under circumstances that 
are extraordinary or compelling or where a substantial right is denied." Id. at 
568,590 A.2d at 1063 (quoting Thodos v. Bland, 75 Md. App. 700, 7Q6.07, 542 
A2d 1307, 1311 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted». 
78. Id. at 569, 590 A2d at 1064. 
79. Under Maryland law, there is also a significant line of case law suggesting that 
this decision is unreviewable. See, e.g., Auchincloss v. State, 200 Md. 310, 316, 
89 A2d 605, 607 (1952) (citing Newton v. 'State, 193 Md. 200, 202, 66 A2d 473 
(1949); Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 367, 46 A2d 607 (1946); Wilson v. 
State, 181 Md. I, 6, 26 A.2d 770 (1942». 
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In support of its contention that the second jury verdict be 
overturned, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had waived his 
right to a new trial by failing to object to all instances of the alleg-
edly offending argument.80 Noting that several Maryland decisions 
had affirmed a trial court's denial of a new trial because the moving 
party had failed to object at trial to errors that served as the basis 
for the motion, the court of special appeals essentially engrafted the 
requirement of preservation of issues for appeal onto the motion 
for new trial.81 Such a requirement would circumscribe the discre-
tion of a trial court. The court stated that this limitation prevented 
litigants from withholding their objections-thereby losing all rights 
to a corrective instruction or appeal-but nonetheless retaining the 
ability to avoid an undesirable verdict.82 
The court's reasoning overlooked some obvious drawbacks to 
such a "sandbagging" strategy for its perpetrator.83 First, holding 
back an objection to objectionable conduct would restrict a party's 
ability to obtain appellate review through means other than a mo-
tion for new trial-a disposition that appellate courts are reluctant 
to disturb. It also assumes that a trial judge, who must play an un-
witting part in the sandbagging if it is to be effective, will be amena-
ble to setting aside a verdict on the basis of misconduct to which no 
objection was raised. The trial court in Buck set aside the verdict be-
cause, from its vantage point, the verdict was extraordinarily low.84 
Indeed, the intermediate court second-guessed the trial court be-
cause of the disparity between the two verdicts.85 
Reversing the intermediate court, the Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland deferred to the court that had observed the trial first-hand-
80. See Cams Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 87 Md. App. at 569,590 A.2d at 1064. 
81. See id. at 571-73, 590 A.2d at 1064-65 (discussing Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 
609, 541 A.2d 969, (1988) (noting that the first opportunity to object to an ex-
cessive verdict is through a motion for new trial); Miller Bldg. Supply v. Ro-
sen, 305 Md. 341, 503 A.2d 1344 (1986) (holding that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it denied a motion for new trial based on an alleg-
edly erroneous jury trial instruction); Brinand v. Denzik, 266 Md. 287, 173 
A.2d 203 (1961) (holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied a motion for new trial when counsel objected to allegedly improper 
remarks but did not request an instruction to the jury to disregard them». 
82. See id. at 576-77, 590 A.2d at 1067. 
83. See id. at 574, 590 A.2d at 1066. 
84. See id. at 578, 590 A.2d at 1068. 
85. See id. at 577-78, 590 A.2d at 1068. The court of special appeals alternatively 
sifted through the evidence to conclude that the smallness of the first award, 
by itself, was insufficient to support the grant of a new trial. See id. 
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the trial court.86 In assessing whether the trial court had abused its 
discretion, the court stated: 
In so doing, we are obliged to consider the breadth of dis-
cretion that is afforded a trial judge in making this type of 
decision. As we have seen in tracing the history of our treat-
ment of the issue, the emphasis is has consistently been 
upon granting the broadest range of discretion to trial 
judges whenever the decision has necessarily depended 
upon the judge'S evaluation of the character of the testi-
mony and of the trial when the judge is considering the 
core question of whether justice has been done.87 
Although the court noted that there are some situations in which a 
trial judge'S discretion might be more limited,88 the court ultimately 
insisted that "[w]e refuse ... to substitute our judgment for that of 
the trial judge in this case. "89 
The court of appeals viewed the issue of a new trial as turning 
primarily on the trial court's view of the weight of the evidence. 
The court of appeals noted that the trial court was in the best posi-
tion to observe "the effect of an accumulation of alleged errors or 
improprieties by defense counsel, no one of which may have been 
serious enough to provoke a request for, or justify the granting of, a 
mistrial."90 The court concluded that because the trial court's discre-
tion under these circumstances "depends so heavily upon the 
unique opportunity the trial judge has to closely observe the entire 
trial, complete with nuances, inflections, and impressions never to 
be gained from a cold record, it is a discretion that will rarely, if 
ever, be disturbed on appeal. "91 
The court of appeals's holding demonstrates the continued vi-
tality of the discretion of the trial court with respect to new trial 
motions. Like the court of special appeals,92 the court of appeals 
86. See Buck v. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 62, 612 A2d 1294, 1300 
(1992). 
87. [d. at 57, 612 A2d at 1297. 
88. See id. at 56-58, 612 A2d at 1297-98 (citing Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 
298 Md. 406, 470 A2d 802 (1984) (considering juror misconduct); Washing-
ton, Baltimore & Annapolis Elec. R.R. v. Kimmey, 141 Md. 243, 253, 118 A 
648, 652 (1922) (considering newly discovered evidence». 
89. [d. at 61, 612 A2d at 1299. 
90. [d. at 59, 612 A2d at 1298. 
91. [d. 
92. See Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc. v. Buck, 87 Md. App. 561, 567-69, 590 A.2d 
1060, 1062-64 (1991). 
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did not independently assess whether the defense counsel's alleg-
edly improper argument warranted a new trial.93 Yet, the court of 
appeals did not give its unfettered support to the trial court's exer-
cise of its discretion. The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with 
the lower appellate court that the movant's failure to object to the 
counsel's argument is a significant factor to be considered by the 
trial court when a motion for a new trial is made.94 Although the 
plaintiff essentially argued that the verdict was against the weight of 
the evidence as a result of the unfairly prejudicial arguments,95 
there is at least an implication in the court of appeals's opinion that 
the plaintiffs failure to object sufficiently to the prejudicial argu-
ment might have prevented the trial court from granting a new trial 
on that basis alone.96 If so, Buck represents a diminution of the trial 
court's discretion to grant a motion for a new trial. 
The trial court's discretion may even be sharply circumscribed 
in cases of egregious conduct. Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Soci-
ety of Maryland v. Evans97 demonstrates that when there is a timely 
objection to prejudicial conduct by an attorney, the trial judge'S dis-
cretion with respect to a new trial may be circumscribed-he or she 
may have to grant a new trial (or mistrial) if the misconduct is suffi-
ciently serious. In Medical Mutua~ Evans, a victim of medical mal-
practice, brought suit against a malpractice insurer for bad faith 
failure to settle a claim.98 The physician, against whom the jury ren-
dered a $2.5 million verdict, assigned his claim against the insurer 
to Evans.99 The physician's policy limit was $1 million. loo The best of-
fer made by the insurer prior to trial was a high-low agreement of 
$400,000/$1,000,000. 101 
A question by plaintifrs counsel implying that a witness had as-
serted a claim for bad faith failure to settle against the defendant 
tarnished the first trial. 102 No such claim had been filed against or 
93. See Buck, 328 Md. at 62, 612 A.2d at 1299. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. at 62, 612 A.2d at 1299-1300. 
96. See id. 
97. 330 Md. 1, 622 A.2d 103 (1993). 
98. See id. at 5, 622 A.2d at 104. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
101. See id. at 13, 622 A.2d at 109. Under such an agreement, the plaintiff would re-
ceive no less than $400,000 and the defendant would have to pay no more 
than $1 ,000,000. See id. 
102. See id. at 14-15, 622 A.2d at 109. 
16 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
paid by the defendant. 103 As a result, the trial court declared a 
mistrial. 104 
At the second trial, the trial court empaneled a jury that in-
cluded ten women who were forty-years-old or younger. I05 The plain-
tiff's lawyer attempted to elicit testimony that the defendant's al-
leged bad faith failure to settle Evans's claim stemmed from 
personal animus between the witness and the plaintiff's counsel. 106 
To make his point, plaintiffs counsel questioned defendant's wit-
ness about a prior medical malpractice case, in which the plaintiff's 
lawyer represented a woman whose reproductive organs had been 
removed without her consent when she was twenty-eight years old. 107 
The plaintiff's lawyer demanded $300,000 to settle the case, to 
which the witness responded with an offer of $23,000.108 In the sub-
sequent trial, the jury awarded $1.4 million to the plaintiff-
$400,000 more than the doctor's coverage. I09 Accusations of the in-
surance company's bad faith were never adjudicated. IIO Medical Mu-
tual promptly moved for a mistrial which the trial court denied}1I 
The trial court also denied Medical Mutual's motion for a new 
trial. I 12 
Reversing the trial court's denial of the two motions,1I3 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland noted at the outset that appellate re-
view of the denial of a motion for mistrial-which was made on the 
same basis as the motion for new trial-is limited to determining 
whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge}14 
The court observed, however, that where there is a question of 
prejudice and a curative instruction rather than a mistrial is the 
remedy chosen by the trial court, the appellate court "must deter-
mine 'whether the evidence was so prejudicial that it denied the 
defendant a fair trial;' that is, whether 'the damage in the form of 
103. See id. at 15, 622 A2d at 109. 
104. See id. at 5, 622 A2d at 105. 
105. See id. at IS, 622 A2d at 110. 
106. See id. at 16-17, 622 A2d at 110 .. 11. The plaintiff began with a question to the 
witness: "Would it be fair to say, sir, that you and I have had some battles over 
the years, haven't we?" Id. at 16, 622 A2d at 110. 
107. See id. at 16-17, 622 A2d at 110. 
108. See id. at 17, 622 A2d at 110. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. at 18, 622 A2d at 111. 
Ill. See id. at 17 .. 18,622 A2d at Ill. 
112. See id. at 19, 622 A2d at Ill. 
113. See id. at 32, 622 A2d at 118. 
114. See id. at 19,622 A2d at 112. 
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prejudice to the defendant transcended the curative effect of the 
instruction. '" 115 
The court viewed the question as an improper inquiry into the 
witness's prior bad acts,l16 which would be admissible only if "the 
trial judge is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for such ques-
tioning, 'that the primary purpose of the inquiry is not to harass or 
embarrass the witness, and that there is little likelihood of obscur-
ing the issue on trial."'117 Even more fundamentally, however, the 
prior bad acts to which Evans's attorney referred were merely accu-
sations and never actually adjudicated}18 The court noted that 
"mere accusations of crime ... may not be used to impeach."119 
The court saw no basis to refer to payment of money above the pol-
icy limits on an assigned bad faith claim by another plaintiff when 
there had been no adjudication of bad faith.120 
The court underscored this conclusion with the apparent mo-
tives underlying the attorney's line of questioning. The implication 
of bad faith combined with a statement that the witness had under-
valued the unauthorized removal of a young woman's uterus before 
a jury made up largely of women of child-bearing age, suggested to 
the court that the primary purpose of the questioning was to harass 
the witness and to suggest that the defendant had "a parsimonious 
and insensitive reaction to an involuntary and irreversible steriliza-
tion of a young woman." 121 The court noted that the cross-
examination had been planned by the plaintiffs lawyer, in that he 
had the file from the earlier case at the time of the cross-
examination. 122 The Court of Appeals of Maryland found error in 
the trial court's denial of a mistrial and a new triaP23 because the 
prejudice to the defendant "transcended the curative instruction."124 
115. Id. at 19-20, 622 A2d at 1I2 (quoting Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 408, 614 
A2d 949, 953-54 (1992)(quoting Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 594, 560 A2d 
1137, 1141 (1989))). 
116. See id. at 20, 622 A2d at 112. 
117. Id. (quoting State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 179,468 A2d 319, 322 (1983». 
118. See id. at 20-21, 622 A2d at 112. 
119. Id. (quoting State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 179,468 A2d 319, 322 (1983) (internal 
quotation marks omitted». 
120. See id. 
121. Id. at 21-22, 622 A2d at 113. 
122. See id. at 24, 622 A2d at 114. Ultimately, the impropriety was in the failure of 
plaintiff's attorney to resolve the admissibility of the matter of the questioning 
in a motion in limine. See id. 
123. See id. at 24, 622 A2d at 114. 
124. Id. This instruction did not appear to address specifically the mischief of the 
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In one sense, Buck and Evans are inconsistent. Overturning a 
trial court's exercise of its discretion in the disposition of a motion 
for new trial, the Evans court took the same initiative that it had re-
versed in Buck.12s The effect of the purported misconduct appears 
to be the only point of departure between the two cases. In Buck, 
the trial and appellate courts seemingly believed that the prejudicial 
argument affected the weight of the evidence. The error of the 
court of special appeals was in placing so much weight on the fail-
ure to object; the possibility of prejudice in Buck was apparent only 
in hindsight once the verdict had been returned. That is often the 
case with inadequate or excessive verdicts. 
Although the court of appeals in Evans addressed the trial 
court's denial of the motion for a new trial, most of its analysis was 
directed at the failure to grant a mistrial. The Evans court empha-
sized that the trial court had stringently limited questioning with re-
spect to "bad acts"126 and that this limitation should have deterred 
the plaintiff's lawyer from engaging in the prejudicial line of ques-
tioning without warning. 127 The Evans court emphasized how the 
questions obfuscated the jury's consideration of the insurer's good 
faith-the jury sent twenty-two notes to the judge during the trial 
asking for guidance.128 
Unlike the Buck court, the court in Evans did not focus on the 
trial court's power with respect to the weight of the evidence. The 
court of appeals did not assess the size of the verdict. Thus, even 
where attorney misconduct is asserted as a prejudicial o<;currence, if 
the overriding issue with respect to new trial is the weight of the ev-
idence, Evans does not appear to limit the broad scope of trial 
court discretion that Buck reaffirmed. If the purported misconduct 
is so severe that it would have called for a mistrial, the trial judge'S 
generally broad power to deny a mistrial will not shield from appel-
late scrutiny his or her refusal to set aside the verdict or abort the 
trial. Generally, the prejudicial occurrence that takes the inquiry 
out of the realm simply of whether the verdict is against the weight 
offending conduct at all; it simply required the jurors to decide the case 
"based on the evidence presented and do that with impartiality, devoid of 
prejudice, and with fairness to both sides." [d. at 18-19 n.13, 622 A.2d at III 
n.13. 
125. For a discussion of Buck, see supra notes 71-96 and accompanying text. 
126. Evans, 330 Md. at 20-22, 622 A.2d at 112-13. 
127. See itl. at 18, 622 A.2d at 111. 
128. See itl. at 22-23, 622 A.2d at 113. 
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of the evidence must be severe in nature. 129 
C. Juror Misconduct 
The scope of the trial judge's power with respect to motion for 
a new trial in the case of alleged juror misconduct reflects a mesh-
ing of three policy considerations. The first is that the verdict must 
be based upon the evidence in the case considered in the manner 
instructed by the court. l30 The second is that jurors are not permit-
ted to impeach their verdict. 131 The third is that when juror miscon-
duct serves as the basis for a motion for new trial or mistrial, Mary-
land courts have mandated that: 
The better rule in such cases would seem to be that such 
questions be left to the sound discretion of the trial court, 
whose decision should only be disturbed in those cases 
where there has been a plain abuse of discretion, resulting 
in palpable injustice. Especially should this be true in cases 
where there is conflict of evidence as to whether the act 
constituting the alleged misconduct in fact occurred.132 
The second policy, that against jurors impeaching their own 
verdicts, has the salubrious effect of insulating verdicts from attack 
in that the most obvious weapon is taken from the hands of the at-
tacker. Although trial judges have been implored to consider juror 
affidavits many times in reported decisions, they have resisted and 
been upheld. 133 Trial courts do have discretion in assessing the ef-
fects of juror misconduct where there is evidence other than juror 
129. The court of appeals has indicated that a showing of "grave error [or] lack of 
due process" requires appellate reversal of denial of a new trial when there 
has been prejudicial argument. Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Smith, 222 Md. 206, 221, 
159 A.2d 823, 831 (1960). Such a standard allows a great deal of latitude to 
the trial court in deciding motions for new trial based on rhetorical excess of 
counsel. See id. As to motions for new trial based on prejudicial occurrences 
other than those occasioned by improper impeachment evidence or inflam-
matory argument, it is clear that one who would urge error in a trial court's 
denial of a new trial must demonstrate prejudice from such occurrence. See 
Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Racine, 234 Md. 250, 253-54, 198 A.2d 898, 899 (1964) 
(determining that the loss of stenographer's notes of trial did not require a 
new trial absent showing of prejudice of such loss to movant). 
130. See Western Md. Dairy Corp. v. Brown, 169 Md. 257, 268, 181 A. 468, 473-74 
(1935) . 
131. See Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 101, 447 A.2d 860, 870 (1982). 
132. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 163 Md. 401, 409, 163 A. 702, 
705-06 (1933). 
133. See, e.g., Oxwby, 294 Md. at 102, 447 A.2d. at 870. 
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testimony. In such cases the third policy prevails and the trial judges 
have had broad discretion. 
The rationale for the Maryland rule with respect to impeach-
ment of a verdict through juror testimony was elaborated by Judge 
Archer in Bosley v. ChesapeoJte Insurance CO:I34 
[W]ere the law different, an inquisition might be instituted 
in every case, into the grounds and motives of a jury for 
their finding, in order to ascertain whether, in coming to 
given conclusions, they had not mistaken facts. Verdicts of 
juries, would then in all cases be uncertain. To permit such 
inquisition into the motives of juries, would it appears to 
me, be against public policy, and lead more frequently to 
the prostration of justice, than to its preservation. 135 
There is no reason to believe, in this age when the multimillion 
dollar verdict has become commonplace, that importuning tactics of 
disappointed litigants and their counsel would be any less sophisti-
cated or insidious than those of the early nineteenth century. Thus, 
Maryland has consisten tly reaffirmed the preclusion of juror testi-
mony in support of allegations of juror misconduct and denied mo-
tions for a new trial based upon this evidence. '36 
Where there is evidence of juror misconduct other than the 
testimony of the jurors themselves, such evidence may be consid-
ered in deciding a motion for new trial. 137 The decisions that have 
allowed consideration of matters other than juror testimony in eval-
uating potential juror misconduct indicate that the trial court has 
broad discretion in determining whether such evidence warrants a 
new trial. 138 The standard applied by the appellate courts in decid-
134. 3 G. &J. 450 (1831). 
135. [d. at 473. 
136. See Christ v. Wempe, 219 Md. 627, 641, 150 A.2d 918, 925 (1959) (noting that 
the rule that a juror cannot be heard to impeach his or her verdict is well set-
tled in Maryland); Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 10l'()2, 447 A2d at 870 (holding that a 
juror cannot be heard to impeach his or her verdict even where there is evi-
dence of juror misconduct); Braun v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Md. App. 545, 551, 
363 A.2d 562, 566 (1976) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying a motion for a new trial where juror misconduct was alleged). 
137. See Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 101'()2, 447 A2d at 870; Christ, 219 Md. at 642, 150 A2d 
at 926. 
138. See, e.g., Wemsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 420, 470 A2d 802, 
809 (1984) ("It is the function of the trial judge when ruling on a motion for 
a new trial to evaluate the degree of probable prejudice and whether it justi-
fies a new trial. That judgment will not be disturbed but for an abuse of dis-
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ing whether a trial court has abused its discretion assures that such 
discretion is broad. 139 
Wernsing v. General Motors Corp.14O is the leading case addressing 
the motion for new trial on the basis of juror misconduct relying on 
evidence other than juror testimony. Although the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland reversed the trial court's disposition of a motion for 
new trial, 141 Wernsing demonstrates the breadth of the trial court's 
discretion in such circumstances. 
In Wernsing, the plaintiff was injured when she was pinned be-
tween two automobiles, her own and that of one of the defendants, 
Howard Seidel. 142 The Seidel vehicle lurched forward when he 
moved the gear shift from "park" to "drive."143 The injured plaintiff 
and her two children sued Seidel, GeneralMotors (GMC) , the man-
ufacturer, and the dealer who had sold the Seidel vehicle. l44 
GMC and the dealer contended that there was no defect in the 
Seidel vehicle at the time of the plaintiff's injury and that the occur-
rence was caused by Seidel's negligent driving. 145 With respect to 
strict liability on the part of GMC and the dealer, the trial court in-
structed the jury that the plaintiffs were required to prove "that the 
[vehicle] was in an unreasonably dangerous condition when sold 
and that the defective condition was a proximate cause of the acci-
dent."I46 The plaintiffs won verdicts against the defendants jointly 
and, after the plaintiffs accepted remittiturs, the trial court denied 
the defendants' motion for new trial. 147 In review, the court of a~ 
peals first assessed the propriety of the evidence offered by defend-
ants in support of the new triaJ148 and, second, the degree of 
prejudice from such misconduct that such evidence must show to 
require a new trial. 149 
The alleged misconduct involved the jury's use of a dictionary 
to determine the meaning of "proximate cause," a term used in the 
cretion."). 
139. See ill. 
140. 298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984). 
141. See ill. at 420, 470 A.2d at 809. 
142. See ill. at 408, 470 A.2d at 803. 
143. See ill. 
144. See ill. 
145. See ill. at 409, 470 A.2d at 803. 
146. Id. at 410, 470 A.2d at 804 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
147. See ill. The court of special appeals, on the basis of juror misconduct, reversed 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for new trial. See ill. 
148. See ill. 
149. See id. at 414-15, 470 A.2d at 806. 
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trial court's instructions. ISO Two events occurred during jury deliber-
ations: the jury foreman sent a note to the judge requesting a defi-
nition of proximate cause and the foreman obtained a dictionary 
from the bailiff.lsl The trial judge defined proximate cause as "legal 
cause. "IS2 On the back of the note signed by the judge were long-
hand notes of the foreman containing a reference to a page in the 
dictionary the bailiff provided and a definition of "legal" as "having 
a formal status derived from law often without basis in actual 
fact. "153 
In addition to these notes and the dictionary, the defendant 
submitted affidavits of jurors and testimony from the bailiff who 
provided the dictionary.154 Denying the motion for a new trial, the 
trial court observed that allowing jurors to overturn their verdicts by 
post-trial affidavits would "create havoc."155 In so deciding, however, 
the court failed to differentiate between the juror affidavits and 
other evidence of juror misconduct. ls6 The court of appeals consid-
ered only the jury notes and the testimony of the bailiff in deter-
mining if the trial judge abused his discretion. ls7 
The court rejected the Wernsings' contention that prejudice 
could be shown only by demonstrating that one or more jurots 
were influenced by "legally incorrect matter found in a diction-
ary."158 Such a standard could not be met because Maryland law 
precludes direct evidence of the effect of the extraneous matter on 
juror deliberations. ls9 The court concluded that the trial judge was 
required to evaluate the degree of probable prejudice from the ex-
traneous matter. 160 
The court of appeals viewed the foreman's notes as demonstrat-
ing that at least one juror understood proximate cause as not re-
150. See id. at 408-10, 470 A.2d at 80~. 
151. See id. at 413-14, 470 A.2d at 806. The bailiff was uncertain as to whether the 
jury first requested the dictionary or asked the judge for the definition of 
proximate cause. See id. 
152. See id. at 413, 470 A.2d at 806. 
153. [d. at 414, 470 A.2d at 806. 
154. See id. at 410-11,470 A.2d at 804. A bystander's affidavit was also utilized at the 
hearing on the motion for new trial. See id. 
155. [d. at 414, 470 A.2d at 806. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. [d. at 418, 470 A.2d at 808. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. at 419-20, 470 A.2d at 809. 
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quiring a basis in fact. 161 Such an approach "[ w] ould mean that all 
of the evidence, including expert opinions, in this protracted and 
complex products liability case would have been disregarded."162 
The court held that the degree of probable prejudice from such cir-
cumstances was so great that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a 
new trial. 163 
At the time Wernsing was decided, it might have been con-
tended that the court based its analysis of prejudice on the 
probability that the jury considered the extraneous matter, rather 
than the probability that such matter actually had a prejudicial ef-
fect on the outcome. l64 Such a standard would likely deprive the 
trial court of the power to assess the effects of potentially prejudi-
cial influences under the circumstances and require that certain ex-
traneous influences automatically require a new trial. Later deci-
sions demonstrate that Wernsing has not so limited a trial judge's 
discretion. 
The most significant such decision is Harford Sands, Inc. v. 
Groft.165 In that case, Harford's sand pit was flooded when some 
youngsters breached a dam that contained a holding pond above 
the pit. l66 The sand pit became a lake and, according to the plain-
tiff, was unsuitable for sand mining. 167 The plaintiff also claimed 
that it was unable to afford repairs for the flooded pit and that it 
had to procure sand from another source, causing additional finan-
cial 10SS.168 The main issue at trial was whether the plaintiff could 
have avoided most of the alleged harm from the defendants' mis-
deeds through prompt repairs at a reasonable cost. l69 The jury re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $4,000 rather 
than the $1.1 million plaintiff sought. 170 
161. See ill. at 420, 470 A.2d at 809. 
162. [d. 
163. See ill. 
164: This is demonstrated by the court's quoting of a New Jersey intermediate ap-
pellate decision involving a dictionary, albeit by then Judge William J. Bren-
nan, which appeared to require a new trial if the extraneous matter on its 
face "could have a tendency to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a 
manner inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court's charge." Palestroni 
v. Jacobs, 77 A.2d 183, 185 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1950). 
165. 320 Md. 136, 577 A.2d 7 (1990). 
166. See id. at 139, 577 A.2d at 8. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. at 13940, 577 A.2d at 8. 
169. See ill. at 140, 577 A.2d at 9. 
170. See ill. at 138, 577 A.2d at 8. 
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The alleged juror misconduct in Harford Sands was a conversa-
tion by a juror with construction workers about the subject matter 
of expert testimony during the trial. 171 During the testimony of the 
plaintiff's expert, the judge advised counsel that he had received a 
note from a juror inquiring about the feasibility of using a concrete 
pumping machine from the service road to repair the dam. l72 The 
attorney asked the witness whether that might have been done.173 
The witness testified that using a concrete pumping machine would 
not have been feasible because the breach was "five hundred feet or 
something" from the service road. 174 At the end of the expert's testi-
mony, the court admonished the jury: 
[0] nce you get this case for deliberation your decision is to 
be based solely on the evidence presented to you from both 
sides. 
You are not to infuse· your own ideas of any knowledge you 
may have of construction or storm water management or 
sediment control. It is only to be based upon the evidence 
that is presented . . . through the various witnesses. 175 
At the hearing in support of a motion for a new trial, the plain-
tiff submitted affidavits from Caroll O'Keefe, the juror who spent a 
luncheon break during the trial at a nearby construction site and 
the two construction workers with whom he spoke. 176 The plaintiff 
also produced affidavits from a spectator at the trial, with whom 
O'Keefe also spoke, and plaintifIs trial counsel who claimed that 
O'Keefe admitted his conversations with construction workers to 
him. 177 
The construction workers testified that O'Keefe spoke with 
them about concrete pumping machines. 178 One stated that he told 
O'Keefe that they could be used to pump concrete laterally over 
half a mile. 179 The plaintifIs trial counsel stated that O'Keefe told 
him after trial that he disregarded the opinion of the plaintifIs ex-
pert about the cost of repairing the dam because of what the con-
171. See itt. at 14041, 577 A.2d at 9. 
172. See itt. at 140, 577 A.2d at 9. 
173. See itt. 
174. [d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
175. [d. at 141, 577 A.2d at 9. 
176. See itt. at 14143, 577 A.2d at 9-10. 
177. See itt. 
178. See itt. at 142, 577 A.2d at 10. 
179. See itt. 
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struction workers had told him. ISO The spectator swore that O'Keefe 
told her that he was "the strongest member of the jury" and he had 
"convinced the other jurors what the 'real' facts were."181 
The trial court accepted only the affidavits of the construction 
workers in connection with the motion for a new trial. I82 The court 
determined that the Wernsing test required it to determine "whether 
there [was] a probability of prejudice from the juror misconduct. "183 
The court denied the plaintiff's motion on the basis that it could 
not infer that the jury as a whole disregarded "their obligations to 
decide the case based solely upon the evidence" from the fact that 
one juror talked to someone about a pumping machine. l84 
Before the court of appeals, the plaintiff depicted O'Keefe as 
having spun a "web of deceit" on the basis of his hostility to the 
plaintiff's theory of the case. 18S It is admittedly difficult to imagine 
many things more corrosive of the fairness of the jury process than 
the lunchtime sleuthing of O'Keefe. The court of appeals agreed 
that the knowledge O'Keefe obtained might have discredited the 
plaintiff's expert and that if one or more jurors had employed this 
information, "it would have had a serious effect on the plaintiff's 
case." 186 To this point the juror misconduct appeared to present the 
same threat to the fairness of the trial that the dictionary had done 
in Wernsing: the threat that vital expert testimony would be 
rejected.187 
The court of appeals seized upon two critical differences be-
tween WernsinK 88 and Harford Sands in holding that the trial court 
had not abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. I89 
The first was that in Harford Sands, it was not possible to determine 
that O'Keefe had employed the fruits of his investigation in jury de-
liberations without resort to his affidavit or the testimony of those 
who spoke with him after the trial about his deliberations. l90 Consid-
180. See ill. 
181. Id. at 142-43, 577 A2d at 10. 
182. See ill. at 143, 577 A2d at 10. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. See ill. 
186. Id. at 148-49, 577 A2d at 10. 
187. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. 
188. For a discussion of Wernsing, see supra notes 141-164 and accompanying text. 
189. See Harford Sands, 320 Md. at 150, 577 A2d at 13. 
190. See id. at 144, 577 A.2d at 11. 
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eration of such evidence was not permitted. 191 In Wernsing, there was 
permissible evidence that at least one juror had used the extraneous 
dictionary evidence in deliberations-the note of the juror. 192 
Secondly, the Harford Sands court found considerable indica-
tion in the record that it was not extraneous matter that led the 
jury in Harford Sands to decide as it did. 193 The supposedly discred-
ited witness also testified that soil conditions on the dam were such 
that concrete would not have been usable to repair the breach. l94 
The court reviewed other evidence that cast doubt on the plaintiff's 
own estimate of its losses.195 In light of this other evidence, the 
court of appeals was unable to conclude that the concrete pump in-
formation probably resulted in prejudice to the plaintiff. 196 
On one level, the distinction between Harford Sands and 
Wemsing is difficult to grasp. The critical difference between the two 
cases-the demonstration in Wernsing of the probability of 
prejudice-hinged on the circumstantial evidence in Wernsing that a 
juror resorted to extraneous material in deliberations. 197 Compari-
son of the two cases, however, demonstrates the firmness of the rule 
against upsetting jury verdicts based on juror testimony. The "exis-
tence of other evidence of actual jury consideration of improper 
matter, something which is not likely to be encountered very often, 
can reduce the scope of the trial judge'S discretion. The trial judge 
will not be overturned, however, when there is only a possibility of 
improper influence on the verdict by extraneous matter. 19B 
This is underscored by the decision of the court of special ap-
peals in Smith v. Pearre. l99 In Smith, the estate of a decedent who had 
died of cancer sought recovery for medical malpractice.2°O The 
defendant doctor conducted only a lower gastrointestinal (GI) ex-
191. See ill. at 144-45, 577 A.2d at 11. 
192. See ill. at 144-45, 577 A.2d at 11-12. The court in Wemsing had stated that re-
sort to this note in reviewing the trial court's denial of the new trial was per-
missible because it was generated during the jury's deliberations and thus did 
not "suffer the taint of possible post-verdict importuning." Wernsing v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406,413,470 A.2d 802, 805 (1984). 
193. See Harford Sands, 320 Md. at 149-50, 577 A.2d at 13. 
194. See ill. at 149, 577 A.2d at 13. 
195. See ill. at 149-50, 577 A.2d at 13. 
196. See ill. at 150, 577 A.2d at 13. 
197. See ill. at 150, 577 A.2d at 11; see also supra notes 141-63 and accompanying 
text. 
198. See Harford Sands, 320 Md. at 150, 577 A.2d at 13. 
199. 96 Md. App. 376, 625 A.2d 349 (1993). 
200. See ill. at 38~ I, 625 A.2d at 351. 
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amination on the decedent in 1988 and had not found any trace of 
cancer.20t In 1989, when the decedent suffered a recurrence of rec-
tal bleeding, an upper GI revealed untreatable cancer that might 
have been detected, and therefore treated, had an upper GI been 
performed in 1988.202 
Mter a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff moved for a new 
trial, relying in part on a post-verdict telephone survey of the jury 
that suggested some impropriety.203 Contrary to the admonitions of 
the trial judge, the jury foreman watched a "60 Minutes" segment 
that suggested that the possibility of litigation pressured doctors to 
perform unnecessary medical tests.204 On the motion for a new trial, 
the plaintiff argued that "the statements made during the program 
would apply as a defense and as an excuse for not performing an 
upper GI series. "205 Analogizing the situation to that in Harford 
Sands,2')6 the trial court concluded that there was no evidence that 
the juror in Smith took the "60 Minutes" segment to mean that the 
tests the defendant did not perform were unnecessary.207 The court 
was not convinced that the plaintiff had been prejudiced because 
there was only a possibility that the juror had been influenced by 
the segment.2OS 
It is clear that Harford Sands and Smith set out the scope of dis-
cretion possessed by the trial judge with respect to a motion for 
new trial based on j'uror misconduct.209 Wernsing's reversal of the 
trial judge's action210 in such a case simply represents a tempering 
of the general rule to circumstances in which evidence that is usu-
ally unavailable demonstrates a probability of prejudice. 
D. Newly Discovered Evidence 
Maryland appellate courts have established guidelines that a 
trial court must observe in deciding a motion for new trial. It is 
clear that there are circumstances in which a trial court is virtually 
compelled to set aside a judgment or verdict based on newly discov-
201. See itl, 
202. See itl. 
203. See itl. at 389-91, 625 A.2d at 355-58. 
204. See itl. 
205. [d. at 390, 625 A2d at 356 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
206. See itl. 
207. See itl. at 391, 625 A2d at 356. 
208. See itl. 
209. See supra notes 165-208 and accompanying text. 
210. See supra notes 141-64 and accompanying text. 
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ered evidence.211 It is somewhat less clear, however, that Maryland's 
appellate courts would ever be willing to reverse the grant of a new 
trial based solely on newly discovered evidence. 
The actual proffer of the newly discovered evidence constitutes 
the baseline for trial courts with respect to motions for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence.212 Maryland courts have not 
viewed this requirement as a limit on a trial court's discretion but 
rather as an element of the exercise of discretion to which parties 
have a legal right.2J3 A trial court's consideration of this new evi-
dence in disposing of a motion for a new trial is governed by five 
requirements established by the court of special appeals: 
(1) the evidence was discovered since the trial; (2) there 
was diligence in attempting to discover the evidence on the 
part of the movant; (3) the evidence relied on is not cumu-
lative or impeaching; (4) it is material to the issues in-
volved; and (5) on a new trial, the newly discovered evi-
dence would probably produce a different result.214 
If a party seeking a new trial was aware of evidence capable of 
yielding a different result and failed to exploit it, such evidence may 
not be the basis of a new trial because the evidence was not discov-
ered after the trial.215 Likewise, a document ·that a party had in its 
custody, but did not discover before trial, may not serve as the basis 
for the grant of a new triaPl6 Evidence that simply contradicts testi-
mony, even perjured testimony,217 or impeaches the opponent's evi-
211. See Buck v. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 58, 612 A.2d 1294, 1297 
(1992) (stating that a motion for new trial should be granted if newly discov-
ered evidence indicates that the jury has been misled, a different result would 
have been reached, or certain information should not have been admitted 
into evidence). 
212. See id. 
213. See Browne v. Browne, 22 Md. 103, 112 (1864) (noting that a party has a legal 
right to the proffer of newly discovered evidence). 
214. Market Tavern, Inc. v. Bowen, 92 Md. App. 622, 649, 610 A.2d 295, 309 (1992). 
215. See Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. S.M.A., Inc., 59 Md. App. 136, 148, 474 
A.2d 950, 956 (1984) (holding that evidence known to the insurer before trial 
is not newly discovered evidence and is not a basis for granting a new trial). 
216. See Maryland Coal & Realty Co. v. Eckhart, 25 Md. App. 605, 616-17, 347 A.2d 
150, 157 (1975) (holding that a document accidently discovered in the party's 
own vault did not support the grant of a new trial). 
217. See Wilmer v. Placide, 127 Md. 339, 34243, 96 A. 621, 622 (1915) (concluding 
that peIjured testimony will not support the grant of a new trial). 
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dence21s may not be the basis for a new trial.219 These requirements 
underscore the strong policy "that there be an end to litigation. "220 
As the court of appeals stated long ago: "It is a salutary principle of 
law, that every person is bound to take care of and protect his own 
rights and interests, and to vindicate them in due season, and in 
the proper place."221 
There are instances, however, when the newly discovered evi-
dence is not simply cumulative, contradicting, or impeaching, and 
in which the policy of ending litigation must yield. When the newly 
discovered evidence probably would have produced a different re-
sult in the first trial, assuming the other requirements for granting 
a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence are met, the 
trial court must grant the new trial.222 
Such a rule assumes that the appellate courts possess the power 
to reverse a trial court when it does not grant a new trial in such 
circumstances. Given the historically broad scope of discretion exer-
cised by trial courts in disposing of new trial motions, the Maryland 
appellate courts' power cannot be lightly assumed. Formerly, appel-
late review of a trial court's disposition of a motion for a new trial 
was permitted only when the action of the trial court was viewed as 
depriving the movant for a new trial of some substantial right.223 
This deference regard~d the trial court's discretion as "a high pre-
rogative to be exercised for the purpose of assuring a sound, cor-
rect, and impartial judicial trial. "224 To allow an exercise of such dis-
cretion to overlook a patently wrong result would entail overlooking 
the purpose for reposing such discretion in the trial judge. 
The leading case of this sort is Washington, Baltimore & Annaptr 
lis Electric Railroad Co. v. Kimmey.225 In that case, Kimmey sued a 
218. See Gott v. Carr, 6 G. &J. 309, 315 (1834) (holding that a new trial may not be 
granted merely for the purpose of giving a party the opportunity to impeach a 
witness' testimony). 
219. See id.; supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text. 
220. Wilmer, 127 Md. at 341, 96 A. at 622 (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY. JR.. 6 
POMEROY'S EQuIlY JURISPRUDENCE § 649 (1905». 
221. Cott, 6 G. & J. at 312. 
222. See Market Tavern, Inc. v. Bowen, 92 Md. App. 622, 649, 610 A.2d 295, 309 
(1992) (noting that in order to grant a motion for a new trial, the newly dis-
covered evidence "would probably produce a different result"). 
223. See State ex reL Scruggs v. Baltimore Transit Co., 177 Md. 451, 454-55, 9 A.2d 
753, 754 (1939) (noting that appellate review is only available where a party 
was denied a substantial right). 
224. Id. at 454, 9 A.2d at 754. 
225. 141 Md. 243, 118 A. 648 (1922). 
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streetcar company for injuries allegedly suffered in a derailment.226 
She contended that an injury to the side of her body-allegedly 
caused when the defendant's streetcar derailed-resulted in fre-
quently recurring uterine hemorrhages.227 The jury returned a ver-
dict for $13,500.228 The defendant moved for a new trial the day the 
jury rendered its verdict,229 relying on affidavits and deposition testi-
mony to argue that the plaintiff's medical condition antedated the 
occurrence at issue in the suit.230 A woman who shared a hospital 
room with Kimmey stated that the plaintiff's uterine bleeding pre-
ceded the occurrence.231 A matron of the barracks at Camp Meade, 
Maryland, where the plaintiff lived, attributed Kimmey's condition 
to the collapse of a building in Albany, New York where she once 
worked.232 The plaintiff's former employer explained that his firm 
compensated the plaintiff with respect to that occurrence to settle a 
suit for damages.233 Two doctors noted that they had determined 
that the plaintiff experienced uterine bleeding before the derail-
ment of defendant's streetcar.234 The defendant offered evidence at 
the hearing on the motion for a new trial as to why it did not pro-
cure such testimony for use at trial.235 The defendant provided am-
ple evidence, two months after trial, that the plaintiff was probably 
using the derailment as a pretext to recover a second time for inju-
ries that resulted from a previous occurrence.236 
Whether even to consider this evidence was a point of depar-
ture between the appellate and trial courts. The trial court granted 
a motion ne mcipiatur as to the affidavits because the defendant had 
failed to timely notify the plaintiff of its intention to use the affida-
vits and depositions.237 The appellate court determined that, at the 
hearing on the new trial, the plaintiff waived any objections to lack 
226. See id. at 245, 118 A. at 648. 
227. See id. 
228. See id. at 245, 118 A. at 649. 
229. See id. at 247, 118 A. at 649. 
230. See id. 
231. See id. at 247, 118 A. at 649-50. 
232. See id. at 24748, 118 A. at 650. 
233. See id. at 248, 118 A. at 650. 
234. See id. 
235. See id. The decision does not indicate what this evidence of due diligence was. 
236. See id. 
237. See id. Ne recipiatuT literally translates to mean "that it be not received." 
BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1040 (6th ed. 1990). It is "a caveat or warning given 
to a law officer, by a party in a cause not to receive the next proceedings of 
his opponent." [d. 
1998] The Motion for New 1iial 31 
of proper notice of submission of the defendant's affidavits.238 Fo-
cusing on Kimmey's "virtual assent" to the defendant's use of the 
testimony and affidavits, the appellate court concluded that Kimmey 
had waived her right to notice.239 
The court of appeals determined that if the trial court had felt 
free to consider the affidavits, "it is hardly conceivable that a new 
trial would have been refused. "240 The court continued: 
[I] t would be plainly unjust to permit a verdict to stand, as 
against an application for a new trial seasonably made, if 
credible evidence, competent to be considered, and not 
previously discoverable by due diligence, supported the con-
clusion that the jury were misled as to a principal part of 
their award.241 
The court of appeals acknowledged the rule that the disposition of 
a trial court of a motion for new trial, at that time, could not be 
overturned on appeaJ.242 Focusing instead on the exclusion of the 
defendant's evidence offered in support of the new trial, the court 
avoided this conundrum.243 The court concluded that the trial 
court's' discretion and judgment should have been influenced by 
this evidence244 and that the defendant was entitled to have them 
given due probative effect.245 
The court insisted that the appeal was not from the order over-
ruling the motion for new trial, but rather from the judgment ren-
dered after a new trial was refused, and the exclusion of the 
defendant's new evidence constituted the grounds for the appeaJ.246 
In a sense, however, the court ruled on the motion for a new trial 
238. See Kimmey, 141 Md. at 249, 118 A at 650. 
239. See id. The trial court explained: 
[d. 
At the time of the presentation, in open court, of the depositions we 
have mentioned, no objection was made to them on the ground 
about to be noticed. In fact, there was a virtual assent to their admis-
sion. They were treated on both sides and by the court, during the 
greater part of the time occupied by the hearings, as being regularly 
in the case for the purposes for which they were offered. 
240. [d. at 250, 118 A at 650. 
241. [d. 
242. See id. 
243. See id. at 251-52, 118 A at 651. 
244. See id. 
245. See id. at 252, 118 A at 651. 
246. See id. 
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when it held that the trial court's action "deprived the court of the 
only available means of exercising a sound discretion" in deciding 
whether to order a new triaP47 The court held that this prejudiced 
the defendant's rights.248 
The circumlocution of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in ra-
tionalizing its unquestionable reversal of the disposition of a trial 
court of a motion for new trial is no longer necessary.249 The court 
has recognized that its past statements, that disposition of motions 
for a new trial are effectively unreviewable, were too broad.2so To-
day, Maryland appellate courts review the disposition of a motion 
for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard.2S1 While this 
standard is a relatively heightened standard, the abuse of discretion 
standard is not a strict standard of review. In light of this change of 
heart regarding the appealability of the disposition of a new trial 
motion, it would seem that it is unnecessary to find deprivation of a 
substantial right of the aggrieved party or to assert that the subject 
of the appeal is the judgment the court refuses to set aside when it 
denies a new trial motion. Therefore, stripped of thorny procedural 
issues, Kimmey stands for the proposition that a trial judge's discre-
tion is very narrow in deciding a motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence when the motion is supported by new ev-
idence presented with due diligence which, had it been used at 
trial, would have produced a different result.2S2 
The trial court's narrowed discretion is underscored by the only 
other Maryland appellate decision setting aside a trial judge's dispo-
sition of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evi-
dence, Angell v. Just. 2S3 Involving a petition for determination of pa-
ternity and for child support, AngeU concerned whether Linda Just 
and Roy Angell had engaged in sexual relations on a specific day in 
1971 in Angell's pickup truck.2S4 The petitioner "repeatedly and per-
247. Id. 
248. See id. 
249. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
250. See Buck v. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 59, 612 A.2d 1294, 1298 
(1992) (noting that in the past, the court's rule of refusing to review all new 
trial motions was too broad). 
251. See, e.g., Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600, 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984) (noting 
that the standard of review for a denial of a motion for a new trial is abuse of 
discretion by the trial judge). 
252. See supra notes 23748 and accompanying text. 
253. 22 Md. App. 43, 321A.2d 830 (1974). 
254. See id. at 44, 321 A.2d at 831-32. 
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sistently" testified on direct and cross-examination that the child's 
conception took place in the truck on that date.255 Angell denied 
having sexual relations with the petitioner on the 1971 date or at 
any time after 1963.256 The trial court found the petitioner to be a 
credible witness and declared the respondent to be father of peti-
tioner's child.2S7 
Angell subsequently filed for a rehearing,258 arguing that he was 
unaware that the petitioner would testify to the parties having had 
intercourse in the truck on the date in question.2S9 He further testi-
fied that his truck was at a repair shop on the date in question and 
proffered an invoice for such repairs.260 The trial court denied the 
respondent's petition for rehearing, determining that the proffered 
evidence constituted "impeachment on a collateral matter" and, 
thus, was an inadequate basis upon which to grant a rehearing.261 
As had the Kimmey court, the court in Angell acknowledged the 
scope of discretion of the trial court with respect to a new trial mo-
tion, noting that "[ t] he action of the trial court upon such motion 
will not be disturbed on appeal except under the most compelling 
and extraordinary circumstances."262 However, unlike Kimmey, the 
Angell court sought for compelling and extraordinary circumstances 
to overcome the trial court's exercise of its discretion.263 
The court did not believe that the respondent's proffered evi-
dence pertained to collateral matters.264 The court of special appeals 
noted that had Just been uncertain about the date and location of 
conception, the proffered evidence might be collateral because such 
evidence would not have rebutted an inference that intercourse 
might have taken place between the parties at some other time and 
place.265 The petitioner herself refuted this possible inference by tes-
255. See id. at 49, 321 A.2d at 834. The court of special appeals noted that she testi-
fied that the date was her birthday. See id. As to the truck, the court noted el-
liptically that such was "a locale about which she could not have been mis-
taken, given her long acquaintance with Mr. Angell and her ample 
opportunity for observation." Id. 
256. See id. 
257. See id. at 4546, 321 A.2d at 832. 
258. See id. at 46, 321 A.2d at 832. 
259. See id. 
260. See id. 
261. Id. at 46, 321 A.2d at 832-33. 
262. Id. at 47, 321 A.2d at 833. 
263. See id. 
264. See id. 
265. See id. at 49, 321 A.2d at 834. 
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tifying that the conception occurred on a specific day and at a spe-
cific place; the evi<;lence proffered by the respondent refuted the 
petitioner's only claim as to time and place of conception.266 Be-
cause the proffered evidence would demonstrate that Just's entire 
story Was untrue, the court regarded the evidence as material rather 
than collateral. 267 
The court then cited Kimmey for the proposition that newly dis-
covered evidence directly contradicting material facts presented by a 
witness and "which, if believed, would probably require a different 
result," constitutes a basis for a new triaJ.268 Stated thus, the rule 
permits the trial court to grant a new trial. The court concluded 
that .. [u] nder the established rules or principles relating to the 
grant of a rehearing or new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence," and because the proffered evidence was not cumulative 
or merely impeaching, Angell was entitled to a rehearing.269 Invok-
ing Kimmey, the court stated: 
[I] t would be plainly unjust to permit a verdict to stand as 
against a timely application for new trial, if credible evi-
dence competent to be considered and not previously dis-
coverable by due diligence supported the conclusion that 
the trier of fact was misled as to the gravamen of the 
case.270 
Acknowledging the requirement that it find an abuse of discretion 
to reverse the trial court's disposition, the court of special appeals 
used the same fig leaf to mask the net effect of its action employed 
in Kimmey-it treated the denial of the rehearing as the denial of a 
substantial right to the respondent.271 
266. See id. 
267. See id. 
268. [d. at 50, 321 A.2d at 835. 
269. [d. at 55, 321 A.2d at 837. 
270. [d. at 55-56, 321 A2d at 838. 
271. See id. at 56, 321 A.2d at 838. In comparison, the appellate court in AngeU re-
versed the trial court's exercise of its discretion more directly than had the 
Kimmey court. In Kimmey, the error of the trial court was in not receiving evi-
dence which the court of appeals assumed would have caused the trial court 
to reach a different result. See Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Elec. R.R. 
Co., v. Kimmey, 141 Md. 243, 24348, 118 A. 648, 648-50 (1922). In Angell, the 
court of special appeals specifically found error in the denial of the motion 
for new trial itself. See Angell, 22 Md. App. at 55, 321 A.2d at 837. The court 
concluded that .. [w] e believe that discretion cannot be characterized as sound 
which improperly regards newly discovered evidence by which its exercise should 
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Two other leading Maryland decisions that involve a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence re-affirm the narrowness of the 
trial court's discretion when properly proffered evidence indicates 
that a mistake underlies a judgment or verdict. Bailey v. Bailef72 in-
volved a divorce based on the husband's alleged adultery.273 At the 
conclusion of the trial, the circuit court noted that it would grant 
the wife an absolute divorce, allowing permanent alimony and 
counsel fees.274 The husband petitioned the court for a rehearing to 
present the testimony of his alleged mistress, Madeline Moltz,275 and 
evidence that he was not in Baltimore, the place of the alleged 
adultery,· on the date that the adultery allegedly occurred.276 
The wife's private detective and bro.ther testified at the petition 
hearing that the husband engaged in intercourse with Ms. Moltz in 
his automobile on October 14, 1944277 and November 2, 1944.278 
The husband offered strong testimony from a number of witnesses 
that his car was stuck in the mud in Frederick County on the eve-
ning of October 14, 1944 and that, owing to foggy conditions, he 
was not able to return to Baltimore until after the time of the al-
leged adultery.279 Moltz testified that her relationship with· the hus-
band was limited to car-pooling required by wartime gasoline ration-
ing.280 A fellow co-worker, who also traveled with the husband to 
work, testified that there was no sexual relationship between the 
twO.281 
have been aided." fd. at 56-57, 321 A.2d at 838 (emphasis added). 
272. 186 Md. 76, 46 A.2d 275 (1946). 
273. See id. at 78, 46 A.2d at 275. Although the plaintiff alleged multiple grounds 
for divorce, the circuit court granted an absolute divorce solely for adultery. 
See itI. 
274. See id. A decree was filed accordingly two days later. See itI. 
275. See id. at 78-79, 46 A.2d at 275. The husband argued that there was no allega-
tion naming Ms. Moltz as a correspondent in the complaint. Given that there 
was no reason to issue a summons to her, she was not in court when the testi-
mony was taken, and therefore, Clarence Bailey was "unable to secure her at-
tendance at the hearing of the cause." fd. 
276. See id. at 79, 46 A.2d at 275. 
277. See id. at 82-83, 46 A.2d at 277. 
278. See id. at 83, 46 A.2d at 277. The court characterized the detective's account of 
the second alleged incident as "strikingly like" his account of the first alleged 
incident. See id. at 83, 46 A.2d at 277. 
279. See id. at 85, 46 A.2d at 278. This testimony included that of the person who 
accompanied him on his trip to Frederick County and members of the family 
who helped to extricate his automobile from the mud. See id. 
280. See itI. at 82, 88, 46 A.2d at 277, 280. 
281. See itI. at 88, 46 A.2d at 280. 
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The court viewed the testimony of the husband's witnesses as 
an "overwhelming contradiction" to the testimony of both the inves-
tigator and the wife's brother that her husband committed adultery 
on October 14.282 As to the latter occasion in November, the court 
concluded, "If you cannot believe the detective and [wife's brother] 
on [the first] occasion, you cannot believe what they say happened 
on the early morning of November 2d . . . . Falsus in uno, falsus in 
omnibus. "283 
Unlike the Kimmey and Angell courts, the Bailey court did not 
reverse a trial court disposition of a motion for a new trial.284 None-
theless, the court of appeals's decision in Bailey supports the restric-
tion on a court's discretion when new evidence is properly prof-
fered. Upholding the trial court's grant of a new trial, the Bailey 
court stated that the newly discovered evidence demonstrated a 
"reasonable possibility of innocence."285 It is difficult to imagine 
that the court of appeals, confronted by evidence strongly sug-
gesting a trial court error, would have affirmed a denial of the hus-
band's petition. 
Another case in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland af-
firmed a trial court's grant of a motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence is Smith v. Lapidus.286 Smith indicates the 
appropriateness of granting a new trial if it appears that newly prof-
fered evidence would affect the plaintiff's recovery in a new triaP87 
Unlike Kimmey and Angel~ and perhaps even Bailey, Smith defers to 
the trial court's findings on a motion for new trial. 
In Smith, a minor was injured in a fall from a second story 
porch.288 In a suit against the landlord, the minor and his mother 
alleged that he fell when a defective board in the porch broke. 289 
An eyewitness testified that the boy was standing outside of the rail-
ing, taking clothes off a pulley clothesline, and the clothesline pul-
282. See ill. at 85, 46 A.2d at 278. 
283. [d. at 85-86, 46 A.2d at 278-79. 
284. Compare id. at 89, 46 A.2d at 280 (affirming trial court's revocation of decree), 
with Angell v. Just, 22 Md. App. 43, 47, 57, 321 A.2d 830, 833, 838 (1974) (re-
versing a trial court's refusal to grant a new trial), and Washington, Baltimore 
& Annapolis Elec. RR Co. v. Kimmey, 141 Md. 243, 253, 118 A. 648, 652 
(1922) (reversing a trial court's refusal to grant a new trial). 
285. Bailey, 186 Md. at 89, 46 A.2d at 280. 
286. 208 Md. 273, 118 A.2d 373 (1955). 
287. See ill. at 279, 118 A.2d at 376. 
288. See id. at 276-77, 118 A.2d at 374-75. 
289. See id. at 277, 118 A.2d at 374. 
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led him off the porch when his hand slipped off the railing.290 A 
third person testified that the boy's mother told her that the occur-
rence was not the landlord's fault. 291 The mother denied making 
this statement.292 
Mter the plaintiffs received jury verdicts, the defendant moved 
for a new triaP93 In support of this motion, the defendant submit-
ted a hospital record with a doctor's notation indicating that the 
mother told him the child slipped while reaching for the clothes-
line.294 The defendant asserted that he did not know about the hos-
pital record until after triaP95 The conflict between the doctor's no-
tation-the truth of which was supported by affidavit of the 
doctor-and the mother's testimony at trial led the court to con-
clude that the plaintiffs' verdicts were excessive and to grant a new 
triaP96 
Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals noted that the 
error in Kimmey was the failure to consider newly discovered evi-
dence, a circumstance not present here.297 It also noted the general 
rule, as stated in State ex reI. Scruggs v. Baltimore Transit Co.,298 is that 
a ruling on a motion for new trial is not appealable except where 
some substantial right is denied.299 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs asserted that they should have been 
given an opportu~ity to give testimony in opposition to the defend-
ant's motion for new trial.300 The court stated, however, that if on 
the basis of affidavits submitted by the defendant, the trial judge 
"entertained a reasonable doubt that justice had not been done, he 
was empowered to strike the judgments. "301 The court noted that 
the exercise by the trial court of its discretion under the circum-
stances entailed no more than having the cause more deliberately 
considered by another jury.302 The court of appeals's description of 
290. See itt. 
291. See itt. 
292. See itt. 
293. See itt. at 278, 118 A2d at 375. 
294. See itt. 
295. See id. at 277, 118 A2d at 375. 
296. See itt. at 278, 118 A.2d at 375. 
297. See itt. 
298. 177 Md. 451, 9 A2d 753 (1939). 
299. See Smith, 208 Md. at 278-79, 118 A2d at 375 (discussing State ex TeL Scruggs, 
117 Md. at 454-55, 9 A2d at 754-55). 
300. See itt. at 279, 118 A2d at 375. 
301. [d. at 279, 118 A2d at 375-76. 
302. See itt. (citing Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 369, 46 A.2d 607, 611 (1946». 
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the trial court's action indicated the scope of the trial court's 
authority: 
The trial judge seems to have assumed the truth of every-
thing stated in the appellants' affidavits, but took the view 
that in any event the entry in the hospital records tended 
to impeach the mother's testimony. He obviously felt that 
the entry, if presented to another jury, might affect the ver-
dicts, or even the amount of the verdicts. This appears to 
be the purport of his brief opinion. We cannot hold that 
this was an abuse of discretion.303 
Whereas the prejudicial circumstances of Kimmey and Angell re-
quired reversal of the trial court, Smith presents the more typical 
scenario of a trial court's exercise of its discretion and the appellate 
courts' deference. The trial court in Smith fairly considered the evi-
dence that indicated that the verdict was wrong and, although it was 
not as convincing as that in Kimmey and Angel~ the trial court set 
aside the verdict.304 The appellate court was unwilling to second-
guess the lower court. It is unlikely that the court would have done 
so even if the trial court had not .granted the new trial. Where the 
evidence does not overwhelmingly establish that a new trial is neces-
sary-so much so that Angell described it as a substantial right for 
the movant305-the trial court has wide latitude in granting or deny-
ing a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 
E. Verdict Against the Weight oj the Evidence 
The power to grant a new trial due to a verdict against the 
weight of the evidence empowers a trial court to undo a jury's 
work.306 Generally, striking a verdict and granting a motion for new 
trial does not require a determination that the jury could not le-
gally have found the result it did because some other result was 
compelled as a matter of law.307 This is particularly true when the 
motion is considered on the basis of either the excessiveness or in-
303. Id. at 279, 118 A.2d at 376. 
304. See id. at 278, 118 A.2d at 375. 
305. Angell v. Just, 22 Md. App. 43, 56, 321 A.2d 830, 838 (1974). For a discussion 
of Angell, see supra notes 254-71 and accompanying text. 
306. See Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 368,46 A.2d 607, 610 (1946) ("While it is 
said that the power of the trial court [to grant a motion for a new trial] 
should be sparingly exercised, such power is universally recognized as a neces-
sary incident and corrective to the jury system. "). 
307. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 558. 
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adequacy of the damages award.308 
The court of appeals has distinguished the circumstances in 
which the verdict is against the evidence and in which it is against 
the weight of the evidence. Overturning a jury verdict against the ev-
idence involves an analysis of the legal sufficiency of the evidence.309 
If the evidence is insufficient to generate an issue of fact for the 
jury, the trial court may simply grant a motion for judgment or a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, if it allows the 
jury to deliberate at all.310 Maryland's appellate courts require trial 
judges to submit a case to the jury if there is any evidence, "how-
ever slight," that would support the opponent of a motion for judg-
ment.31l Even though a slight quantum of evidence tending to cre-
ate an issue of fact requires the trial court to submit the case to the 
jury, the trial court nonetheless has broad authority to set aside a 
result that it does not believe is warranted by the evidence.312 
How broad is this authority in Maryland? A leading treatise de-
scribed the broadest view of the trial court's authority as the power 
to act as the "thirteenth juror" -the power to set aside the verdict if 
there is "any evidence which would support a judgment in favor of 
the [moving party]."313 A somewhat more restrictive "federal test" 
was described in the same treatise314 as epitomized by the following 
quotation: 
On ... [a motion for new trial] it is the duty of the judge 
to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, if he is of the 
opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or is based upon evidenc.e which is false, or will 
result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be 
substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a 
308. See JAMES ET AL, supra note 22, at 394. 
309. See Buck v. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 60, 612 A.2d 1294, 1299 
(1992). 
310. See MD. R CIV. P. 2-519; MD. R CIV. P. 2-532. 
311. Mallard v. Earl, 106 Md. App. 449, 456, 665 A.2d 287, 290 (1995); see also My-
ers v. Bright, 327 Md. 395, 399, 609 A.2d 1182, 1183 (1992) ("'If there be any 
evidence, however slight, legally sufficient as tending to prove negligence, ... 
the weight and value of such evidence will be left to the jury. m (quoting Fowler 
v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246, 213 A.2d 549, 554 (1965»). 
312. See Buck, 328 Md. at 60-61, 612 A.2d at 1299; see also FRlEOENTHAL ET AL, supra 
note 4, at 558. 
313. JAMES ET AL., supra note 22, § 7.28, at 392-93. 
314. See ill. at 393. 
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verdict.315 
Maryland has not embraced the "thirteenth juror" standard.316 
A trial court may not set aside a verdict simply because it might 
have reached a different result.3I7 On the other hand, Maryland 
case law indicates that state appellate courts have never reversed a 
trial court's disposition of a motion for new trial based on the con-
tention that a verdict was against the weight of the evidence. This 
practice has held firm in cases involving both denial and granting 
of new trials. The pattern of decisions demonstrates a broader 
scope of discretion in a trial court than the "federal test" noted 
above, a scope limited by vaguely expressed concerns for the effect 
of the new trial motion on the right to trial by jury. To be fair, how-
ever, the pattern of decisions demonstrates a tendency on the part 
of trial judges themselves to respect the fact-finding role of the jury. 
In the few leading cases that have involved the granting of a motion 
for new trial, however, the appellate courts have deferred to the 
trial court's exercise of wide discretion. . 
The reported decisions involving trial court dispositions of mo-
tions for a new trial usually involve a challenge to the size of the 
verdict rather than the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The court 
of appeals has clearly stated its unwillingness to second-guess a trial 
court as to the appropriateness of the size of a verdict: 
It is axiomatic that whether a new trial should be granted 
because of the inadequacy or excessiveness of a verdict lies 
in the sound discretion of the trial judge. In a long line of 
cases, this Court has unswervingly refused to disturb the ex-
ercise of the trial judge'S discretion in denying a motion for 
new trial on those grounds.318 
Generally, in assessing the propriety of a trial court's disposi-
tion of a motion for new trial the appellate courts are concerned 
only that the trial court properly exercised its discretion-that it 
fully considered the contention of the party aggrieved by the court's 
disposition.319 
315. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 352-53 (4th Cir. 1941). 
316. In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 326, 539 A.2d 664, 686 
(1988). 
317. See id. at 321, 539 A.2d at 684. 
318. Greenstein v. Meister, 279 Md. 275, 295, 368 A.2d 451, 463 (1977). 
319. See Grabner v. Battle, 256 Md. 514, 519, 260 A.2d 634, 636 (1970) (holding 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion 
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On several occasions, the appellate courts have affirmed a trial 
court's denial of a motion for a new trial in the face of verdicts that 
manifested palpable anomalies. For example, in Kirkpatrick v. Zim-
merman,320 a plaintiff who had suffered severe injuries321 and who 
had required medical services at a military hospital valued at $3,100, 
won a verdict of only $2,500.322 The trial court refused to set aside 
the verdict as inadequate.323 Such an award obviously provided no 
recovery for pain and suffering, a compensable item on a finding of 
liability.324 The appellate court noted that the jury verdict may have 
reflected that the plaintiff did not pay for the medical care at the 
military hospital.325 The court concluded: 
The hard fact is that after having heard all of the evidence 
and upon receipt of proper instructions from the court, the 
jury made its findings. It was within the sound discretion of 
the lower court to determine whether a new trial was justi-
fied. In the exercise of that discretion it ruled that it was 
not, and we have no intention of disturbing that decision.326 
In Grabner v. Battle,327 the trial court denied a plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial when the jury awarded recovery for property damage 
and medical expenses, but not for personal injuries or pain and suf-
fering' arising from an automobile accident.328 The plaintiff struck 
her nose on the steering wheel during the collision with the 
defendant's automobile and underwent a complete nasal recon-
struction and submucous resection.329 With respect to the jury's dis-
for a new trial); cf Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis RR Co. v. Kimmey, 
141 Md. 243, 250, 118 A. 648, 650-51 (1922) (holding that the trial court's per-
emptory dismissal of the motion for a new trial constituted an abuse of discre-
tion). 
320. 257 Md. 215, 262 A.2d 531 (1970). 
321. See id, at 216, 262 A.2d at 531. The appellate court went so far as to concede 
the severity of the injuries. See id. 
322. See id. 
323. See id. 
324. See Bannon v. Baltimore & Ohio RR, 24 Md. 108, 123 (1866). 
325. See KiTkpatrick, 257 Md. at 216-17, 262 A.2d at 531-32; Leizear v. Butler, 226 Md. 
171, 175, 172 A.2d 518, 520 (1961) (holding that the lower court correctly 
ruled that the plaintiff's damages should not be reduced because he was paid 
his salary by his employer during the period of his disability). 
326. Kirltpatrick, 257 Md. at 217, 262 A.2d at 532. 
327. 256 Md. 514, 260 A.2d 634 (1970). 
328. See id. at 519, 260 A.2d at 636. 
329. See id. at 515, 260 A.2d at 634. 
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regard for the suffering that must have attended such an injury, the 
court observed: "They might well have directed their attention to 
the elements of personal injury and pain and suffering and found 
them inconsequential. "330 
The Grabner court also addressed the issue of whether a jury 
may be permitted to limit a plaintiff's recovery to out-of-pocket 
losses or "specials."331 The court turned to Leizear v. Butler,332 which 
also considered a verdict that obviously made a very low award for 
pain and suffering.333 Refusing to overturn the trial court's denial of 
a new trial in Leizear, the court emphasized the jury's prerogative to 
determine damages except when "a clear wrong or injustice is 
shown, "334 and the trial court has the prerogative to set it aside or 
let it stand.335 Therefore, the Grabner court concluded that the jury's 
verdict was proper and affirmed the trial court's denial of Grabner's 
motion for a new trial. 336 
The Grabner and Leizear courts' refusal to overturn jury verdicts 
that did not compensate for pain and suffering that had been pa-
tently sustained, and that were less than the expenses incurred by 
the victims demonstrates a strong respect for the jury's fact-finding 
role. Even greater respect is accorded to the trial court's evaluation 
330. Id. at 517, 260 A.2d at 635. The issue of personal injury and pain and suffer-
ing was muddied by the fact that the plaintiff suffered a similar injury three 
years after the occurrence at issue, but before trial. See id. at 515, 260 A.2d at 
634. While the jurors were instructed to disregard the effects of the second in-
jury, it is possible that they did not do so. See id. at 516, 260 A.2d at 635. The 
willingness to allow juries to determine whether to compensate victims for 
their injuries was demonstrated starkly in Shapiro v. Chapman, 70 Md. App. 
307, 520 A.2d 1330 (1987). Here, patients at a state mental facility sued under 
federal civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and state law to recover for 
physical abuse inflicted by Barry Chapman, one of their caretakers. See Shapiro, 
70 Md. App. at 311, 520 A.2d at 1332. The jury awarded $1.00 each to the 
plaintiffs in damages and the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a 
new trial. See id. at 310, 520 A.2d at 1331. The appellate court stated: "The 
jury found that Chapman willfully and maliciously assaulted appellants, but it 
apparently did not believe that appellants sustained any significant injuries. 
These findings were certainly within the jury's prerogative." Id. at 318, 520 
A.2d at 1335. The court held that the denial of a motion for a new trial by the 
appellate court was not an abuse of discretion. See id. at 319,520 A.2d at 1336. 
331. See Grabner, 256 Md. at 518-19, 260 A.2d at 636. 
332. 226 Md. 171, 172 A.2d 518 (1961). 
333. See id. at 174-75, 172 A.2d at 519-20. 
334. Id. at 177, 172 A.2d at 521. 
335. See id. 
336. See Grabner, 256 Md. at 519, 260 A.2d at 636. 
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of the jury's performance. Appellate courts have deferred to the 
trial court's judgment determining whether or not deference is due 
to the jury.337 
In Thodos v. Bland,338 the court of special appeals explored the 
outer boundaries of this deference to the jury's fact-finding role 
and to the trial court's judgment in letting the jury's work stand. In 
Thodos, the controversy pertained to the jury's exoneration of both 
co-defendants in a lawsuit to recover for injuries sustained in an au-
tomobile accident.339 The plaintiff was injured when the automobile, 
in which she was a passenger, was struck while making a left turn by 
a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction.340 The plaintiff sued 
the operators of both vehicles.341 Although it was clear from the evi-
dence that either the driver of the car in which plaintiff was a pas-
senger or the driver of the other car caused the accident,342 the jury 
337. Deference to both the jury and the trial court may also be seen in instances 
in which the jury has allowed recovery on a basis that may be legally inappro-
priate. In Brinand v. Denzik, 226 Md. 287, 173 A.2d 203 (1961), the plaintiff's 
counsel exhorted the jury in closing argument to calculate damages on the as-
sumption that the plaintiff had sustained a 10 % disability. See id. at 289, 173 
A.2d at 204. The plaintiff's medical witness did not assign a percentage of dis-
ability. See id. Although the trial judge sustained defendant's objection to this 
argument, a tabulation sheet prepared by the jury foreman during delibera-
tions indicated that the jury probably did as the plaintiff's lawyer had ex-
horted. See id. at 290, 173 A.2d at 205. Upholding the trial court's denial of 
the defendant's motion for a new trial, the court of appeals speculated that 
the trial court may have been influenced by the lack of an award for pain and 
suffering. See id. at 293, 173 A.2d at 206. This is remarkable because it gives 
the trial court leeway to compensate for one legal anomaly with another. Re-
garding denial of the motion for a new trial under the circumstances as an 
abuse of discretion, Judge Horney observed: 
As I see it, since the jury was not at liberty to take the remarks of 
counsel into account in arriving at the amount of its verdict, the re-
fusal to grant the motion was an abuse of discretion in that it was im-
proper for the lower court to ignore the undisputed fact that the 
jury of its own volition over the signature of its foreman, informed 
the clerk of the court that it had considered as evidence facts not 
before it. 
[d. at 294-95, 173 A.2d at 207 (Horney, j., dissenting). 
338. 75 Md. App. 700, 542 A.2d 1307 (1988). 
339. See id. at 703, 542 A.2d at 1309. 
340. See id. 
341. See' id. 
342. See id. at 705, 542 A.2d at 1310. If the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a pas-
senger had been turning left on a green arrow, the signal controlling traffic 
for the other vehicle would have been red. See id. If the turning vehicle did 
not attempt to turn until after the green arrow, then traffic in the opposite di-
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found that the plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the ev-
idence that either defendant was responsible for the accident.343 
In assessing whether the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial was an abuse of discretion, the court first de-
termined whether the case involved extraordinary or compelling cir-
cumstances or denial of a substantial right.344 In light of the defend-
ants' near concession at oral argument that one or the other was 
the proximate cause of the accident345 and the plaintiff's potential 
assumption of the entire cost of her 10ss,346 the court saw the case as 
presenting extraordinary circumstances and the denial of a substan-
tial right to the plaintiff-an opportunity for just resolution of her 
claim.347 
In addressing whether the trial court's denial of plaintiff's mo-
tion for a new .trial was an abuse of discretion, the court was unable 
to find a similar Maryland decision.348 Decisions in two similar cases 
in other states349 established that the denial of a new trial could be 
an abuse of discretion.35o In those two cases, however, unlike Thodos, 
there was no specific finding that the plaintiff had not met the bur-
den of proof as to either defendant.351 The court of special appeals 
speculated that the jury so found because it could not agree which 
of the defendants caused the accident.352 The court posited that the 
trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial effected a real in-
justice to the plaintiff.353 It was lawful, however, for the jury to find 
that the plaintiff had not met the burden of persuasion with respect 
to either defendant because the question of liability was for the 
jury.354 The court upheld the denial of the motion for a new trial 
rection would have been free to move through the intersection and would 
have had the right of way. See ill. Testimony of a witness from the State Roads 
Department indicated that the lights in the intersection were functioning 
properly at the time of the accident. See ill. 
343. See id. 
344. See id. at 707, 542 A.2d at 1311. 
345. See ill. at 709, 542 A.2d at 1312. 
346. See ill. 
347. See ill. at 709-10, 542 A.2d at 1312. 
348. See ill. at 710, 542 A.2d at 1312. 
349. See ill. at 710-12, 542 A.2d at 1312-13 (discussing Banes v. Thompson, 352 So. 
2d 812 (Miss. 1977); Myers v. Gold, 419 A.2d 663 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980». 
350. See ill. at 710-11, 542 A.2d at 1313. . 
351. See id. at 711-12, 542 A.2d at 1313. 
352. See ill. at 717,542 A.2d at 1316. 
353. See ill. at 713, 542 A.2d at 1313-14. 
354. See ill. at 713, 542 A.2d at 1314. 
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because the decision of the trial court to accept the jury's unjust, 
but lawful, verdict was not an abuse of discretion.355 
In concluding, Judge Bell candidly expressed the court's un-
happiness with its limited role: "Were we ruling upon appellant's 
new trial motion, we would have unhesitatingly granted it. Neverthe-
less, we are unable to rationalize a basis for finding that the trial 
judge abused his discretion. Accordingly and regretfully, we affirm 
the judgment. "356 Like the other decisions affirming the trial court's 
denial of a new trial motion, Thodos represents an appellate act of 
faith in both the fact-finding role of the jury and, in turn, the dis-
cretion of the trial court in evaluating the verdict. 
The appellate decisions that assess the granting of motions for 
a new trial have focused only on the power of the trial court to as-
sess the verdict in light of the weight of the evidence. Although the 
grant of a new trial motion is inherently antagonistic to the fact-
finding prerogative of the jury, that has not been a critical consider-
ation in appellate analysis of such action. 
The leading case involving affirmance of the grant of a new 
trial motion, Snyder v. Cearjoss,357 demonstrates the degree of discre-
tion the court of appeals has bestowed on trial courts vis a vis the 
jury's fact-finding role. Snyder involved two suits by the administra-
trix of both the estates of Malinda Summers, her mother, and Mary 
Hughes, her aunt, against the administratrix of the estate of Jesse 
O. Snyder Uesse).358 Jesse was the draftsman and principal benefici-
ary of the will of Abraham Snyder (Abraham), who died in 1922.359 
Abraham was the brother of Summers and Hughes.360 
The suit alleged that Jesse persuaded Summers and Hughes not 
to contest probate of Abraham's will, which left most of Abraham's 
estate to Jesse, by promising that he would give them each one 
third of the amount he received from Abraham's estate.361 Hughes 
died in 1932, Summers died in 1933, and Jesse died in 1941.362 The 
case was asserted to have been brought within the statute of limita-
tions on the basis of an alleged oral acknowledgment in 1940 by 
355. See ill. at 712, 542 A.2d at 1313. 
356. [d. at 717, 542 A.2d at 1316. 
357. 186 Md. 360, 46 A.2d 607 (1946). 
358. See id. at 361-62, 46 A.2d at 607. 
359. See id. at 362, 46 A.2d at 607. 
360. See id. 
361. See id. at 362, 46 A.2d at 607-08. 
362. See id. at 363, 46 A.2d at 608. 
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Jesse of his obligation to Hughes and Summers.363 The trial court 
denied the parties' motions for directed verdict, and the jury. re-
turned verdicts of $28,521.93 in favor of each estate.364 The trial 
court denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict but granted a new trial as to both verdicts.36S 
The quarrel with the jury's verdicts was not with the amount of 
the awards, but rather with the findings of liability.366 It is clear from 
the explanation of the three circuit court judges who disposed of 
the new trial motion that they were unhappy that they had to let 
the jury decide the case. Moreover, they were not going to sustain 
plaintiffs' verdicts on just enough evidence to get the cases to a 
jury: 
[U] nder our system here in Maryland, if there is more than 
a scintilla of evidence, and giving consideration to all the 
evidence and all the inferences properly deducible from it 
you find there is more than a scintilla of evidence, you have 
to let the jury pass on it .... But the evidence is not satis-
factory to us; it is unconvincing. The total effect of it is to 
set aside a will that was some forty years old. We feel that 
there ought to be clear and satisfactory evidence to sustain 
that kind of a case.367 
This statement is remarkable in that it appears to call for a 
higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence for 
cases seeking to disturb ancient probate matters. Requirement of 
such a standard in such cases is essentially a legislative determina-
tion. Such a determination may be made as a matter of common 
law;368 if such were made the law, a plaintiff's case would not be 
submitted to a jury unless it could reasonably find that the evidence 
meets the higher standard. The trial court in Snyder essentially im-
posed this requirement at the back end, by setting aside the jury 
363. See id. at 363-64, 46 A2d at 608. 
364. See id. at 365, 46 A2d at 609. 
365. See id. 
366. See id. at 366, 46 A2d at 609. 
367. Id. The court of appeals accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, refusing 
to substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the trial 
court. See id. at 369, 46 A2d at 611. 
368. For example, in an action for deceit, fraud must be proven by clear and con-
vincing evidence. See Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 257-58, 630 A2d 1156, 
1161 (1993). 
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verdict because the jury did not apply a higher standard.369 Assum-
ing that the same standard is applied on a retrial, plaintiffs' verdicts 
are vulnerable to attack unless the plaintiffs offer stronger evidence 
of the agreements among the decedents than they did in the first 
trial. That is not something that should be determined on a motion 
for new trial, however, but rather on a motion for judgment under 
Maryland Rule 2-519.370 
Since the trial court had ,granted the motion for new trial, an in-
terlocutory order, the case was not properly before the court of ap-
peals and it dismissed the appeal on that basis.371 The court consid-
ered at some length, however, the power of the trial court to grant 
a new trial.372 Although the court cautioned that the power of a trial 
court to set aside a verdict on the grounds that it is against the evi-
dence should be used sparingly,373 it quoted from a leading nine-
teenth century treatise about the power of the trial court with re-
spect to the jury findings: '"It is settled, then, that the court which 
tried the cause, may, in a proper case, of which it shall be the 
judge, set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, under circum-
stances which at first blush would seem to trench upon the rights of 
the jury. '''374 The court stated further: 
We cannot substitute our judgment as to the weight of the 
evidence for that of the trial court. If the evidence is not 
satisfactory to the trial court, it is within its province to or-
der a new trial before another jury. Whether there is any 
limit to the number of times a trial court may override a 
jury's verdict is a question upon which we need not pass at 
this time.375 
Such a scope of authority is a matter of constitutional concern, 
particularly when the dispute about the verdict pertains to liability 
vel non rather than the amount of damages. In Snyder, the trial 
369. See Snyder, 186 Md. at 365-66, 46 A.2d at 609. 
370. On retrial, directed verdicts were granted in favor of the defendant but were 
reversed on appeal. See Snyder v. Cearfoss, 187 Md. 635, 644, 51 A.2d 264, 268 
(1947). It does not appear that the court of appeals imposed the higher stan-
dard of proof on the plaintiff than it had earlier appeared to endorse. See id.; 
see also supra notes 366-69 and accompanying text. 
371. See Snyder, 186 Md. 366-67, 46 A.2d at 609-10. 
372. See id. at 368-69, 46 A.2d at 610-11. 
373. See id. at 368, 46 A.2d at 610. 
374. [d. at 369, 45 A.2d at 611 (quoting DAVID GRAHAM & THOMAS W. WATERMAN, 
NEW TRIALS 1212 (1855». 
375. [d. 
48 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
court insisted on a particular result, even when the evidence was 
such that the choice among possible results resided with the jury.376 
If a trial court intends to impose a higher standard of proof as to a 
particular cause of action, it should do so as part of its function in 
stating the law to the jury377 rather than by stretching its power to 
evaluate the verdict in light of the evidence. 
The discretion of the trial court to set aside a verdict based on 
an excessive amount of damages, rather than on the issue of liabil-
ity, appears to entail less tension with the jury's constitutional fact-
finding role; rather, it is a broad power. This may be seen in Conk-
lin v. SchiUinger.378 In that case, the plaintiff was injured when the 
defendant, driving on the wrong side of the road at forty miles per 
hour because he was too impatient to move with the heavy traffic in 
his own lane, collided head-on into the vehicle in which plaintiff 
was a passenger.379 The plaintiff suffered facial lacerations, profuse 
bleeding, permanent disfigurement, an injury to her cervical spine, 
a broken arm and finger, and ruptured ligaments in her knee.38o 
The jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict on these injuries of 
$100,000.381 The trial court granted a new trial as to that part of the 
award on the basis that it was "so excessive as to shock the con-
science of the [c] ourt. "382 
The plaintiff asserted a constitutional argument that the trial 
court had no authority to set aside the verdict based on excessive-
ness of the verdict.383 Making a detailed review of English authori-
ties, the court concluded: 
[W]e are of the opinion that the majority of the English de-
cisions prior to the adoption of the Maryland Constitution 
of 1776 indicated that power existed to grant new trials in 
tort cases upon the sole ground of a jury verdict for exces-
sive damages and this opinion is confirmed by the English 
decisions rendered during the 2Q..year period following 
1776.384 
376. See id. at 366, 46 A.2d at 609. 
377. See Singleton v. Roman, 195 Md. 241, 246, 72 A.2d 705, 707 (1950). 
378. 255 Md. 50, 257 A.2d 187 (1969). 
379. See id. at 54-55, 257 A.2d at 189-90. 
380. See id. at 55-56, 257 A.2d at 190. 
381. See id. at 53, 257 A.2d at 189. 
382. [d. 
383. See id. at 58, 257 A.2d at 191. 
384. [d. at 64, 257 A.2d at 194. 
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The court noted that it had sustained the practice of the trial court 
granting a new trial unless the plaintiff remitted the portion of the' 
verdict deemed by the trial court to be excessive.385 The court noted 
that it is for the trial judge to determine whether a verdict 
"shock[s] his conscience,"386 but, making its own review of the evi-
dence,387 it concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in granting the new trial,388 
The notion that a trial court may set aside a judgment that 
shocks its conscience is well established in Maryland law.389 It should 
at least be noted, however, that when a trial court delves into mat-
ters of conscience, it assumes a role that is the raison d' etre of the 
jury.390 The tendency of jurors to be passionate needs to be con-
trolled, but the court must recognize that a jury will also consult 
their conscience and common sense in their decisions, before it sets 
aside a verdict. Increasingly, the lower federal courts and some state 
courts are reassessing the scope of the trial court's discretion con-
cerning a new trial in order to accord proper respect to the jury's 
fact-finding role.391 
385. See id. 
386. [d. at 69, 257 A.2d at 197 (citing Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Smith, 222 Md. 206, 
223, 159 A.2d 823, 833 (1960». 
387. See id. at 70, 257 A.2d at 197. Noting that the plaintiff was painfully injured, 
the court stated "fortunately most of her injuries responded to treatment and 
did not result in extensive permanent injury." [d. The court of appeals's lan-
guage sounds a great deal like the deliberations of a jury. See id. at 69-70, 257 
A.2d at 197. 
388. See id. 
389. See, e.g., Safeway Trails, 222 Md. at 223, 159 A.2d at 833 (holding that it is for 
the trial judge to determine whether the verdict shocked his conscience so 
that remittitur was permissible); ACandS v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 692, 710 
A.2d 944, 994 (1998) (stating that the test for remittitur is not the amount of 
the verdicts, but "whether it shocks tl1e conscience of the court"); Alexander 
~v. Evander, 88 Md. App. 672, 716, 596 A.2d 687, 709 (1991) (holding that the 
standard to be applied by the trial judge in ordering a new trial is whether 
the verdict shocks the conscience). 
390. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, j., dissent-
ing) (stating why the framers of the Bill of Rights included a civil jury trial 
right: "Trial by a jury of laymen rather than by the sovereign's judges was im-
portant to the founders because juries represent the layman's common sense, 
the passional elements in our nature, and thus keep the administration of law 
in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community." (quoting OUVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 238 (1920) (internal quotation 
marks omitted»). 
391. See infra Part IV. 
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III. MARYLAND'S EVOLVING RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL 
A. Adaptation of Federal and Maryland Jury Trial Right to the Merger of 
Law and Equity 
The civil jury trial provisions of the Maryland Constitution pre-
serve a right to a jury trial that had existed since the adoption of 
the United States Constitution.392 Historically, the determination of 
the right to trial by jury depended upon law and equity as it existed 
at the time of the creation of the constitutional right. Jury trials 
were unavailable in actions filed on the equity side of the court, 
and equitable relief was not granted in actions at law.393 Although 
the separation of law and equity jurisdiction was quite carefully 
maintained in Maryland practice,394 legal claims sometimes found 
their way onto the equity side of the court and were thus decided 
without a right to a jury trial.395 
392. Several provisions of Articles five, twenty, and twenty-three of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights have been construed as embodying different entitle-
ments for the determination of a common law jury trial right. See MD. CONST., 
DEeI- OF RIGHTS arts. 5, 20, 23; see also Kann v. Kann, 344 Md. 689, 703, 690 
A.2d 509, 516 (1997) (finding that the law prior to 1851 did not bestow a right 
to jury trial with respect to trust and estates, with certain exceptions); Turner 
v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 503, 158 A.2d 125, 
130 (1960) (recognizing that the practices of remittitur and of granting a new 
trial were present when the Maryland Constitution was adopted). Although 
there is not an absolute right to a jury trial in all actions, this ambiguity had 
no effect on the power of the trial judge to grant a new trial. See Turner, 221 
Md. at 503, 158 A.2d at 130. 
393. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 540, 530 A.2d 724, 728 (1987) (noting that 
prior to 1984, civil actions were required to be filed as either law or equity 
actions). 
394. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging that the historical separation of law and equity 
had been "scrupulously maintained"); Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. 107, 
113, 448 A.2d 332, 335 (1982) (noting the procedural distinctions between ac-
tions at law and suits at equity and that many county circuit courts maintained 
separate law and equity dockets before the merger of law and equity). For ex-
amples of exceptional situations where a jury trial was provided in equity pro-
ceedings, and where courts of law were able to exercise equitable powers, see 
Higgins, 310 Md. at 540 n.2, 530 A.2d at 728 n.2. 
395. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 54041, 530 A.2d at 728 (noting that the doctrine of eq-
uitable "clean-up" allowed a chancellor in equity to decide both legal and eq-
uitable issues that ended up in equity court by "claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim or third-party action"). Equitable jurisdiction of a matter, which existed 
at the time of filing, was not destroyed merely because an adequate remedy at 
law became available. See American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215 
(1937). In its sound discretion, the court may suspend the suits in equity until 
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In 1984, a major revision of the Maryland Rules included Rule 
2-301 which provides: "There shall be one form of action known as 
"civil action. "'396 The new rule merged law and equity into one type 
of claim, without the former distinctions and without affecting the 
right to a jury trial.397 Before merger, one could not invoke the 
powers of an equity tribunal without a showing that a remedy at law 
would be inadequate.398 Mter the merger, any claim arising in a cir-
cuit court comes before a judge possessing equitable powers and 
broad discretion to employ such powers. The judge's equitable pow-
ers include the right to consolidate actions, enter joint or separate 
verdicts, and the right to order separate trials for multiple claims.399 
The power to control the order of claims, when combined with 
an unprecedented mixture of legal and equitable claims in the 
same action, posed a serious threat to trial by jury. Unless a trial 
judge allowed legal claims triable by jury to be tried first, such 
claims would effectively be resolved by the trial court's adjudication 
of the equitable claims, thereby depriving legal claims of the right 
to jury trial.400 
In Higgins v. Barnes,401 the Court of Appeals of Maryland ad-
dressed the issue of whether a party loses the right to a jury trial on 
legal issues simply because they are raised in an equitable action. 
This case allowed the court to determine the scope of the right to 
jury trial in the wake of the merger of law and equity.402 Broader 
policy implications of Higgins may also shed light on the relation-
ship between the right to a jury trial and the trial court's power to 
other legal claims are disposed or vice versa. See id. at 215-16. Whether a chan-
cellor consolidated legal and equitable claims in one action or the chancellor 
enjoined prosecution of a related but separate action was left to the chancel-
lor's discretion. See id. 
396. MD. R CIV. P. 2-301. 
397. See Rees, supra note 5, at 304 n.1. 
398. See, e.g., Brumbaugh v. &hnebly, 2 Md. 320, 325 (1852). 
399. See MD. R CIV. P. 2-503. 
400. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959) (reversing the 
court of appeals's holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to try the eq-
uitable cause first, even though it might prevent a full jury trial of the other 
legal claims). 
401. 310 Md. 532, 551, 530 A.2d 724, 733 (1987) (explaining that compelling a 
defendant to raise legal counterclaims in an equity-based action may unconsti-
tutionally deprive him of a jury trial). 
402. See id. (finding a constitutional requirement to "inviolably preserve" the right 
to trial by jury in actions at law). 
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grant a new trial.403 
In Higgins, the plaintiff made a contract with the Barneses to 
transfer an improved lot subject to a mortgage so long as the 
Barneses assumed this mortgage.404 The Barneses, in turn, were to 
convey two unimproved lots to Higgins, on which they were to con-
struct a home for Higgins.405 Higgins agreed to give a mortgage on 
the property to the Barneses, representing the difference between 
the value of the property she conveyed and that of the property 
conveyed to her, plus the costs of construction of the structure.406 
Unhappy with the construction, Higgins declined to execute 
the mortgage, claiming a credit for construction defects.407 The 
Barneses sued Higgins for specific performance of the contract to 
execute a mortgage, seeking damages in the alternative.408 Higgins 
counterclaimed for breach of contract and demanded a jury trial.409 
The trial court granted the Barneses' motion to strike the jury de-
mand on the basis that the merger of law and equity had no effect 
on the right to trial by jury.410 Higgins appealed to the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, but the court of appeals granted certi-
orari before consideration of the case by the intermediate appellate 
court.411 
The court of appeals stated squarely the issue posed by Ms. 
Higgins's jury demand as to her counterclaim: 
Now that the merger of law and equity has been accom-
plished, and parties may join legal and equitable claims in a 
single civil action to be decided by a court no longer di-
vided into law and equity sides, this Court must determine 
the impact the rules change shall have upon the availability 
of trial by jury.412 
For guidance, the court turned to federal court decisions that 
had already grappled with the question of what protection was re-
quired for jury trial of legal claims combined in the same action 
403. See itt. 
404. See itt. at 534, 530 A2d at 725. 
405. See itt. 
406. See itt. at 535, 530 A2d at 725. 
407. See itt. 
408. See itt. at 535, 553, 530 A2d at 725, 737. 
409. See itt. at 535, 530 A2d at 725. 
410. See itt. at 536, 530 A2d at 726. 
411. See itt. 
412. Id. at 541, 530 A2d at 728. 
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with equitable claims.413 The essentially identical language of Fed-
eral Rule 3 and Maryland Rule 2-301 - the rules that effected the 
merger of law and equity in the federal and Maryland courts respec-
tively - also motivated the court's decision to consult federal law.414 
The court further considered how the Supreme Court assessed the 
effect of the federal rules on the right to trial by jury to determine 
how the similar Maryland rule should affect the right to trial by 
jury.415 
The court looked primarily to Beacon Theatres v. Westover,416 
which was the Supreme Court's first decision addressing the effects 
of the merger of law and equity on the right to jury trial under the 
Seventh Amendment.417 The Court in Beacon Theatres adopted a rule 
which so protected the right to a jury trial that it has been con-
tended that the court expanded, rather than preserved, the right as 
it existed in 1791.418 
413. See id. at 54347, 530 A.2d at 729-31; see also, e.g., Myers v. United States Dist. 
Court, 620 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1980); Eldredge v. Gourley, 505 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 
1974); Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th 
Cir. 1961). 
414. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 543, 530 A.2d at 729. 
415. See id. The court noted that reliance by the Maryland courts on federal deci-
sions to construe analogous Maryland rules is traditional. See id. Although con-
struction of a constitutional right was as much at issue in Higgins as construc-
tion of a Maryland rule, the court did not, at least explicitly, look to federal 
case law construing the scope of the federal constitutional guarantee itself. See 
id. The Maryland courts assess the scope of the right to trial by jury in light of 
the right that existed in Maryland at the time of the adoption of the Mary-
land Constitution because the Seventh Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution is not applicable to the states. See, e.g., Knee v. City Passenger Ry. Co., 
87 Md. 623, 40 A. 890 (1898) (explaining that it is the historical trial by jury 
as it existed when the Constitution of the United States was first adopted to 
which individuals are entitled); see also Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335 
A.2d 670 (1974) (holding that Maryland courts do not turn to the Seventh 
Amendment to assess the scope of this right). 
416. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
417. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 54344,530 A.2d at 729-30. 
418. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510. Indeed, Justice Stewart addressed this ex-
pansion in his dissent. See id. at 518 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also John C. 
McCoid, II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon 
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 16 U. PA L. REv. 1, 13 (1967). The court of appeals 
noted that decisions of courts in other states that have consummated the 
merger of law and equity revealed "a variety of approaches and philosophies 
ranging from a jealous protection of the right to jury trial to a preference for 
the 'efficiency' of having a judge determine all issues in any case involving a 
legitimate equitable claim," and finally, a "middle ground" of opinions which 
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The facts of Beacon Theatres bore significant resemblance to 
those of Higgins. Fox West Coast Theatres, Inc. operated a cinema 
in San Bernardino, California and had contracts with movie distrib-
utors for clearance-"a period of time in which no other theatre 
[could] exhibit the same pictures. "419 Beacon built a drive-in theater 
eleven miles from San Bernardino and notified Fox that it believed 
the clearances were "overt acts in violation of the antiuust laws. "420 
Fox sued for a declaratory judgment, alleging that the notifica-
tion, as well as threatened lawsuits and treble damages amounted to 
"duress and coercion," depriving it of its right to negotiate for ex-
clusive first-run contracts.421 It sought a declaration that the clear-
ances were reasonable and not in violation of antiUUSt laws.422 Fox 
also sought an injunction pending final resolution of the suit 
preventing Beacon from instituting any action against Fox or its dis-
tributors under the antiUUSt laws.423 Beacon answered with a coun-
terclaim,424 alleging that the clearances represented a conspiracy be-
tween Fox and its distributors to restrain trade and monopolize 
first-run pictures in violation of the antitrust laws.425 Beacon de-
manded a trial by jury.426 
Believing the issues to be essentially equitable, the trial court 
determined that it would first decide the issues grounded in equity, 
including some common to the counterclaim for damages.427 Bea-
con sought review of the determination by mandamus and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court.428 Explaining that the Fox 
complaint had established a valid claim for injunctive relief, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the claim was cognizable in equity.429 Rejecting Beacon's contention 
determined the right to jury trial depending on whether the issues in the case 
are predominantly legal or equitable in nature. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 541, 
530 A.2d at 728. In short, not alJ states protect the right to jury trial to the ex-
tent of the Supreme Court. 
419. Beacon Theat~, 359 U.S. at 502. 
420. Id. 
421. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
422. See id. at 502-03. 
423. See id. at 503. 
424. See id. 
425. See id. 
426. See id. 
427. See id. 
428. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958). 
429. See id. at 873. The court of appeals opined that the effects and damages of the 
defendant's threats would be difficult to ascertain. See id. 
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that an adequate legal remedy had become available to the plaintiff 
through an opportunity to defend the counterclaim, the court in-
stead focused on the timing of Fox's suit: it had no means to estalr 
lish the invalidity of the defendant's threats at that time.430 The in-
termediate appellate court held that once equitable jurisdiction 
attached, it was not destroyed simply because a legal remedy had 
become available.431 The court noted that, as before the adoption of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the question as to whether le-
gal or equitable actions "should be tried first remains primarily 
within the discretion of the trial judge and is for the determination 
of that judge after consideration of various factors of fairness and 
convenience. "432 
The United States Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that if the district court had exercised its discretion and adju-
dicated the plaintiff's claim first, without a jury, there would be no 
opportunity to adjudicate issues common to the plaintiff's and 
defendant's claims before a jury.433 Nonetheless, the court deemed 
this to be appropriate in light of the district court's characterization 
of the basic issues in the suit as equitable.434 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court did not dispute that Fox's 
complaint could be construed "as alleging the kind of harassment 
by a multiplicity of lawsuits which would traditionaUy have justified 
equity to take jurisdiction and settle the case in one suit. "435 The 
Court did not explicitly reject the assumption of the Ninth Circuit 
that when equity was properly invoked, the chancellor could deter-
mine the order of trial of claims in the action.436 Yet, the Supreme 
Court held that a trial court may not deprive a party of jury trial on 
a counterclaim triable by jury by exercising its discretion to try first 
the plaintiff's equitable claim.437 
430. See id. 
431. See id. (relying on American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937». 
432. Id. at 875-76. 
433. See id. at 876. 
434. See id. at 877-78. 
435. Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506 (1959)(footnote omitted). 
436. See id. at 505. It did note, however, that American Life Insurance v. Stewart, 300 
U.S. 203 (1967), was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 505. In dissent, Justice Stewart ac-
cused the Court of denigrating American Life as a "precedent[ ] decided under 
discarded procedures." Id. at 518 (Stewart, j., dissenting). 
437. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 51 ()'II ( .. [0] nly under the most imperative cir-
cumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the 
Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal 
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It was to this holding that the court in Higgint38 looked to de-
cide that the Bameses, by winning the race to the courthouse and 
suing in equity, could not deprive Higgins of her right to jury on 
her counterclaim in contract. The Higgins court discussed Beacon 
Theatres and other federal precedents at some length, concluding: 
In the federal courts, then, the entitlement to jury trial is 
not determined simply by the characterization of the action 
as a whole as legal or equitable. If an asserted counterclaim 
presents a legal claim historically accorded the right to jury 
trial and raises factual issues in common with the plaintiff's 
equitable claim, the defendant is ordinarily entitled to a 
jury determination of those factual legal issues. Beacon Thea-
tres and its progeny speak of some narrow discretion of a 
trial court to deny a jury trial in "the most imperative cir-
cumstances," but the lower Federal courts have seldom rec-
ognized such circumstances.439 
Later in the opinion, the Higgins court indicated that its hold-
ing went beyond protecting the right to trial by jury of 
coun terclaiman ts: 
We are constitutionally required to "inviolably preserve" the 
right of trial by jury in actions at law, and so "where both 
legal and equitable issues are presented in a single case, 
'only under [the] most imperative circumstances ... can 
the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior 
determination of equitable claims. '"440 
Beacon Theatres removed a potential impediment to trial by jury that 
existed in 1791 by restricting the trial judge's discretion to first adju-
dicate equitable claims that effectively adjudicated one's legal claims 
issues be lost through prior determination of equity claims."). 
438. 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987). 
439. ld. at 547, 530 A.2d at 731 (footnote omitted). 
440. ld. at 551, 530 A.2d at 733 (quoting Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-
73 (1962». The Higgins rule is not limited to discrete legal claims, as opposed 
to issues, when combined with equitable claims or issues. See id. at 535 n.l, 530 
A.2d at 725 n.l. As concluded by the Court of Appeals of Maryland: 
ld. 
[O]ur concern is with the nature of the issues legitimately raised by 
the pleadings, and not with the labels given to the pleadings. The le-
gal issues in this case were identified by Higgins' particularlized an-
swer to the complaint, and our decision does not turn on the fact 
that a counterclaim was filed. 
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as well. Whereas the Seventh Amendment simply preserves trial by 
jury as it existed in 1791, one might argue that Beacon Theatres pro-
tected trial by jury to a degree beyond that required by the Consti-
tution by reducing the equitable chancellor's power over the order 
of a trial.441 In essence, Beacon Theatres expanded the jury trial right 
beyond its historical boundaries. 
The power of the chancellor to control the order of trial of re-
lated cases existed in Maryland as well.442 Indeed, it was implicitly 
exercised by the trial judge in Higgins.443 It appears that sweeping 
away this power of the chancellor to determine the order of claims 
expanded, rather than preserved, the right to jury trial. 
The Beacon Theatres Court was not unmindful of this point. The 
Seventh Amendment requires trial by jury "in suits at common 
law."444 This latter phrase has long established a dividing line-for 
purposes of trial by jury-between actions at law and those in eq-
uity, admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence.445 The Court in Beacon 
Theatres observed that "the expansion of adequate legal remedies 
provided by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules 
necessarily affects the scope of equity."446 The Court retains its fidel-
ity to a historic notion of the scope of trial by jury but, in reality, 
views history as requiring only a dema~cation between law and eq-
uity, with the latter subject to shrinkage with the march of procedu-
441. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510 (stating that the jury trial must occur first 
if the equitable claim infringes on one's right to trial by jury for legal cases). 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court has discretion to or-
der separate trials of claims in an action. See FED. R ClV. P. 42(b). Prior to the 
adoption of the federal rules and the Declaratory Judgment Act, equity courts 
possessed essentially the same power; however, in an unmerged system, it took 
the form of an ability to stay either matters within its own jurisdiction or, 
since it could act in personam, related matters in a law court. See Beacon Thea-
tres, 359 U.S. at 507. For a discussion of the impact of the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, see infra notes 450-53 and accompanying text. 
442. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 540-41, 530 A.2d at 728. 
443. In Higgins, after one judge struck Higgins' jury demand on the basis that "the 
merger of law and equity had no effect on the right to trial by jury," a second 
judge tried the Barnes' specific performance claim first. Id. at 536, 530 A.2d at 
726. In the course of the second trial, the judge gave Ms. Higgins a credit for 
construction defects; therefore, there was no need for a trial by jury of her 
counterclaim. See id. 
444. US. CONST. amend. VII. 
445. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433,446 (1830). 
446. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509. For a discussion of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, see infra notes 450-53 and accompanying text. 
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ral innovations.447 
In Beacon Theatres, the plaintiff, Fox, sued in equity because it 
had no other way to deal with Beacon's threats, which Fox believed 
were based on an erroneous understanding of the antitrust laws.448 
Otherwise, Fox could not defend because Beacon had not sued. 
Before merger, Fox might have obtained the assistance of equity in 
restraining such threats.449 With the Declaratory Judgment Act450 
available in modern federal practice, Fox did not have to wait to be 
sued to have a court determine the propriety of Fox's clearances 
under the antitrust laws.451 Further, in the event that Fox might suf-
fer damage to its business pendente lite,452 the federal district court, 
possessing equitable power in a merged system, might have entered 
a preliminary injunction against Beacon's threats.453 When Beacon 
interposed a counterclaim, triable by jury,454 there was no longer 
any justification for treating the court as possessing a discretion en-
titling it to try Fox's claim first without a jury if it saw fit. Noting 
that there might be cases in which the court might not be able to 
fully protect the party seeking equity from irreparable harm by al-
lowing a jury case to go forward, the Beacon Theatres Court insisted 
that "the right to jury trial is a constitutional one ... while no simi-
lar requirement protects trials by the court. "455 
Beacon Theatres, theri, represents more than simply a rule for 
ordering the trial of related legal and equitable claims joined in the 
same action. It represents an unhinging of the right from past prac-
447. See McCoid, supra note 418, at 6-7. 
448. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 502-03. 
449. Or at least so thought the court of appeals in Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 252 
F.2d 864, 873 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
450. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1994). 
451. See id. at § 2201 (a). 
452. Damages pendente lite result from the ongoing litigation. See BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 1134 (6th ed. 1990). 
453. See FED. R CIY. P. 65(a). 
454. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (citing Fleitmann v. Wels-
bach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27, 29 (1916». 
455. Id. at 510. It is not surprising that Justice Black, in authoring Beacon Theatres, 
took this bold step to protect the jury trial. From a recent biography of Justice 
Black: 
No stronger proponent of jury trial has ever sat on the Supreme 
Court than this old trial lawyer .... When a jury decides against 
someone, Black liked to say, the losing litigant knows he has gotten a 
fair shot, whereas if the judge decides against someone, the litigant 
often thinks that the system is rotten. 
ROGER K NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 322 (1994). 
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tices.4S6 The analysis of Beacon Theatres has become an important ele-
ment in resolving problems of the applicability vel non of trial by 
jury under the Seventh Amendment even where the merger of law 
and equity is not a factor.4s7 
While Higgins relied primarily on the result of Beacon Theatres as 
persuasive precedent in interpreting the effect of Maryland Rule 2-
301 on the right to trial by jury,4S8 it is not clear that the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland intended to follow the route traveled by the 
Supreme Court in reaching that result. In short, Higgins contains no 
analysis as to whether the demarcation between law and equity, so 
critical for purposes of trial by jury, is flexible or static; it does not 
address whether equity may be reduced by enhancement of the ade-
quacy of legal remedies through procedural reform. 
Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland has applied Beacon Theatres or Higgins respectively to 
flesh out the constitutional implications of a trial court's power to 
grant a new trial, those decisions, particularly Beacon Theatres, may 
shed light on such an inquiry. Beacon Theatres did not simply protect 
the jury trial right of a legal counterclaimant in a suit that 
originated in equity.459 The case provided a basis for re-examination 
of the line between law and equity. It established a clear bias in 
favor of jury trial when that right comes into conflict with the tradi-
456. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 506. The notion that the Seventh Amendment 
jury trial right should not be fettered strictly to circumstances as they existed 
in 1791 is not new. In Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830), Justice 
Story parsed the phrase "suits at common law" in light of the intent of the 
framers: 
By common law, they meant what the constitution denominated in the 
third article "law;" not merely suits, which the common law recog-
nized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal 
rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to 
those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable 
remedies were administered. 
Id. at 447 (emphasis added). This flexible notion allowed the right to jury trial 
to be extended to actions that did not exist in 1791 but were deemed anal<>-
gous to actions that did. See generaUy Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) 
(stating that the Seventh Amendment applies to the issue of liability under 
section 1319(b) of the Clean Water Act); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 
(1974) (involving a jury trial in a racial discrimination suit under the housing 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968). 
457. See McCoid, supra note 418, at 6. 
458. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 543, 530 A.2d 724, 729 (1987). 
459. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 508. 
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tional prerogatives of equity460 that have generally allowed a jury 
trial to carry the day.461 That bias may yet influence the current reas-
sessment of the new trial power of a trial judge in the federal 
courts. 
Higgins, perhaps because its rationale was ostensibly narrower 
than that of Beacon Theatres, has so far provided less clear guidance 
to later decisions that have addressed the right to jury trial. The 
court took a protective view of jury trial in the context of deciding 
the effect of merger on the adjudication of mixed claims.462 This 
sheds some light on how to grapple with other jury trial issues, even 
if it does not provide an analytical framework for such grappling. 
B. The Development of the Beacon Theatres Analysis in Later Supreme 
Court Decisions 
The next occasion after Beacon Theatres for the Supreme Court 
to address the right to trial by jury was Dairy Queen, Inc. v. WOOd,463 
which involved the unhappy demise of a franchise relationship. The 
plaintiffs owned the Dairy Queen trademark.464 The defendant con-
tracted with the plaintiffs for use of the trademark in certain por-
tions of Pennsylvania.465 The contract provided for payments of 50% 
of gross receipts as well as annual minimum payments without re-
gard to receipts.466 The plaintiffs notified the defendant of a breach 
in the contract's payment provisions and asserted that the contract 
would be terminated unless the default was remedied 
immediately.467 
The plaintiffs sued in federal district court when the defendant 
continued to use the trademark after termination of the agree-
460. Professor McCoid sees this bias as rooted in a "fundamental assumption that 
jury trial is a desirable form of fact-finding in a democratic society." McCoid, 
supra note 418, at 15. 
461. Another factor that has played a crucial role in the development of the law of 
jury trial in the federal courts, and which has strongly favored the jury trial, is 
the Court's decision in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), where the Court 
followed Justice Story's analogical approach in Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 
Pet.) 433,446 (1830), in determining that actions for damages under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1994), were triable to a jury. See Curtis, 
415 U.S. at 198. 
462. See Higgins, 310 Md. at 541, 530 A.2d at 728. 
463. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
464. See id. at 473. 
465. See id. 
466. See id. at 473-74. 
467. See id. at 474. 
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ment.468 The plaintiffs' suit alleged that the defendant had commit-
ted a material breach of the contract, that its use of the trademark 
after plaintiffs' termination of the contract constituted trademark 
infringement, that the defendant's financial condition was unstable, 
and that plaintiffs were threatened with irreparable injury for which 
they had no adequate remedy at law.469 The plaintiffs sought tempo-
rary and permanent injunctions of the defendant from use of plain-
tiffs' trademark, an accounting to determine the exact amount ow-
ing to the plaintiffs, and an injunction pending the accounting to 
prevent defendant from collecting any money from Dairy Queen 
stores in its territory.470 
The defendant did not counterclaim. Denying that it had 
breached the contract and contending that the parties had orally 
modified it, the defendant asserted laches and estoppel on the part 
of plaintiffs that had permitted the defendant to spend large 
amounts of money developing its right to use the trademark and al-
leged violations of the antitrust laws by the defendant in dealing 
with the trademark.47I The defendant demanded a trial by jury.472 
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to strike 
defendant's jury demand on the basis that either the action was 
purely equitable or that whatever legal issues were raised were inci-
dental to equitable issues.473 The Court cut through the plaintiffs' 
468. See id. 
469. See id. at 475. 
470. See id. 
471. See id. at 475-76. 
472. See id. at 476. 
473. Id. at 470. The Court summarily dismissed the plaintiffs' contention that there 
was no right to jury trial in the action because the legal issues were merely in-
cidental to equitable issues. The Court cited Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 117 
(1891) for the proposition that a court of equity cannot even take jurisdiction 
of a suit "in which a claim properly cognizable only at law is united in the 
same pleadings with a claim for equitable relief." Dairy Queen Inc., 369 U.S. at 
470-71 (citing Scott, 140 U.S. at 117). Scott seems more to be based on the ap-
propriateness of the exercise of equitable jurisdiction in the absence of inade-
quacy of the remedy at law. It does not appear to address the effect on jury 
trial when resort to equity is appropriate. To state that jury trial may not be 
sidestepped when the legal relief is incidental may stretch Scott somewhat. The 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland clearly has not accepted Justice Black's 
view that the right to jury trial must be preserved when legal and equitable 
claims and remedies are combined in the same pleadings. See Mattingly v. Mat-
tingly, 92 Md. App. 248, 607 A.2d 575 (1992); Kahle v. John McDonough 
Builders, Inc., 85 Md. App. 141,582 A.2d 557 (1990); Fink v. Pohlman, 85 Md. 
App. 106, 582 A.2d 539 (1990). 
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claims for relief and agreed with the defendant that "insofar as the 
complaint requests a money judgment it presents a claim which is 
unquestionably legal. "474 The Court viewed the suit as a claim by 
plaintiffs to recover "whatever was owed then under the contract," 
plus "damages for infringement of their trademark .... "475 As to 
the contention by the plaintiffs that they sought an accounting, the 
Court stated that "the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be 
made to depend upon the choices of words in the pleadings. "476 
Turning to Beacon Theatres, the Court stated that the right to 
maintain a suit for equitable accounting required absence of an ad-
equate remedy at law.477 The accounts between the parties must be 
of such a complicated nature that "only a court of equity can satis-
factorily unravel them. "478 The Court pointed to the ability of a trial 
court, under Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
appoint masters to assist a jury to untangle accounts too compli-
cated for them to do so alone.479 In light of the procedures availa-
ble under the federal rules, the Court opined that "it will indeed be 
the rare case" in which it will be shown that equitable jurisdiction is 
properly invoked.480 The Court concluded that this was not such a 
rare case: 
A jury, under proper instructions from the court, could 
readily determine the recovery, if any, to be had here, 
whether the theory finally settled upon is that of breach of 
contract, that of trademark infringement, or any combina-
tion of the two. The legal remedy is not inadequate merely 
because the measure of damages may necessitate a look 
into petitioner's business records.481 
In Dairy Queen, the Court took the Beacon Theatres analysis an 
important step further. No question of the effect of the merger of 
law and equity or the order of trial of joined legal and equitable 
claims was presented in Dairy Queen. The enhanced ability of juries 
under procedures of the federal rules to adjudicate more compli-
474. 369 U.S. at 476. 
475. [d. 
476. [d. at 477-78. 
477. See id. at 478. 
478. [d. at 478 (citing Kirby v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R Co., 120 U.S. 
130, 134 (1887». 
479. See id. 
480. [d. 
481. [d. at 478-79. 
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cated matters contracted the scope of equity. Willingness of the 
Court to reappraise the scope of equity compels that a suit that 
might once have been heard in equity must be tried by jury. 
Although this approach has not been applied to the scope of the 
power of a trial judge by the Supreme Court or the Maryland Court 
of Appeals,482 it could be. If jurors, because of procedural reforms483 
or even because of a higher level of literacy and education in the 
general population, may adjudicate more sophisticated matters, per-
haps the need to control a jury should be contracted. 
In its next opportunity to address the scope of the right to jury 
trial under the Seventh Amendment, Ross v. Bernhard,484 the Court 
enhanced the scope of the right and provided a further framework 
for determining its applicability. Ross involved a shareholders' deriv-
ative action.485 The trial court denied the defendants' motion to 
strike the plaintiffs' jury demand and the Second Circuit reversed.486 
The district court evaluated the question of the jury trial right as if 
the corporation itself had sued on its own behalf.487 The court of 
appeals regarded the suit as equitable in nature.488 Indeed, the Su-
preme Court noted that the common law refused to entertain suits 
by shareholders to hold corporate managers responsible and that 
equity entertained "a suit to enforce a corporate cause of action 
against officers, directors, and third parties. "489 In such a suit there 
were two things to adjudicate: the corporate claim itself and the 
plaintiff stockholder's right to sue on behalf of the corporation.490 
482. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland appears to view the equitable na-
ture of accounting as unaffected by procedural changes. See Mattingly v. Mat-
tingly, 92 Md. App. 248, 607 A.2d 575 (1992). 
483. 9 JAMES W. MOORE. MOORE'S FEo. PRAC. § 38.42[3] [c] (3d ed. 1997) suggests 
procedural rules that have enhanced the potential for juries to adjudicate 
complex cases. Such procedures include: Rule 53, appointment of a master; 
Rule 42, separate trial of claims or issues; Rule 16, pretrial conferences to sim-
plify issues; Rule 49, use of special verdicts. Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence provides for use of summaries of voluminous materials. In In n1 Japa-
nese Elec. Prods., 631 F.2d 1069, 1088 (3d Cir. 1980), the court, in rejecting a 
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment, recommended thoughtful 
use of the Manual for Complex Litigation to enhance a jury's capabilities in 
complicated cases. 
484. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
485. See id. 
486. See id. at 532. 
487. See id. 
488. See Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1968). 
489. Ross, 396 U.S. at 534. 
490. See id. at 534-35. 
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As it had done in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, the Court 
looked to the reason that equity had acted: the unwillingness of the 
courts of law to entertain a suit by a shareholder had left such a 
party without an adequate legal remedy.491 Once equity assumed ju-
risdiction to decide the question of the shareholder's standing, it 
could then decide the corporate claim without a jury.492 This was so 
whether or not the corporate claim would have been triable by a 
jury if the corporation itself were the plaintiff.493 
Reversing the court of appeals's denial of the plaintiffs' right to 
a jury trial, the Court assessed the scope of equity in light of proce-
dure under the federal rules: "Under the Rules there is only one 
action - a "civil action" - in which all claims may be joined and all 
remedies are available. Purely procedural impediments to the pres-
entation of any issue by any party, based on the difference between 
law and equity, were destroyed. "494 In a merged civil action, the trial 
court, able to entertain all equitable issues, may resolve the question 
of the plaintiff's standing to sue.495 If it deems the plaintiff has 
standing, it may then try the corporate claim to a jury if it would 
otherwise be entitled to jury tria1.496 
The magnitude of what the Court wrote in Ross may perhaps 
most clearly be seen through Justice Stewart's stinging dissent: 
In holding as it does that the plaintiff in a shareholder's de-
rivative suit is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, the 
Court today seems to rely upon some sort of ill-defined 
combination of the Seventh Amendment and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Somehow the Amendment and 
the Rules magically interact to do what each separately was 
expressly intended not to do, namely, to enlarge the right 
to a jury trial in civil actions brought in the courts of the 
United States.497 
Whether Justice Stewart's polemical language is necessary, the Court 
did precisely as he said. It did something it had not done in Beacon 
Theatres or Dairy Queen. It took an action from the equity side of the 
law/equity line and placed it on the law side. 
491. See id. at 539. 
492. See id. at 537. 
493. See id. at 538. 
494. [d. at 53940. 
495. See id. at 540. 
496. See id. 
497. [d. at 543 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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In a reductio ad absurdam near the end of his dissent, Justice 
Stewart questioned where the process would end: 
An equitable suit for an injunction, for instance, often in-
volves issues of fact which, if damages had been sought, 
would have been triable to a jury. Does this mean that in a 
suit asking only for injunctive relief these factual issues must 
be tried to the jury, with the judge left to decide only 
whether, given the jury's findings, an injunction is the ap-
propriate remedy?498 
Justice Stewart was not off the mark when he observed: "The 
Court's decision today can perhaps be explained as a reflection of 
an unarticulated but apparently overpowering bias in favor of jury 
trials in civil actions. "499 This bias has been described as based on 
the notion that jury fact-finding serves democratic values.5°O 
In addition to applying the methodology of Beacon Theatres to 
the matter of characterizing an action for purposes of trial by jury, 
the Court, in a famous footnote, set out a framework for determin-
ing the nature of an action that has served to reinforce the bias in 
favor of jury trial decried by Justice Stewart: "Al; our cases indicate, 
the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the 
pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the 
remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of 
juries. "501 
The first of these, pre-merger custom, while perhaps an attempt 
to restate the obvious, actually creates an ambiguity in determining 
the jury trial right.502 The third, the practical abilities of juries, for a 
498. [d. at 549-50. Interestingly, the answer to this undoubtedly rhetorical question 
in Higgins v. Bames, 310 Md. 532, 530 A2d 724 (1987), is not as clear as Jus-
tice Stewart might assume. In determining to protect the right to trial by jury 
it was the presence of legal issues, rather than a discrete claim asserted by the 
defendant, that triggered the need to protect the right to jury trial. See supra 
note 439 and accompanying text. 
499. RDss, 396 U.S. at 551 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
500. See Rees, supra note 5, at 355-56. 
501. RDss, 396 U.S. at 538, n.lO. 
502. The merger of law and equity in the federal system occurred with the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules in 1938. See, e.g., ill. at 53940. The adoption of the 
Seventh Amendment, the critical point for distinguishing the respective scopes 
of law and equity, occurred in 1791. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 
(1974); Ross, 396 U.S. at 533-34. Passage of nearly a century and a half necessa-
rily entails a different landscape from which to determine the scope of the 
right to trial by jury. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History 
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time created the erroneous impression that the Court's ability to 
recharacterize the nature of an action was a double-edged sword.503 
In the years since Ross, the Supreme Court, in determining the ap-
plicability of a right to trial by jury in particular cases, has demon-
strated the "bias" in favor of jury trial that Justice Stewart decried in 
his dissent in Ross. In fact, in all but one case, the Court has held 
that there is a right to a trial by jury.504 The Supreme Court's recent 
of the Sroenth Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 643 (1973); Lettow, supra note 
16, at 505-08 (discussing the continual evolution of the judge-jury relation-
ship). 
503. For example, in In R.e Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (w.n. 
Wash. 1976), a district court judge struck plaintiffs' demand for jury trial in an 
action under state and federal securities laws. See id. at 108. Noting the enor-
mous amount of documentary material that had been generated in the case, 
the court stated that "[t]he factual issues, the complexity of the evidence that 
will be required to explore those issues, and the time required to do so leads 
to the conclusion that a jury would not be a rational and capable fact finder." 
Id. at 103. For the court, the jury's inability to act as a rational and capable 
fact finder raised Fifth Amendment due process considerations. See id. at 104. 
It described superior capability to adjudicate such a case and justified its ac-
tion on the basis of the third part of footnote 10 in Ross. See id. at 105. The 
c'ourt appeared to view the right to civil jury trial in the federal courts not as 
a constitutional mandate but rather as a general policy preference: "There 
can be no doubt that jury trials are favored in civil litigation." Id. at 103. This 
approach has made little headway in the lower federal courts. See FDIC v. Uni-
versity Anclote, Inc., 764 F.2d 804, 814, n.6 (11th Cir. 1985), cm. denied, 474 
U.S. 1059 (1985); In 1T! United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub. nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). The 
denial of certiorari in both cases shows that the Supreme Court has offered 
no further encouragement for development of a complexity exception to the 
right to jury trial. This has led leading commentators to state: 
Whether the Supreme Court wiIl be willing to utilize the Ross test, 
particularly the third criterion, in setting a limit on the Beacon Thea-
tm principle is highly debatable. In the more than twenty years since 
Ross there has been no indication that the Court is likely to retreat 
from its expansive interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. 
Friedenthal, supra note 4, at 499 (footnote omitted). In Higgins v. Barnes, the 
court of appeals shared this skepticism about a complexity exception to the 
right to trial by jury. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 547, n.7, 530 A.2d 
724, 731, n.7 (1987). 
504. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998) 
(claiming damages under the Copyright Act); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and 
Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 561 (1990) (claiming breach of a 
union's duty of fair representation); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 
U.S. 33, 36 (1989) (bringing an action by bankruptcy trustee to set aside 
fraudulent transfers); Tun v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987) (request-
ing a fine to be imposed under the Clean Water Act). In Markman v. Westview 
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trend of favoring jury trials is largely a result of a presumption in 
favor of jury-determined damages. Historically, however, the Court's 
decision to allow a jury trial was reached through either historical 
analogy or mere indulgence in the affinity for a jury determination 
of damages. 
In TuU v. United States,5OS the first of these post-Ross decisions, 
the federal government sued a developer for a civil penalty under 
the Clean Water Act506 for dumping fill on the wetlands of 
Chincoteague Island, Virginia.507 Such a cause of action did not ex-
ist in 1791. To determine whether such action entailed a right to 
jury trial, the Court focused on whether the case was analogous to 
suits at common law or those tried in courts of equity or admiralty, 
neither of which traditionally required a trial by jury.508 The Court 
explained that, in addressing this question, it needed to "examine 
both the nature of the action and the remedy sought. "509 
Seeking a jury trial, the developer analogized the suit of the 
government to an action for a debt, which is a suit at common 
law.510 The Court accepted this analogy.511 Although the Government 
contended that the action was analogous to a suit to abate a public 
nuisance, the Court rejected this argument, explaining: "V'/le need 
not rest our conclusion on what has been called an 'abstruse histor-
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), the Court held that in an action for pat-
ent infringement, construction of the patent, including the patent's terms of 
art within the claim, was within the province of the court. See id. at 372. In 
Parklnne Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Court held that collateral 
estoppel may preclude a trial by jury if the facts adjudicated against a party in 
a prior equitable action are subsequently alleged by a different party in a later 
action. See id. at 337. Parklnne is significant because it does not adhere to the 
policy of favoring a jury trial as found in Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and 
Ross. It does accept their teaching that the line demarcating the right to trial 
by jury is not fixed in antiquity. See id. at 334-35. Strict adherence to the mutu-
ality of estoppel rule, extant in 1791 would have required a jury trial in the 
second action. It must be noted, however, that Parklnne is distinguishable from 
the Court's other civil jury trial cases of recent years because it involved the 
effects of collateral estoppel on a jury trial in two separate lawsuits, an issue 
that Beacon Theatres and its progeny did not confront. 
505. 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
506. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994). 
507. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 414. 
508. See id. at 417. 
509. Id. 
510. See id. at 418. 
511. See id. at 420. 
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ical' search for the nearest eighteenth century analog. "512 The Court 
focused on the relief sought, a penalty, which could only be tradi-
tionally enforced in courts of law.513 The net result of Tull is a de-
emphasis on the historical nature of the action and a re-focus on 
the forum that historically determined the remedy. 
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberlfl4 was the next case in which the 
Court addressed the applicability vel non of the right to jury trial. In 
Granfinanciera, a bankruptcy trustee sought to set aside a fraudulent 
transfer.515 Unlike the action in Tul~ however, this type of action did 
exist in the eighteenth century.516 The Court therefore emphasized 
equally the historical nature of the action and the relief sought, de-
termining that such actions were maintainable at law.517 The Court 
held that the plaintiff "plainly [sought] relief traditionally provided 
by law courts or on the law side of courts having both legal and eq-
uitable dockets" because the plaintiff merely sought the payment of 
money and did not request an accounting.5lS 
In some situations, however, analogy is not at all helpful in de-
termining the nature of the claim and the existence of a right to a 
jury trial. In Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry,519 
the plaintiffs sued their union under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act520 for breaching the duty of fair representation-an action 
that did not exist in eighteenth century England.521 The Court was 
essentially unable to determine whether the action was historically 
S12. [d. at 421, (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. S31, S38, n. 10 (1970». 
S13. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 422. The Court found that while the defendant had a 
right to a jury trial as to liability, Congressional assignment for determining 
the amount of the penalty left solely to the judge does not violate the defend-
ant's right to a trial by jury. See itt. at 426-27. The Court explained that Con-
gress could have fixed the penalty itself and therefore, could delegate the task 
to a trial judge. See itt. at 427. Bifurcation of liability and penalty between jury 
and judge prompted Justice Scalia to state in his separate opinion: "[w]hile 
purporting to base its determination (quite correctly) upon historical practice, 
the Court creates a form of civil adjudication I have never encountered. I can 
recall no precedent for judgment of civil liability by jury but assessment of 
amount by the court." [d. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
S14. 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
SIS. See itt. at 36. 
S16. See itt. at 43. 
S17. See itt. 
S18. [d. at 49. 
S19. 494 U.S. 558 (1990). 
520. 29 U.S.c. § 185 (1994). 
S21. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 565. 
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analogous to legal or equitable actions.S22 It concluded that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial because "the money damages 
[they sought] are the type of relief traditionally awarded by courts 
of law. "523 This analysis, like that of Tun, is historical in a looser 
sense than that of Granfinanciera. Once the remedy is ascertained, if 
it is monetary, then there is a right to jury trial. 
With time, the Court has relied less and less on the ability of a 
party to establish analogies to historical causes of action grounded 
in law or equity. In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,524 the 
Court found the right to trial by jury inapplicable to the action in-
volved and de-emphasized strict historical analogy to eighteenth 
century actions.S2S It did so mostly because it could find no answer 
there.526 In the absence of such guidance, the Court explained: "We 
are forced to make a judgment about the scope of the Seventh 
Amendment guarantee without the benefit of any foolproof test. "527 
In deciding whether issues in an action under the patent law might 
be determined by Congress to be triable by jury, the Court de-
emphasized minute details of the right as it existed in the eight-
eenth century: '"Only those incidents which are regarded as funda-
mental, as inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial by 
jury, are placed beyond the reach of the legislature. "'528 Without the 
assistance of historical fetters, the Court held that "functional con-
siderations . . . play their part in the choice between judge and jury 
to define terms of art. "529 
The Court concluded that construction of written instruments 
"is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do bet-
ter than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis. "530 The Court 
regarded the jury's capabilities-evaluating demeanor, sensing the 
mainsprings of human conduct, or reflecting community stan-
522. The union, which in North Carolina did not want a jury trial, analogized the 
cause of action to an action for breach of trust. See id. at 567. The employees 
analogized it to attorney malpractice. See id. at 568. Although the Court found 
the trust analogy more persuasive, it concluded the historical analysis was "in 
equipoise as to whether respondents are entitled to a jury trial." Id. at 570. 
523. Id. at 573. 
524. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
525. See id. at 384 (noting that when the practice of historical analogy provides no 
clear answer, the Court must make a judgment without its benefit). 
526. See id. at 377. 
527. Id. 
528. Id. at 377-78 (quoting TulI v. United States, 481 U.S. 412. 426 (1987». 
529. Id. at 388. 
530. Id. 
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dards-as "much less significant than a trained ability to evaluate 
the testimony in relation to the overall structure of the patent. "531 
The Supreme Court's disposition does not represent a com-
plete abandonment of the right to a jury trial in Markman; however 
it must be noted that the Court's decision in Markman takes only 
part of the case from the jury. The Court acknowledged that once 
the patent is construed, the question of infringement is one for the 
jury.532 The Court's holding did not arrogate the determination of 
damages to the trial court. Like Tull and Terry, Markman departs 
from a strict historical analysis of trial by jury. Unlike Tull and Terry, 
it embraced a functional rather than a remedial analysis. Although 
the Court emphasized functions the judge might more adequately 
perform, it did recognize functions that are more appropriate for a 
jury. 
Finally, in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,533 the Court 
emphasized the importance of the jury's role in determining dam-
ages.534 In Feltner, the plaintiff sought statutory damages under the 
Copyright Act.535 The defendant sought trial by jury.536 Unable to 
find that the statute guaranteed this right, the Court turned to the 
Seventh Amendment.537 Looking to English and early American 
precedents, the Court determined that copyright claims were triable 
to a jury.538 Not denying this finding, the plaintiff contended that 
the statute itself created an equitable remedy.539 The Court reverted 
531. [d. at 389-90. 
532. See id. at 384 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1854) (stating that 
the determination of whether an infringment occurred is a question of fact 
for the jury». 
533. 118 S. Ct. 1279 (1998). 
534. See id. at 1283-88. 
535. See id. at 1282; 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l). 
536. See Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1282. 
537. See id. at 1284 (stating that upon determining that there is no statutory right 
to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages, the 
court must turn to the constitutional question). 
538. See id. at 1285-86 (stating that historical evidence suggests that copyright ac-
tions seeking damages are tried by a jury). 
539. See id. at 1286 (noting that the plaintiff contended that statutory damages are 
clearly equitable in nature). The plaintiff's argument was based on the lan-
guage of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l), which provides: 
Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright 
owner may elect at any time before final judgment is rendered, to re-
cover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory 
damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to 
anyone work, ... in a sum of not less than $500 or more than 
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to the "general rule" that monetary relief is legal.540 Focusing specif-
ically on the damages remedy, the Court explained: "The right to a 
jury trial includes the right to have a jury detennine the amount of 
statutory damages, if any, awarded to the copyright owner. It has 
long been recognized that' 'by the law the jury are the judges of the 
damages. "'541 The Seventh Amendment thus supplied the right to 
jury trial that Congress had not provided. 
Feltner and Markman reflect the most recent pronouncements 
on the allocation of power between judge and jury in the federal 
courts under the Seventh Amendment. If Markman allows an expan-
sive modification of the trial court's role due to the judge's superior 
capacity to certain issues pertaining to liability, then it would seem 
that Feltner would sanction a similar recognition of the jury's power, 
even at the expense of the trial court's power to grant a new trial. 
The Supreme Court has not yet articulated such a principle. In-
deed, the power of appellate courts in the federal system even to re-
view trial court dispositions of new trial motions has been just re-
cently definitively established.542 Now that such review is permitted, 
it is difficult to think of a more appropriate subject than the inter-
play of the grant of new trial with the Seventh Amendment because, 
as the Supreme Court has noted: "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-
finding body is of such importance and occupies so finn a place in 
our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the 
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care. "543 
This assertion provides a uniform and clear rationale for the in-
creasing number of federal appellate decisions that have assessed 
the granting of new trial orders in light of the Seventh 
Amendment. 
C. Trial by Jury in Maryland After Higgins 
The Supreme Court case law demonstrates how the right to 
jury trial has evolved generally in the federal system in the wake of 
$20,000 as the court considers just. 
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1994). 
540. See Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1287 (citing Chauifers, Teamsters and Helpers Local 
No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990». 
541. [d. at 1287 (quoting Lord Townshend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 151, 86 Eng. 
Rep. 994, 994-95 (C.P. 1677». 
542. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 435-36 (1996) 
(holding that appellate review of a trial judge'S disposition regarding a motion 
for a new trial is permitted). For a discussion of Gasperini, see infra notes 649-
64 and accompanying text. 
543. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935). 
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Beacon Theatres. It is fairly easy to see how this right developed from 
seeds planted in Beacon Theatres. Likewise, this evolution might pro-
vide guidance for the development of the right to jury trial in Mary-
land, particularly in light of the Higgins court's adoption of the re-
sult and some of the language of Beacon Theatres. Yet, subsequent 
decisions by the Maryland appellate courts do not appear to have 
exhibited the same bias toward jury trials that the Supreme Court 
has shown when interpreting the Seventh Amendment. 
In the first appellate case that grappled with the question of 
trial by jury after Higgins, the court of special appeals, in Hashem v. 
Taheri,544 was true to and arguably extended Higgins. In Hashem, the 
plaintiff filed both stockholder derivative claims and direct claims 
against both a corporation and individuals.545 The plaintiff de-
manded a jury trial.546 The defendants responded that the plaintiff 
was not a stockholder of the corporation, and therefore was unable 
to bring stockholder derivative claims or direct claims.547 
At trial, the court decided to try both issues in the case without 
a jury: the plaintiff's status in the corporation and the plaintiff's eq-
uity-based derivative claims.548 Mter the nonjury trial, the court 
ruled that the plaintiff was a stockholder and granted equitable re-
lief as to his equitable derivative claims.549 Before a jury was em-
paneled to hear the plaintiff's remaining legal claims, the defend-
ants filed an interlocutory appeaJ.550 The defendants contended that 
they were deprived of their right to trial by jury on the issue of 
whether the plaintiff was a stockholder, an issue necessary to the 
success of both legal and equitable claims of the plaintiff.55t 
The court held that although Hashem and Higgins were factually 
distinguishable, Hashem required the same result.552 As noted by the 
Hashem court, the court of appeals in Higgins held that the trial 
544. 82 Md. App. 269, 571 A2d 837 (1990). 
545. See id. at 270-71, 571 A2d at 838. 
546. See id. at 271, 571 A.2d at 838. 
547. See id. 
548. See id. at 271, 571 A.2d at 838-39. The court originally granted the plaintiff's 
motion to bifurcate these two issues; however, on the scheduled date of the 
first trial, the court decided that both issues would be heard simultaneously by 
the court without a jury. See id. 
549. See id. at 271, 571 A.2d at 839. 
550. See id. at 271-72, 571 A.2d at 839 (holding that the appeal was proper from an 
order granting an injunction under Maryland Code Annotated, Courts and Ju-
dicial Proceedings Article, section 12-303(3)(i». 
551. See id. at 273, 571 A.2d at 840. 
552. See id. at 273-74, 571 A.2d at 840. 
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court could not make a determination of the plaintiff's status as a 
stockholder that would be binding for purposes of plaintiffs legal 
claims in adjudicating claims not triable by jury.553 Likewise protect-
ing the defendant's right to a jury trial, notwithstanding its recogni-
tion of the historically equitable nature of the stockholder's deriva-
tive suit,554 the Hashem court followed Higgins and noted that this 
historical pedigree did not entitle the chancellor to use his "clean-
up" powers to resolve the entire suit.555 
The Hashem court also relied on Rnss v. Bernhard 556_a case in 
which the Supreme Court had confronted the issue of jury trial in 
shareholders derivative suits.557 Protecting the defendant's right to a 
jury trial notwithstanding its recognition of the historically equitable 
nature of the stockholder's derivative suit,558 the court implicitly ac-
cepted the teaching of Rnss that this historical pedigree did not en-
title the chancellor to use "clean-up" powers to resolve the entire 
suit.559 
By holding that the plaintiff's status was within the province of 
a jury, the Hashem court arguably went further than the Court in 
RnsS.560 Unlike the Court in Rnss, the court in Hashem did not view 
plaintiff's status, at least insofar as it entailed a determination of 
whether he was a stockholder, as a preliminary matter.561 The court 
in Hashem, unlike the Court in Rnss, did not assert the rationale that 
the expansion of remedies at law had affected the scope of equity.562 
553. See id. at 273, 571 A.2d at 839 (citing Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 530 A2d 
724 (1987». 
554. See id. at 271 n.3, 571 A.2d at 838 n.3 (citing Waller v. Waller, 187 Md. 185, 
189-92,49 A2d 449, 452-53 (1946». 
555. See id. at 272, 571 A2d at 839 (citing Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 54041, 
530 A.2d 724, 728 (1987». 
556. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
557. See Hashem, 82 Md. App. at 273-74, 571 A2d at 840. 
558. See id. at 271 n.3, 571 A2d at 838 n.3. 
559. See id. at 272, 571 A.2d at 839. 
560. In Ross, the Court observed that, "[iJ n a civil action presenting a stockholder's 
derivative claim, the court after passing upon plaintiff's right to sue on behalf 
of the corporation is now able to try the corporate claim for damages with the 
aid of a jury." Ross, 396 U.S. at 540 (footnote omitted). 
561. The Court in Ross appeared to sue in terms of satisfaction of conditions prece-
dent, noting: "One precondition for the suit was a valid claim on which the 
corporation could have sued; another was that the corporation itself had re-
fused to proceed after suitable demand, unless excused by extraordinary con-
ditions." Id. at 534 (footnote omitted). 
562. See id. at 540 (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 
(1959». 
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It viewed the case simply as presenting factually interwoven legal 
and equitable claims. It followed Higgins in requiring in such a situ-
ation that the issue important to the legal claim be tried first to a 
jury. Implicitly, however, the court diminished the power of equity 
in a stockholder's derivative suit. 
Yet, the Hashem court's embrace of such a broad right to a jury 
trial has not typified subsequent decisions by the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland. In a trilogy of cases soon after Hashem, the 
court of special appeals provided much less protection to the right 
to jury trial than had the Hashem court. These decisions were Fink v. 
Pohlman,563 Kahle v. John McDonough Builders, Inc.,564 and Mattingly v. 
Mattingly.565 In Fink, the decedent, survived by four children, had ex-
ecuted a codicil essentially disinheriting two of her children.566 One 
of the children who had been disinherited alleged that she had 
made an agreement with the personal representative of the estate, 
her brother, in which she would receive a one-quarter share of the 
estate in exchange for her not contesting the probate of the will in 
the state of Florida.567 After the estate proceeding was resolved, the 
personal representative offered his sister a sum that was much less 
than what she understood to be one quarter of the estate.568 
The plaintiff sued the personal representative and another sib-
ling in Maryland for breach of contract, conversion, and .breach of 
truSt.569 The breach of contract claim was against the personal rep-
resentative in that capacity only.570 The trial court dismissed the 
claim against the personal representative, holding that Maryland 
courts do not have jurisdiction over a personal representative ap-
pointed in Florida.571 It also found that there was no conversion 
where there was an alleged breach of contract and that a familial 
relationship was an insufficient basis for finding a fiduciary relation-
ship or imposing a constructive trust.572 The trial court struck the 
plaintiff's jury demand as to the breach of trust claims.573 
563. 85 Md. App. 106, 582 A2d 539 (1990). 
564. 85 Md. App. 141, 582 A2d 557 (1990). 
565. 92 Md. App. 248, 607 A2d 575 (1992). 
566. See Fink, 85 Md. App. at 109-10, 582 A2d at 540. 
567. See id. at 110, 582 A.2d at 541. 
568. See id. 
569. See id. at 110-11, 582 A.2d at 541. 
570. See id. at 111, 582 A.2d at 541. 
571. See id. at 111-12, 582 A2d at 541. 
572. See id. at 111, 582 A2d at 541. 
573. See id. 
1998] The Motion for New Trial 75 
In consideration of the plaintiff's contention that her right to 
jury trial had been infringed,574 the court cited Higgins and Hashem, 
but insisted that "[ t] he effect of the merger of law and equity and 
the Higgins decision is not to convert non jury cases to jury cases. "575 
Noting that it might be presented with a different question if a 
count for breach of contract had survived, the court held that there 
was no right to trial by jury on the breach of trust claim.576 
The plaintiff sought damages against the defendants individu-
ally to the extent that the remaining assets of the estate were not 
sufficient to provide her one-quarter of the original estate.S77 The 
court perceived this as a claim for legal relief, but regarded it as a 
collateral request.578 Thus, the equitable character of the claim was 
unaltered.579 The lack of a cause of action which could give rise to 
the legal remedy the plaintiff sought made her right to jury trial 
problematic. The court's implicit determination with respect to the 
assertion of breach of fiduciary duty, in the context of decedents' 
estates, was prescient; the court of appeals later so held.58o 
Nevertheless, the route by which the court reached its result 
does not seem entirely consistent with Higgins. Clearly the court in 
Fink acted upon its characterization of the plaintiff's remaining 
claim as equitable.581 In Higgins, the court addressed the characteri-
zation of an action and its effect on jury trial: "In the federal 
courts, then, the entitlement to jury trial is not determined simply 
by the characterization of the action as a whole as legal or equita-
ble. "582 Placing its imprimatur on this federal approach, the Higgins 
court also commented: "Alternatives to the federal approach fail to 
safeguard the constitutionally protected right to jury trial. Granting 
or denying a jury trial based on the characterization of the action as 
'essentially legal' or 'essentially equitable' has produced unpredict-
574. The court also addressed the question of the liability of the defendants only 
as individuals, upholding the trial court's dismissal of the conversion claim be-
cause it is necessary to show a positive tortious act to make out a claim for 
conversion arising out of a contract. See ill. at 115, 582 A.2d at 543. The issue 
of the liability of the personal representative was not appealed. See ill. at 112, 
582 A.2d at 541. 
575. [d. at 120, 582 A.2d at 546. 
576. See ill. at 120-21, 582 A.2d at 546. 
577. See ill. at 121, 582 A.2d at 546. 
578. See ill. 
579. See ill. 
580. See Kann v. Kann, 344 Md. 689, 690 A.2d 509 (1997). 
581. See Fink, 85 Md. App. at 121, 582 A.2d at 546. 
582. Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 547, 530 A.2d 724, 731 (1987). 
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able results and offers little certainty to litigants in planning their 
own actions. "583 The approach of the court in Fink has not been em-
ployed by lower federal courts.584 
The next in the trilogy of court of special appeals cases ad-
dressing Higgi~type problems is Kahle v. John McDonough Builders, 
Inc.58s In Kahle, a builder sought to enforce a mechanic's lien for 
failure of the defendants to make payments on a cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contract.586 The defendants counterclaimed for breach of con-
tract,S87 contending that the builder had established a relationship 
of trust and confidence with them and that he had breached this 
trust in not informing them of costs far beyond those originally pro-
jected.s88 The defendants demanded a jury trial.S89 
In a joint jury and bench trial, the jury heard the defendants' 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, which was for $250,000, while the 
plaintiff's claim to enforce the mechanic's lien was heard without a 
jury.S90 The trial judge determined that defendants owed the builder 
$145,151.25.s91 He limited the jury to consideration only of defective 
workmanship,592 resulting in a verdict for the defendants of 
$12,000.593 The trial court subtracted that amount from the amount 
it awarded on the mechanic's lien claim.s94 
The court of special appeals held that the defendants were not 
unjustly deprived of a jury trial under the circumstances.s9s The 
court viewed both the suit to enforce the mechanic's lien and the 
breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim as equitable.s96 This is appro-
583. [d. at 548, 530 A2d at 732 (footnote omitted). 
584. See 8 MOORE ET AL., supra note 483, § 38.31 [5] [b] [ii]. 
585. 85 Md. App. 141,582 A2d 557 (1990). 
586. See id. at 145, 582 A.2d at 559. 
587. See id. 
588. See id. at 14546, 582 A2d at 559. The original estimate of cost-plus-fixed-fee 
was $509,000. See id. at 144, 582 A2d at 558. At the time of suit, the developer 
claimed $881,000. See id. at 145, 582 A2d at 559. 
589. See id. at 143, 582 A2d at 557. 
590. See id. at 143, 582 A2d at 558. 
591. See id. 
592. See id. at 149, 582 A2d at 560. 
593. See id. at 143, 582 A2d at 558. 
594. See id. The total amount of judgment for the plaintiff was $133,151.25 plus 
prejudgment and post judgment interest on the mechanic's lien claim. See id. 
595. See id. at 154, 582 A2d at 563 (concluding that the trial court properly re-
served the disposition of the breach of fudiciary relationship claim). 
596. See id. The court emphasized that "[a]lthough we have merged law and equity 
in Maryland, we have not eradicated the historical judicial function of deter-
mining equitable issues." [do. 
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priate with respect to the mechanic's lien;597 the characterization of 
the breach of trust as equitable in the context of a construction 
contract was probably not consistent with Beacon Theatres,598 Dairy 
Que~99 or even Higgins. 
The court in Kahle distinguished Higgins, noting that the 
defendant in Higgins asserted an independent legal counterclaim 
that had no equitable component.600 The court essentially created 
this distinction by gerrymandering the breach of fiduciary duty 
solely to the equitable mechanic's lien claim by the plain tifI.6O 1 
Higgins itself was quite explicit that the right to jury trial did 
not depend on legal issues being raised in the isolation of a discrete 
legal claim.602 The Higgins court noted that the plaintiff's claim was 
defensive and did not qualify as a separate claim under Maryland 
Rule 2-602.603 The court went on to observe: 
597. Former Maryland rule BG 71, applicable at the time of this case, provided 
"[a] n action to establish a mechanic's lien is equitable in nature." See id. at 
150, 582 A.2d at 561 (quoting MD. R CIV. P. BG 71). 
598. For a discussion of Beacon Theatres, see supra notes 416-57 and accompanying 
text. 
599. For a discussion of Dairy Qy,een, see supra notes 463-81 and accompanying text. 
600. See Kahle, 85 Md. App. at 153, 582 A2d at 562-63. In contrast, the court de-
clared: " [T]raditionally under Maryland law, breach of fiduciary duty is an eq-
uitable principle." [d. at 153, 582 A2d at 563. 
601. There is considerable logic to treating a breach of trust claim as equitable, 
but such logic is not inescapable. In Kann v. Kann, 344 Md. 689, 690 A2d 509 
(1997), the court held "that there is no universal or omnibus tort for the re-
dress of breach of fiduciary duty." [d. at 713, 690 A.2d at 521. It found that 
there was no action at law against a fiduciary of a decedent's estate. See id. at 
712-13, 690 A2d at 520-21 (discussing the court's concern over any potential 
elimination of "the nearly complete exclusivity of equitable jurisdiction" in 
the case of trustees). In so doing, however, the court did not inexorably pre-
clude trial by jury with respect to claims for breach of fiduciary duty: 
Our holding means that identifying a breach of fiduciary duty will be 
the beginning of the analysis, and not its conclusion. Counsel are re-
quired to identify the particular fiduciary relationship involved, iden-
tify how it was breached, consider the remedies available, and select 
those remedies appropriate to the client's problem. Whether the 
cause or causes of action selected carry the right to a jury trial will 
have to be determined by an historical analysis. 
[d. at 713, 690 A.2d at 521. If the court had left open the possibility that 
breach of a fiduciary duty might be triable by jury in some contexts, it would 
seem that a counterclaim for breach of contract might be such a context. 
602. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 551, 530 A2d 724, 733 (1987). 
603. See id. at 535 n.l, 530 A2d at 725 n.l (citing East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453,445 
A2d 343 (1982». 
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[T]hese facts do not affect our decision because our con-
cern is with the nature of the issues legitimately raised by 
the pleadings, and not with the labels given to the plead-
ings. The legal issues in this case were identified by Hig-
gins' particularized answer to the complaint, and our deci-
sion does not turn on the fact that a counterclaim was 
filed.604 
It may be that it was appropriate for the court in Kahle to treat 
the breach of trust issue as an equitable defense to a claim for an 
equitable remedy. In light of Higgins, it is not appropriate to do so 
because the issue was not raised in a discrete legal claim. 
The net result of Kahle is that the plaintiff was able to divest, 
for the most par,t, the defendant's right to jury trial by suing first 
for a mechanic's lien. One cannot deny the policy behind the 
mechanic's lien, providing the tradesman an efficient remedy to col-
lect the value of his services.6OS Allowing most of the breach of con-
tract dispute to take on the equitable character of the mechanic's 
lien appears to be contrary to Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.606 In Kahle, 
as in Fink, the court protected the traditional scope of equity in a 
way that allowed sidestepping a jury trial of legal issues. 
The third in ~e trilogy of court of special appeals decisions is 
Mattingly v. Mattingly.607 Like Fink and Kahle, Mattingly found the 
604. Id. (emphasis added). 
605. See Frank J. Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Lauderman, 270 Md. 152, 162, 311 A.2d 780, 
785-86 (1973) (noting that "[t]he purpose of the mechanic's lien law is to pro-
tect the material men and ... this law is to be construed in the most liberal 
and comprehensive manner in their favor. "). 
606. The existence of the mechanic's lien does not affect the builder's liability 
under the contract. See Sodini v. Winter, 32 Md. 130, 133-34 (1870). Once eq-
uity has protected this interest, the buyer's liability may be adjudicated by a 
jury if the buyer has counterclaimed for breach of contract and demanded a 
trial by jury. An excellent illustration of the need to carefulIy protect the right 
to a jury trial in legal claims, even though the original suit may be technicalIy 
grounded in equity, is Dairy Queen in which the plaintiffs sought to avoid a 
jury trial by characterizing their claim as an accounting. See Dairy Queen v. 
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1962). The United States Supreme Court refused 
to allow the wording of the pleadings to frustrate trial by jury as to what was 
essentially a breach of contract suit. See id. In Kahle, the plaintiff was undoubt-
edly entitled to the protection of the lien, but that did not necessarily warrant 
recharaterization of the entire dispute as equitable. See Kahle, 85 Md. App. at 
150-51, 582 A.2d at 561-62. 
607. 92 Md. App. 248, 607 A.2d 575 (1992). 
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right to trial by jury inapplicable to its issues grounded in equity.6OS 
Unlike the two earlier decisions, the court in Mattingly closely em-
ployed the approach of Higgins and even looked to the progeny of 
Beacon Theatres in reaching its result.609 In Mattingly, two brothers in-
herited the businesses and property of their father.6lo One brother, 
Buddy, sold his interest in the lands and business to the other, Au-
brey.611 Buddy's wife contended that this agreement was obtained 
through "undue influence and other unfair means. "612 She was ap-
pointed guardian of Buddy's property and sued to set aside the 
transfers, for a dissolution of the brothers' partnership, and for an 
accounting.613 The defendant, Aubrey, demanded a jury trial. The 
trial judge denied the plaintiff's motion to strike the demand and 
the jury found for the defendant.614 
In analyzing whether the trial court erred in not striking the 
jury demand, the court noted the intertwined rulings of the federal 
and Maryland courts: 
[B] oth the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have 
directed that when "the existence of both legal and equita-
ble issues within the same case requires the selection be-
tween the jury and the court as the determiner of common 
issues, the discretion of the trial court 'is very narrowly lim-
ited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve 
jury trial. "'615 
The court also looked to the three-part test of Ross v. Bernhard 616as 
developed in Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. 
Terry,617 and explained that according to the Supreme Court, the na-
ture of the remedy sought is the most important test in determining 
applicability of the right to trial by jury.6lS 
608. See ill. at 257, 607 A.2d at 580. 
609. See ill. at 257-59, 607 A.2d at 580-81. 
610. See ill. at 251,607 A.2d at 576. 
611. See ill. at 252, 607 A.2d at 517. 
612. [d. at 253, 607 A.2d at 578. 
613. See ill. at 253, 607 A.2d at 577-78. 
614. See ill. at 253-54, 607 A.2d at 578. 
615. [d. at 255, 607 A.2d at 579 (quoting Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 544, 530 
A.2d 724, 730 (1987) (quoting Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 
(1959))). 
616. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.1O (1970). 
617. 494 U.S. 558, 569 (1990). 
618. See Mattingly, 92 Md. App. at 256, 607 A.2d at 579. 
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Looking at the nature of the action, the court viewed it as one 
for rescission and accounting between partners, customarily decided 
by an equity court before the merger of law and equity.619 The court 
carefully distinguished Dairy Queen, which also sounded in account-
ing, on the basis that the trial court therein had improperly treated 
legal issues as incidental to equitable issues.62o In contrast, the court 
noted that there were no legal issues in Mattingly; any monetary re-
lief entailed "the natural consequence of the winding up of partner-
ship affairs. "621 The court rejected the defendant's contention that 
submission of the case to the jury was harmless error because of the 
lower burden of proof with respect to fraud once a confidential re-
lationship has been established in an action in equity.622 
Although it did not hold that the action was triable by jury, 
Mattingly more than any other Maryland decision has adopted the 
methodology of the Supreme Court with respect to the applicability 
of the right to trial by jury.623 Consideration of this trilogy of deci-
sions by the court of special appeals somewhat in isolation is signifi-
cant because it provides insight into the Maryland judiciary's con-
ception of the effect of Higgins on the boundary between law and 
equity for purposes of jury trial. All three decisions indicate a ten-
dency not to re-examine the scope of equitable jurisdiction in light 
of procedural innovations that the Supreme Court has viewed as 
tending to enhance the adequacy of remedies at law.624 If Hashem v. 
Taherf>25 falls more into the federal mold, it does so only implicitly. 
Nevertheless, Higgins provides a clear mandate to protect the 
right to jury trial from usurpation by equity when legal issues are 
joined with equitable issues or asserted in a forum possessing equi-
table powers.626 In Martin v. Howard County,627 the court of appeals 
reaffirmed this in the strongest terms. Here, Howard County, Mary-
land brought suit against tenants of a townhouse to stop drug activ-
ity on the premises.628 The statutory scheme used by the plaintiff 
619. See id. at 257, 607 A.2d at 580. 
620. See id. at 259-60, 607 A.2d at 581. 
621. [d. at 260, 608 A2d at 581. 
622. See id. at 262, 607 A2d at 582 (determining that the improper grant of a jury 
trial resulted in actual prejudice). 
623. See supra notes 382-543 and accompanying text. 
624. See supra notes 494-500 and accompanying text. 
625. 82 Md. App. 269, 571 A2d 837 (1990). 
626. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 550-52, 530 A2d 724, 733 (1987). 
627. 349 Md. 469, 709 A.2d 125 (1998). 
628. See id. at 471-72, 709 A2d at 127 (construing MD. CODE ANN .. REAL PROP. § 14-
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permitted a court to order the tenant to vacate within seventy-two 
hours, upon finding a drug-related nuisance on the premises.629 
This order by itself did not restore the landlord to possession.63O 
Such an order resulted if the tenant failed to vacate as ordered and 
the owner was a party to the action.631 
The defendants filed a timely demand for jury trial in the dis-
trict court and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for 
Howard County.632 Although the action sought restitution of the 
premises to the owner as well as an order of the defendants to va-
cate, the county moved to strike the jury demand on the basis that 
the action was equitable in nature.633 The trial court struck the jury 
demand and remanded the case to district court.634 The defendants 
appealed this order to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.635 
Affirming the order of the circuit court,636 the court of special 
appeals bifurcated the relief sought by the plaintiff. It viewed the 
claim for the defendants to vacate the premises as one for equitable 
relief to abate a nuisance637 which did not terminate the tenancy.638 
The court viewed restitution of possession to the landlord as a con-
tingent remedy, applicable only if the tenant violated the order to 
vacate and after another hearing.639 This holding ignored the 
preclusive effect of the finding of drug activity on a claim for pos-
session, directly or indirectly, or that a violation of the order to va-
cate would have on the claim for restitution of the premises. 
In reversing, the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that 
the court of special appeals' procedural view of the case 
"render[ed] the statutory scheme dysfunctional," because it left the 
issue of possession unresolved in the consideration of an order for 
120 (1996». 
629. See id. at 472-73, 709 A.2d at 127-28 (construing MD. CODE ANN .. REAL PROP. § 
14-120(f)(1) (1996». 
630. See id. at 478, 709 A.2d at 130 (construing MD. CODE ANN .. REAL PROP. § 14-
120(f) (1 )-(2) (1996». 
631. See id. at 474, 709 A.2d at 128 (citing MD. CODE ANN .. REAL PROP. § 14-
120(f) (3) (1996». 
632. See id. at 475, 709 A.2d at 128. 
633. See id. at 477, 709 A.2d. at 129. 
634. See id. at 477-78, 709 A.2d at 130. 
635. See id. at 478, 709 A.2d at 130. 
636. See Martin v. Howard County, 107 Md. App. 331, 667 A.2d 992 (1995). 
637. See id. at 34142, 667 A.2d at 997-98. 
638. See id. at 342, 667 A.2d at 998. 
639. See id. at 343, 667 A.2d at 998. 
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the defendant to vacate the premises.640 The court of appeals held 
that an order of the tenant to vacate terminates the tenant's interest 
in the property and gives the landlord the right of possession.641 
Under those circumstances, there was a right to trial by jury 
because: 
[a]n action by or on behalf of a landlord to evict a tenant, 
on the ground that the tenant no longer is entitled to pos-
session, and torestore possession to the landlord, '"is histori-
cally an action at law to which the right to a jury trial has 
always attached in this State. "'642 
The court held that the legislature could not constitutionally create 
a statutory equitable action that would resolve legal disputes and 
thus circumvent a party's right of trial by jury.643 
The court of appeals' holding in Martin represented a strong 
reaffirmation of the right to jury trial in instances in which that 
right comes into conflict with an equitable adjudication. The court 
observed: "[W] hen a party presents legal issues and legal claims for 
relief in an action which also involves equitable issues and claims, 
the party is ordinarily entitled to a jury trial on the legal issues and 
legal claims for relief."644 In that Martin involved the applicability of 
the right to trial by jury with respect to an action in which this right 
was well-established, the court did not address the question whether 
the scope of equity might be contracted by procedural innovations. 
It did hold that equity could not be expanded, even by legislative 
innovations, at the expense of trial by jury.645 
D. &-examination of Judge-Jury Interaction 
As demonstrated by the post-Beacon Theatres development of the 
right to jury trial in the federal system and in Maryland, particularly 
640. Martin, 349 Md. at 492, 709 A.2d at 137. The court of appeals noted that ac-
cording to the court of special appeals' position, there could be a hearing as 
to the issue of possession only if the tenants violated the order to vacate. If 
they did vacate the premises, the premises would be vacant, and an action for 
ejectment would not lie. See id. 
641. See id. at 492-93, 709 A.2d at 137. 
642. [d. at 481, 709 A.2d at 131 (quoting Carroll v. Housing Opportunities 
Comm'n, 306 Md. 515, 521, 510 A.2d 540, 543 (1986) (quoting Bringe v. Col-
lins,.274 Md. 338, 34647, 335 A.2d 670,676 (1975»). 
643. See id. at 487, 709 A.2d at 134. 
644. [d. at 481,709 A.2d at 131. 
645. See id. at 487, 709 A.2d at 134. 
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as that right has competed with the traditional scope of equity,646 
the federal courts have been more explicit in articulating a ratio-
nale for re-examining and reducing the scope of equity. Both sys-
tems, however, have vigorously protected the constitutional right to 
jury tria1.647 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland have assessed the power of a trial court to grant a new 
trial in light of post-Beacon Theatres decisions. While the Supreme 
Court has examined new trial questions in light of the Seventh 
Amendment,648 it has not done so in light of post-Beacon Theatres de-
cisions. These decisions demonstrate that the scope of judicial as-
sessment of jury verdicts is amenable to re-examination. The most 
recent statement by the Supreme Court regarding the relationship 
between the trial court's power to grant a new trial and the Seventh 
Amendment was Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.649 The issue 
in Gasperini was a so-called Erie question,650 whether a state statute 
must be applied in a suit based on federal diversity jurisdiction.651 
The state statute was a New York law, enacted in 1986 as part of 
"tort reform" measures,652 requiring intermediate appellate courts, 
when reviewing money judgments, to "determine that an award is 
excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what would be 
reasonable compensation. "653 This provision expanded the appellate 
courts' authority to review trial courts' dispositions of motions for a 
new trial based on excessiveness or inadequacy of a verdict.654 As to 
the Erie matter, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts 
could not ignore this New York law in diversity cases.655 The Court 
then had to determine how to implement this review of verdicts in 
light of the Seventh Amendment. The Court noted that the Seventh 
Amendment re-examination clause656 bears "on the allocation of 
646. See supra notes 463-645 and accompanying text. 
647. See supra notes 5~5 and accompanying text. 
648. See infra notes 649-701 and accompanying text. 
649. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
650. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
651. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418. 
652. See id. at 423. 
653. See id. at 418 (quoting N.Y. C1V. PRAC. LAw AND RULES 5501 (c) (McKinney 
1995». 
654. See id. at 423-24. 
655. See id. at 430-31. 
656. The second clause of the Seventh Amendment states that "no fact tried by a 
jury, shaH be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law." Id. at 432 (quoting U.S. CONSf. 
amend. VII). 
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trial functions between judge and jury [and] the allocation of au-
thority to review verdicts. "657 As a result, the Court concluded that 
the re-examination clause granted trial courts a large degree of au-
thority to set aside jury verdicts.658 
As to the power of an appellate court to review trial court dis-
positions of motions for new trial and, indirectly, the jury verdicts 
sustained or set aside by such dispositions, the Court held that an 
appellate court could, consistent with the re-examination clause, re-
view a trial court's disposition of a motion to set aside a jury verdict 
as excessive.659 Although Erie required that the New York law be aJr 
plied, the Court treated the allocation of the exercise of this review 
as a matter of fec!eral law.660 It provided that the federal trial courts 
should determine whether jury awards deviate materially from rea-
sonable compensation661 and that appellate courts should review 
such action under an abuse of discretion standard.662 
It is not surprising that the Court, by explicitly sanctioning aJr 
pellate review of trial court dispositions of new trial motions for the 
first time, called for application of the timid abuse of discretion 
standard.663 That the Court could establish such a practice at all, 
however, indicates that the Seventh Amendment can accommodate 
reassessments of the roles of judges and juries with respect to find-
ings of fact.664 
657. [d. at 432. 
658. See itt. at 432-33. Among other things, the Court quoted Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 353 (4th Cir. 1941), to the effect that the trial 
court's power to set aside a jury verdict and grant a new trial "is not in dero-
gation of the right of trial by jury but is one of the historic safeguards of that 
right." [d. at 433 (holding consistently with the statement of Lord Mansfield in 
Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 391, 97 Eng. Rep. 365 (1757». 
659. See itt. at 436. 
660. See itt. at 437. 
661. See itt. 
662. See itt. 
663. See itt. at 434-35. In dissent, Justice Scalia angrily insisted that appeIlate courts 
possessed no power to review motions for a new trial: 
The time to . question whether orders on motions for a new trial were 
in fact reviewable at common law has long since passed. Cases of this 
Court reaching back into the early 19th century establish that the 
Constitution forbids federal appeIlate courts to "reexamine" a fact 
found by the jury at trial; and that this prohibition encompasses re-
view of a district court's refusal to set aside a verdict as contrary to 
the weight of the evidence. 
[d. at 458 (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
664. See itt. at 435. 
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Seventh Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates a struggle to 
fix the boundaries between the roles of judge and jury using both a 
strict historical approach and one that is less SO.665 A high point of 
this struggle may be seen in Slocum v. New Yom Life Insurance Co.,61J6 
in which a federal appellate court overturned a jury verdict and or-
dered the trial court to grant a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict for the defendant.667 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, 
held that this was inconsistent with the Court's understanding of an 
appellate court's power concerning a verdict at common law: 
[I] nstead of ordering a new trial, as was required at com-
mon law, the Circuit Court of Appeals itself re-examined 
the issues, resolved them in favor of the defendant, and di-
rected judgment accordingly. This we hold could not be 
done consistently with the Seventh Amendment, which not 
only preserves the common law right of trial by jury, but ex-
pressly forbids that issues of fact settled by such settled by 
such a trial shall be re-examined otherwise than "according 
to the rules of the common law. "668 
Balanced against the strict historical approach were the dissenters, 
speaking through Justice Hughes: "When the question is raised of 
invasion of the constitutional right, we must always look to the sub-
stance of what is done, and not to mere names or formal 
changes. "669 
The Supreme Court's struggle with the interaction between the 
Seventh Amendment and the power of courts concerning post-trial 
motions continued through most of the twentieth century. In Dimick 
665. See id. at 432-33. 
666. 228 U.S. 364 (1913). 
667. See id. at 400. 
668. [d. at 399 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII). Professor Henry Schofield vigor-
ously supported this position, viewing an array of judge/jury relationships 
fixed as of 1791 as a bulwark against gradual erosion of the right to trial by 
jury. See Henry Schofield, New Trials and the Seventh Amendment-Slocum v. New 
York Life Insurance Co.; 8 ILL. L. REv. 381, 382-83 (1914). 
669. Slocum, 228 U.S. at 408 (Hughes, J., dissenting). This outlook was phrased 
more expansively in a critique of Professor Schofield's article by Arthur W. 
Spencer, who noted: "According to the rules of the common law the Seventh 
Amendment does not mean in absolute conformity with every technical re-
quirement of common law pleading and practice; the phrase simply means 
not repugnant to the underlying principles of the common law." Arthur W. 
Spencer, Superfluous New Trials and The Seventh Amendment, 24 GREEN BAG 106, 
107 (1914). 
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v. Scheidt,670 the Supreme Court, on the basis of a historical analysis 
of English practices in 1791, held that a trial court may not condi-
tion a new trial on the refusal of the defendant to accept an ad-
ditur.671 The Court clearly viewed the particulars of English proce-
dure as set in stone: 
[W]e are dealing with a constitutional provision which has 
in effect adopted the rules of the common law, in respect 
of trial by jury, as these rules existed in 1791. To effectuate 
any change in these rules is not to deal with the common 
law, qua common law, but to alter the Constitution.672 
This language drew a sharp rebuke from Justice Stone in dissent: 
Such a provision [the Seventh Amendment] of government, 
intended to endure for unnumbered generations, is con-
cerned with substance and not with form. There is nothing 
in its history or language to suggest that the [Seventh] 
Amendment had an purpose but to preserve the essentials of 
the jury trial as it was known to the common law before the 
adoption of the Constitution.673 
Justice Stone noted that the Court already approved of departures 
from English common law jury practices.674 
In Montgomery Wam & Co. v. Duncan,675 the Court approved of 
the grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Federal 
Rule 50(b) without reservation by the trial court of the question of 
law on a directed verdict.676 The Court labeled this practice as an 
"incident of jury trial at common law at the time of the adoption of 
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution."677 In so doing, the 
670. 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
671. See id. at 476. 
672. Id. at 487. 
673. Id. at 490 (Stone, j., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
674. Id. at 491. Justice Stone's dissent noted this Court's approval of a federal 
court's use of auditors to report to the jury as an aid to its fact finding. See Ex 
Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 314 (1920). A court may also require general and 
special verdicts, then direct a verdict for the defendant on the basis of the 
facts found. See Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 598 
(1897). Alternatively, a court may grant a partial new trial. See Gasoline Prods. 
Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499 (1931). 
675. 311 U.S. 243 (1940). 
676. See id. at 250. 
677. Id. 
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court seemed to remain faithful to Dimick's mandates to remain 
faithful to the common law. 
Yet, in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction CO.,678 the Court up-
held the power of an appellate court to set aside a verdict and 
grant judgment for the other party-a procedure it had forbidden 
on Seventh Amendment grounds in Slocum v. New Yom Life Insurance 
CO.679 In Neely, Justice Black based his vigorous dissent largely on his 
construction of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 (c) and (d), and 
not the Seventh Amendment.680 In the post-Beacon Theatres era, inau-
gurated by Justice Black, it would have been difficult for him to ar-
gue the Seventh Amendment as an immutable bulwark against mod-
ifications of the scope of jury trial or judge/jury relations, as he had 
done in Galloway v. United States.681 
In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,682 the Court held that the find-
ing in an earlier suit at equity could be used against the party in a 
later action, triable by jury, even if it involved a stranger to the first 
suit.683 Such preclusion essentially deprives the party to the first suit 
of trial by jury as to any issues established in the suit based in eq-
uity.684 Such preclusion was impossible in 1791 because of the rule 
of mutuality of estoppe1.68S 
Justice Stewart, dissenter in Beacon Theatres and Ross, brushed 
aside the jury trial objection to the application of non-mutual collat-
eral estoppel: 
The Seventh Amendment has never been interpreted in the 
rigid manner advocated by the petitioners. On the contrary, 
many procedural devices developed since 1791 that have di-
minished the civil jury's historic domain have been found 
not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment.686 
This provoked a strong dissent from then Justice Rehnquist, who 
utilized a strong historical view of the Seventh Amendment, albeit 
one recognizing many departures from the common law rules: 
678. 386 U.S. 317,322 (1967). 
679. 228 U.S. 364 (1913). 
680. See Neely, 386 U.S. at 340. 
681. 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943) (Black, j., dissenting); see supra note 21. 
682. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
683. See id. at 337. 
684. See id. 
685. See id. at 335. 
686. Id. at 336. 
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To say that the Seventh Amendment does not tie federal 
courts to the exact procedure of the common law in 1791 
does not imply, however, that any nominally "procedural" 
change can be implemented, regardless of its impact on the 
functions of the jury. For to sanction creation of procedural 
devices which limit the province of the jury to a greater de-
gree than permitted at common law in 1791 is in direct 
contravention of the Seventh Amendment.687 
The decision in Gasperini, over the strong dissent of Justice Scalia,688 
indicates that those who would focus on the preservation of the sub-
stance of the right to trial by jury, rather than its eighteenth cen-
tury trappings, appear dominant. 
Even from an historical point of view, it is sensible not to at-
tach too much significance to the minutiae of the eighteenth cen-
tury jury trial right. According to Justice Story, the common law of 
England was utilized because it provided a common reservoir 
amidst the variations in the practices of the states.689 English com-
mon law did not fix practices at anyone point; practices evolved 
over time.690 A leading scholar who has examined the historical re-
cord of the Seventh Amendment flatly stated: 
Nowhere in the history of the Philadelphia convention, the 
ratifying conventions of the several states, or the specific 
"legislative history" of the Bill of Rights can any evidence 
be found that the relation of judge to jury was considered 
as affected in any but the most general possible way by the 
seventh amendment [sic], or even that it was considered at 
all.691 
The development of the protective post-Beacon Theatres jurispru-
dence has demonstrated that the substance of jury trial right has 
been guarded, even as old trappings of the right have evolved. 
687. [d. at 346 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
688. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 u.s. 415, 449 (1996) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) ("It is not for us, much less for the courts of appeals, to decide 
that the Seventh Amendment's restriction on federal-court review of jury find-
ings has outlined its usefulness."). 
689. See United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (No. 16,750) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) 
(Story, j., Circuit Justice). 
690. See Morrell de Reign, The History and Development of the Motion for New Trial and 
in A77l!St of Judgment, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 377, 380 (1913). 
691. Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L. 
REv. 289, 290 (1966). 
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Recognizing a tension between a trial court's power to grant a 
new trial, particularly on the basis that the verdict is against the 
weight of the evidence, and allowing appellate courts to review that 
grant in light of the jury trial right, would no doubt encumber the 
new trial power in a manner unknown that did not exist at com-
mon law, at whatever point the "common law" is reckoned.692 It 
would entail a constitutional restriction of the equitable power to 
grant a new trial. It would also entail recognizing a constitutional 
interest iIi preserving the first verdict of a jury. This would expand 
the jury trial right beyond its apparent historical bounds. Such an 
expansion would not be generated by a threat to jury trial, such as 
that posed by merger, but rather a recognition of the effect of new 
trial on the constitutional right. 
In a sense, such an evolution in the view of jury trial has al-
ready happened in both the federal system and Maryland. Both the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Maryland have held 
that when special findings are sought by a trial judge,693 the judge is 
constitutionally required to attempt to fashion equitable relief to 
the special verdict answers rather than make separate findings of 
fact. In doing so, the judge should attempt to make the findings by 
the jury consistent with each other and with the equitable relief or-
dered. This constitutional duty was established squarely in the fed-
eral courts in Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd.694 
and was embraced also by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Ed-
wards v. Grambling Engineering C01jJ.695 
The Supreme Court in Atlantic & Gulf Stevedore appears to have 
cut this Seventh Amendment duty out of whole cloth, at least from 
a historical perspective. The only authority cited by the Court for· 
the proposition was Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Railway CO.,696 a 
brief per curiam decision which is based on the federal supremacy 
692. In Turner v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 158 A.2d 125 
(1960), the historical point of reference is 1776. See ill. at 503, 158 A.2d at 130 
(citing Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Ry. Co., 87 Md. 623, 632, 40 A. 890, 
894 (1898». In Kann v. Kann, 344 Md. 689, 690 A.2d 509 (1997), the historical 
time is fixed at 1851, the adoption of the first constitutional provision explic-
itly preserving the right to trial by jury in civil proceedings. See ill. at 703, 690 
A.2d 516. 
693. See FED. R CIY. P. 49(a); MD. R CIY. P. 2-522(c}. 
694. 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962); see also Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio RR Co., 372 
U.S. 108, 114-15 (1963). 
695. 322 Md. 535, 543, 588 A.2d 793, 797 (1991). 
696. 353 U.S. 360 (1957) (per curium). 
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entailed in the Federal Employers Liability Act697 rather than the 
Seventh Amendment.698 Nevertheless, this duty has become a recog-
nized aspect of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.699 In recogniz-
ing this duty in Maryland in Edwards, the court of appeals cited At-
lantic & Gulf Stevedores rather than any precedent pertaining to such 
a duty in Maryland jurisprudence.7(JO The recognition of this duty 
with respect to special verdicts is significant to the question at hand 
(the power of the trial judge to grant a new trial) because it in-
volves a limitation based on the constitutional jury trial right in a 
realm where the trial judge has great discretion.701 If such constitu-
tional deference is accorded the jury's special findings, is there any 
reason, historical or otherwise, not to extend such deference to 
general verdicts as well? It is a notion well in harmony with the 
evolution of trial by jury in the Maryland and federal judicial 
systems. 
IV. RECOGNITION OF THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE 
GRANT OF NEW TRIAL ON THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN 
THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 
In recent times, there has been a growing recognition of the 
constitutional issues entailed in the grant of a new trial motion, par-
ticularly in the federal appellate courts. Most circuits have recog-
nized these issues and in nearly every circuit, appellate courts have 
reversed a trial court's granting of a motion for a new trial as an in-
fringement of the right to jury trial.'°2 This is remarkable in that the 
power of an appellate court to review a trial court's disposition of a 
new trial motion was not unequivocally established in the federal 
courts until 1996.703 A small number of state courts have grappled 
697. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51.(j0 (1994). 
698. See Arnold, 353 U.S. at 360-61. 
699. See, e.g., Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995). 
700. See Edwards, 322 Md. at 543, 588 A.2d at 797 (citing Atlantic & Gulf Steve-
dores, Inc., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962». 
701. Whether the trial judge uses the special verdict at all is a matter of his or her 
discretion. See Sun Cab Co. v. Walston, 15 Md. App. 113, 161, 289 A2d 804, 
829-30 (1972), aff'd, 267 Md. 559,298 A2d 391 (1973). 
702. See infra notes 70~22 and accompanying text. 
703. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1996). In Gas-
perini, the Supreme Court addressed a trial court's denial motion for a new 
trial based on an allegedly excessive verdict. See id. at 415-16. For a discussion 
of Gasperini, see supra notes 649-64 and accompanying text. The Court held 
that such review, under an abuse of discretion standard, did not violate the 
Seventh Amendment's re-examination clause. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 415. 
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with constitutional issues implicated by the granting of a motion for 
a new trial, although the phenomenon is not as uniformly recent as 
in the federal COUrts.704 The state courts that have addressed such is-
sues squarely have not as uniformly recognized the constitutional 
tension between new trial ~nd the right to jury trial as have the fed-
eral circuit courts. 70S 
A. Evolving Federal Decisions 
In Marsh v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,706 the trial court made a 
well-known statement of the traditional view of the federal trial 
court's scope of discretion as to a motion for a new trial: "[T] he 
common law power of the trial judge to grant a new trial in his dis-
cretion, irrespective of error and merely because he does not think 
the verdict right, is fully preserved. "707 This view was not limited to 
the Fifth Circuit.7°S 
A seminal break with this thinking occurred in the Third Cir-
cuit in Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc.109 Here, Lind, a salaried district 
The proscription of appellate review was applied to grants of new trials as well 
as denials. See, e.g., Portman v. American Home Prods. Corp., 201 F.2d 847, 
848 (2d Cir. 1953). A leading treatise has argued that the re-examination 
clause is inapplicable to review of the granting of a writ for a new trial be-
cause an appellate court, by reversing the trial court, reinstates the jury's find-
ings. See 11 CHARLES AlAN WRIGHT ET AL. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
2819 (2d ed. 1993). Regardless, Gasperini does nothing to discourage federal 
appellate reversals of orders granting new trials on the basis of the size of the 
verdict or on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, as 
this Section will demonstrate. 
704. See infra notes 82:H>5 and accompanying text. 
705. See infra notes 82:H>5 and accompanying text. 
706. 175 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1949). 
707. [d. at 499 (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (1830». Interestingly, the ap-
pellate court reversed the trial court's conditional denial of a new trial. See id. 
at 500. The trial court had granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to 
the defendant and, despite its belief that the evidence was overwhelmingly 
against the plaintiff, denied defendant's motion for new trial on the basis that 
there were no other errors of law. See id. Because the trial court failed to exer-
cise the full range of its discretion, the appellate court ordered it to do so. See 
id. 
708. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 352-53 (4th Cir. 1941) 
(noting that in a motion for a new trial, the trial court may "set aside the ver-
dict and grant a new trial, if he is of the opinion that the verdict is against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or based upon evidence which is false, or will re-
sult in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence 
which would prevent the direction of a verdict."). 
709. 278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1960). 
92 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
sales manager,710 brought a breach of contract action against his 
employer.7Il He contended that the defendant orally contracted to 
give him one percent of the sales of the salespersons beneath him 
as additional compensation.712 The jury found that the contract ex-
isted and determined its duration and terms.713 The trial court then 
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant 
under former Federal Rule 50(b)714 and conditionally granted a new 
trial.71S On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the grant of judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and then turned to the granting of the 
new triaP16 
The court narrowed the permissible bases for a new trial to just 
one: that the verdict for plaintiff was against the weight of the evi-
dence.717 The court conceded that the trial court's broad discretion 
with respect to whether the verdict is against the weight of the evi-
dence718 and explained that "appellate courts rarely find that the 
trial court abused its discretion. "719 
Notwithstanding the narrow scope of the appellate court's 
power in reviewing the disposition of a motion for new trial, the 
court sought to ascertain standards for making such review.720 The 
court noted that such standards "vary according to the grounds 
urged in support of the new trial. "721 Recognizing that there was lit-
tle authority for such standards, the court turned first to Professor 
710. See id. 
711. See id. at 82. 
712. See id. 
713. See id. at 83. 
714. See id. at 84. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b), as amended in 
1993, this post verdict challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence takes the 
form of a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. See id. 
715. See Lind, 278 F.2d at 84. 
716. See id. at 87. 
717. See id. at 87-88. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held 
that the trial court's determination that the verdict was contrary to law was un-
done by its reversal of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See id. The 
trial court also granted a motion for a new trial based on an erroneous admis-
sion of evidence addressing the amount of the plaintiff's alleged damages. See 
id. at 88. The appellate court concluded that the admission of this evidence 
was not erroneous and therefore could not constitute the grounds for new 
trial. See id. at 88. 
718. See id. at 88. 
719. Jd. 
720. See id. at 89. 
721. Jd. 
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Moore, who took a limited view of the trial court's power to set 
aside a verdict: 
[S]ince the credibility of witnesses is peculiarly for the jury 
it is an invasion of the jury's province to grant a new trial 
merely because the evidence was sharply in conflict . . . . 
The judge's duty is essentially to see that there is no miscar-
riage of justice. If convinced that there has been then it is 
his duty to set the verdict aside; otherwise not .722 
The court's statement that Profossor Moore's views were "but-
tressed by some decisional authority"723 was a circumlocution for one 
commentator's description of what the court was really doing: "The 
Lind decision far exceeds prior appellate efforts to delineate and re-
strict the area within which the trial judge may properly grant a 
new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence. "724 In discerning a principled means to carry out the ap-
pellate authority it was asserting, the Lind court was largely in un-
charted waters.725 
The court distinguished the situation in which a new trial is 
considered on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence from other bases for a new trial, such as prejudicial state-
ments, erroneous instructions, or newly discovered evidence.726 The 
rationale for this distinction was that, as to bases for new trial other 
than when the verdict is against the weight of the evidence: 
[S]omething occurred in the course of the trial which re-
sulted or which may have resulted in the jury receiving a 
722. Id. (quoting 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FED. PRAC. § 3819 (1948». 
723. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Werthan Bag Corp. v. Agnew, 202 F.2d 119, 122 
(6th Cir. 1953». 
724. Note, Civil Procedure: Puwer oj Trial Judge to Grant New Trial Where Venlict is 
Against Weight oj the Evidence, 1961 DUKE LJ. 308, 311 (1961). 
725. See id. . 
726. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has implicitly recognized such a distinc-
tion. See Buck v. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 59, 612 A.2d 1294, 
1298 (1992). In BuCk, the court explained that in considering whether a ver-
dict is against the weight of the evidence, "the range of discretion of the trial 
judge [is] necessarily at its broadest." Id. This is true even though the court's 
description of this standard, abuse of discretion, is nominally the same as that 
applicable to other bases for a new trial. See, e.g., Medical Mutual Liab. Ins. 
Soc. of Maryland v. Evans, 330 Md. 1,19,622 A.2d 103, 111-12 (1993) (ad-
dressing a motion for a new trial based on unfairly prejudicial attorney mis-
conduct). For a discussion of Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society oj Mary. 
land, see supra notes 90-124 and accompanying text. 
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distorted, incorrect, or an incomplete view of the operative 
facts, or some undesirable element obtruded itself into the 
proceedings creating a condition whereby the giving of a 
just verdict was rendered difficult or impossible.727 
When a judge sets aside a verdict that is the product of delibera-
tions untainted by influences not created by the jury itself, such ac-
tion entails the judge "substitut[ing] his judgment of the facts and 
the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury. "728 Therefore, the 
court explained: "Such an action effects a denigration of the jury 
system and to the extent that new trials are granted the judge takes 
over, if he does not usurp, the prime function of the jury as the 
trier of the facts. "729 The potential of such usurpation, according to 
the Lind court, warrants a closer degree of appellate supervision 
over the trial court "to protect the litigant's right to jury trial. "730 
The court stated that a trial judge should be given greater lati-
tude with respect to new trial "[ w] here a trial is long and compli-
cated and deals with a subject matter not lying within the ordinary 
knowledge of jurors. "731 The court regarded the subject matter of 
the dispute involved therein as "simple and easily comprehended by 
any intelligent layman. "732 Thus, the court concluded that the trial 
court had substituted its judgment for that of the jury, thereby con-
stituting an abuse of discretion.733 
The court in Lind undertook to restrict the trial court for 
much the same reason that courts restrict expert testimony as to 
matters that may better be decided on the basis of common knowl-
edge or common sense734-to prevent an invasion of the province of 
the jury. The contention in the dissent by Judge Hastie mirrors to 
some extent the justification for expert testimony: 




731. [d. The court used the example of a patent case concerning a possible in-
fringement regarding a potential newly discovered organic compound. See id. 
at 91. 
732. [d. at 91. 
733. See id. 
734. See Langenfelder v. Thompson, 179 Md. 502, 20 A.2d 491 (1941) (citing Con-
solidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co. v. State, ex rei. Smith, 109 Md. 186, 203, 
72 A.2d 651, 658 (1909) (holding that expert testimony is not admissible when 
the jury can decide for itself). 
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The judge may not substitute the verdict he would have 
rendered on the evidence for that actually rendered by the 
jury. But he may avoid what in his professionaUy trained and 
experienced judgment is an unjust verdict by vacating it and 
causing the matter to be tried again by a second jury.73S 
95 
Judge Hastie's dissent views the potential usurpation of trial by 
jury through the trial judge's power to grant a new trial in much 
the same way as did Blackstone. There is no usurpation because the 
grant of a new trial is followed by a better trial, also before a jury.736 
The majority in Lind, however, implicitly initiate the development 
of a notion that a more important component of the right to jury 
trial than obtaining the "best" result is to preserve, if possible, the 
first result.737 
In Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd.,738 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined 
the conditional grant of a new trial in favor of a plaintiff.739 To 
avoid a severe limitation on damages under the Warsaw Conven-
tion,740 the plaintiff had to prove willful miscon~uct by the air car-
rier to recover for a plane crash in which his decedent was killed.741 
The jury found that the plaintiff had not done SO.742 The trial court 
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the plaintiff and 
granted a new trial conditionally in the event of a reversal of the 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.743 The Second Circuit re-
versed the trial court on both the judgment and grant of motion 
for a new trial. 744 
735. Lind, 278 F.2d at 91 (Hastie, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
736. See 3 BlACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 391. 
737. A more recent statement of the Third Circuit standard is that "'new trials be-
cause the verdict is against the weight of the evidence are proper only when 
the record shows that the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or 
where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our 
conscience.'" Wilburn v. Maritrans GP Inc., 139 F.3d 350, 364 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 
1991». 
738. 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965). 
739. See ill. at 534. 
740. See ill. (citing Convention and Additional Protocol with Other Powers Relating 
to International Air Transportation, October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 3019 
(1934». 
741. See ill. 
742. See ill. 
743. See ill. 
744. See ill. at 542. 
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Regarding the new trial, the court took an interesting ap-
proach. Rather than invoking the usual incantation about the abuse 
of discretion standard, the court observed that "[ t] 0 order a new 
trial [on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evi-
dence] when there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury, [there] 
need not be an abuse oj discretion in every case. "745 In light of the nature 
of the issues and evidence,746 the court reversed the grant of the 
new trial. 747 
Although the court did not explain its rationale as fully as the 
Lind court, its action was remarkable in its own right. The court ap-
pears to have enunciated a strong presumption, enforceable by ap-
pellate reversal, for upholding a jury determination when there is 
enough evidence to create a jury issue.748 The court made no men-
tion at all of what had been nearly an impenetrable wall of judicial 
discretion with respect to new triaJ.149 Although the court's rationale 
was somewhat cryptic, over time the Second Circuit's standard on 
the issue of grant of a new trial evolved to the view that "[t]he dis-
trict court's grant of a new trial motion is usually warranted only if 
it 'is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous re-
suit or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice. "'750 
Although the court in Duncan v. Duncan75 I acknowledged that 
" [t] here are few cases where an appellate court has reversed a deci-
sion of a district court in either granting or denying a motion for a 
new trial" based on the weight of the evidence,752 the Sixth Circuit, 
building on Lind and Berner, did precisely that.753 In Duncan, a car's 
745. [d. at 541 (citing 6 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FED. PRAG., § 59.08(5) (2d ed. 
1953) (emphasis added». 
746. Whether the pilot had engaged in wilful misconduct depended on whether he 
had received proper signals for clearance for descent. See Berner, 346 F.2d at 
537-38. The plaintiffs asserted that the signals were working properly and thus, 
the pilot had not received such clearance. See id. at 538. Viewing resolution of 
the issue as dependent on inferences from circumstantial evidence, the court 
of appeals concluded: "One can hardly imagine a clearer case in which such 
questions should have been left to the jury." [d. (citing LeRoy v. Sabena Bel-
gian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 271 (2d Cir. 1965». 
747. See id. at 542. 
748. See id. at 538. 
749. See, e.g., Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 485 (1933). 
750. Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 875 (2d Cir. 1992) (quot-
ing Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions, Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 
1988». 
751. 377 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1967). 
752. [d. at 53. 
753. See id. at 50. 
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passengers brought suit against a driver in a one-vehicle accident.7S4 
There was evidence tending to show that the driver was operating at 
a speed too fast for the weather and road conditions, but there was 
no evidence why the vehicle went out of control.7SS The jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant and the trial court granted a mo-
tion for a new trial noting: 
But, I am not too happy with the verdict in view of the evi-
dence in the case. It impressed me during this trial that 
there was almost overwhelming evidence of negligence on 
the part of the driver. In fact, I was quite surprised when 
the verdict came in as it did because I thought there was ev-
idence of negligence .756 
The appellate court recognized the scope of discretion of the trial 
judge on a motion for new trial but looked to the Supreme Court 
to support the notion that trial courts may not set aside a verdict 
"because judges feel that other results are more reasonable. "757 
The court looked to Berner to illuminate the well-established 
principle that when a case goes to the jury, the verdict should not 
be set aside if reasonable persons could find in favor of the party 
who won the verdict.758 The court also accepted Lind's distinction 
between complicated and simple cases for purposes of a trial court's 
discretion on a new trial motion/59 noting that the Duncan trial had 
lasted less than two days.760 It agreed with the defendant that the 
case was a "prime example of subject matter lying well within the 
comprehension of jurors."761 The court thus vacated the grant of a 
new trial and the verdict the plaintiff won in the second trial.'62 
In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. AALCO Wrecking Co., Inc.,763 
754. See itt. at 50-51. The defendant driver was married to one of the passengers 
and there was significant evidence that the driver's wife, a plaintiff, was actu-
ally driving. See itt. at 51. 
755. See itt. 
756. Id. at 52. 
757. Id. (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944». 
758. See id. at 53 (quoting Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 
346 F.2d 532, 538 (2d Cir. 1965». For a discussion of Berner, see supra notes 
738-750 and accompanying text. 
759. See id. at 54. For a discussion of Lind, see supra notes 709-37 and accompany-
ing text. 
760. See id. at 55. 
761. Id. 
762. See itt. 
763. 466 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1972). 
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit consid-
ered whether insurance companies could recover in a subrogation 
action against a wrecking company for losses arising from a ware-
house fire.764 The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a 
new triaI.765 Building on Lind, Berner, and Duncan, the court held 
that: 
Regardless of the rhetoric used the true standard for grant-
ing a new trial on the basis of the weight of the evidence is 
simply one which measures the result in terms of whether a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred. When through judicial 
balancing the trial court determines that the first trial has 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the court may order a 
new trial, otherwise not.766 
The Fireman's Fund court introduced a new rationale for the 
emboldened appellate review of trial court discretion that had been 
developing judicial economy.767 It viewed the state of the evidence 
as one on which reasonable persons might differ as to liability. 768 
On such a record, the court observed: 
We are hard pressed to say that a miscarriage of justice has 
taken place in the first trial. We cannot approve under the 
existing circumstances another time-consuming and costly 
trial without better justification on the record. All courts 
should be sensitive to and reasonably avoid crowded 
dockets.769 
Two judges of the circuit strongly dissented from denial of rehear-
ing en banc.77o 
They emphasized the state of Supreme Court precedent with 
764. See ill. at 181. 
765. See ill. at 185-86. 
766. [d. at 187. 
767. See ill. at 188. 
768. See ill. at 187. 
769. [d. at 188. 
770. See id. (Mehaffy, J., dissenting). The dissenters noted: 
The only sure way to prevent a miscarriage of justice in this case is to 
grant the rehearing and sustain the trial court's order granting a new 
trial. This is a complicated case with a lengthy record and it clearly 
requires something more than a weighing of the evidence when the 
trial court has concluded that it mistakenly admitted testimony which 
could well have influenced the jury. 
[d. at 190 (Mehaffy, J., dissenting). 
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respect to the trial court's discretion on a new trial motion 771 
and rebuked straightforwardly the judicial economy rationale of 
the court's opinion: 
If we must follow the panel's new rule, it will place this 
court in the role of trying cases de novo for which we are 
not and cannot be equipped. Furthermore, this new appel-
late capacity threatens to erode the fact-finding responsibil-
ity of the district COUrts.'72 
When granting a motion for new trial based on the weight of 
the evidence, the Eighth Circuit provided that a trial court must 
"articulate reasons supporting the judge's view that a miscarriage of 
justice has occurred."773 Once the trial court has done so, its deter-
mination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence "is 
entitled to great deference and is reversible only upon a strong 
showing of abuse."774 
In Taylor v. Washington Terminal CO.,775 the District of Columbia 
Circuit considered the Seventh Amendment implications posed by 
the trial court's granting of a motion for a new trial conditioned on 
the plaintiff's acceptance of a remittitur.776 Once the jury found the 
defendant railroad liable for the plaintiff's personal injuries under 
the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"),777 the trial court 
granted the defendant's motion for a new trial so long as the plain-
tiff would not accept a remittitur of $60,000.778 The plaintiff refused, 
and the second jury awarded $25,000.779 The appellate court bal-
anced the "judge's unique opportunity to consider the evidence in 
771. See id. at 189 (Mehaffy, j., dissenting) (citing Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. 
Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967); Neese v. Southern Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77 (1955); 
United States v. johnson, 327 U.S. 106 (1946); United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 
287 U.S. 474 (1933». 
772. Id. at 190 (Mehaffy, j., dissenting). 
773. King v. Davis, 980 F.2d 1236, 1237 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing White v. Pence, 961 
F.2d 776, 780-82 (8th Cir. 1992». 
774. Id. The Eighth Circuit has observed more recently that when the size of the 
verdict is the basis for a new trial, its review is "extraordinarily deferential." 
Sanford v. Crittenden Mem'l Hosp., 141 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 1998). 
775. 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
776. See itt. at 146. 
777. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964). 
778. See Taylm, 409 F.2d at 146. 
779. See itt. 
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the living courtroom"780 with the role of the jury as "the agency to 
whom the Constitution allocates the fact-finding function in the first 
instance. "781 It noted that the district judges in the circuit had al-
ready observed that a new trial would not be granted on the. basis 
of excessiveness unless it is '"so inordinately large as obviously to ex-
ceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the 
jury may properly operate. "'782 The court stated that it would reverse 
the grant of a new trial based on excessive damages only where the 
amount of "damages found by the jury was clearly within the maxi-
mum limit of a reasonable range."783 The court thus set aside the 
verdict of a second trial and ordered reinstatement of the plaintiff's 
first verdict.784 
In Spurlin v. General Motors Cmp.,785 the trial court awarded dam-
ages to a parent whose child was killed allegedly due to the defend-
ant's braking system.786 The trial court set aside the jury verdict for 
the plaintiff on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
and, in the alternative, on a motion for a new trial.787 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit viewed the Seventh 
Amendment as expressing a principle that "facts once found by a 
jury in the context of a civil trial are not to be reweighed and a 
new trial granted lightly. "788 In light of that principle, it enunciated 
a standard that the district court should not grant a new trial mo-
tion unless the jury verdict is "at least ... against the gmat weight of 
the evidence. "789 
780. [d. at 148. 
781. [d. 
782. [d. at 149 (quoting Graling v. Reilly, 214 F. Supp. 234, 235 (D.D.C. 1963». A 
similar test has been adopted by the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Brun:Jacobo v. Pan 
American World Airways, Inc., 847 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1988). 
783. Tay/nr, 409 F.2d at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
784. See ill. 
785. 528 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1976). 
786. See ill. at 614. 
787. See id. 
788. [d. at 620. 
789. [d. (quoting Cities Servo Co. v. Launey, 403 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1968»; see 
also Peterson v. Wilson, 141 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that there is 
a well~stablished principle that a verdict can be against the great weight of 
the evidence, and therefore grounds for new trial, even though there is sub-
stantial evidence to support it). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similar test -
a new trial may not be granted unless the verdict is clearly contrary to the 
weight of the evidence. See, e.g., WiIliam Ingliss & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Con-
tinental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 1980). Likewise, the Federal 
Circuit has noted that" [a] new trial is warranted if the verdict is against the 
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In WiUiams v. City of Valdosta,790 the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
the alternative granting of a motion for a new trial,791 Here, a 
firefighter brought action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the 
municipality for alleged retaliatory action as a result of his pro-
tected First Amendment activity.792 Mter the plaintiff began unioniz-
ing the firefighters and filing a number of personnel grievances, the 
city abolished his captaincy and demoted him to lieutenant.793 The 
city contended that its action was in response to a fiscal crisis and 
that the action saved the city $1,700.794 There was ample evidence 
that the economy rationale was pretextual, and the jury found in 
favor of the plaintiff.795 
The appellate court, on reviewing the evidence, found that 
there was "'no great weight of the evidence in any direction.'"796 
The court held that granting a new trial in such circumstances was 
an abuse of discretion.797 The court acknowledged that the abuse of 
discretion standard applies whether a trial court grants or denies a 
new trial motion, but emphasized that when a trial court grants the 
motion based on insufficiency of the evidence, it is more likely to 
have abused its discretion, at least when all of the evidence is prop-
erly before the jury and the proceedings have been decorous.798 The 
court underscored that "fact-finding is the province of the jury. "799 
'clear or great weight of the evidence .... Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. 
Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). However, the court employs the 
abuse of discretion standard of review and it is not clear from the court's deci-
sions that the grant of a new trial on a showing lower than against the clear 
or great weight of the evidence would be reversed as an abuse of discretion. 
See Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
790. 689 F.2d 964 (lIth Cir. 1982). 
791. See itt. at 966. The trial court also granted judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict for the defendant, which the appellate court also held to be erroneous. 
See itt. at 972-73. 
792. See itt. at 966. 
793. See itt. at 966-68. 
794. See itt. at 968. 
795. See ill. 
796. Id. at 976 (quoting Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 
360, 367 (5th Cir. 1980». 
797. See itt. 
798. See itt. at 973-76. 
799. Id. at 974, n.8; see also Carter v. Decisionone Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1004 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (noting that a jury verdict is not to be disturbed unless it is against 
the great weight of the evidence); Hardin v. Hayes, 52 F.3d 934, 938 (l1th Cir. 
1995) (observing that the trial court's discretion to set aside a jury verdict is 
narrowed when the court contends it is against the great weight of the evi-
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In Coffran v. Hitchcock Clinic, Inc.,800 the First Circuit assessed 
the trial court's granting of a motion for a new trial in a medical 
malpractice action following a defendant's verdict,SOI holding that 
the trial court abused its discretion.so2 This decision is significant be-
cause it involved setting aside the trial judge's assessment of rather 
complex medical testimony.803 Ultimately, whether there was actiona-
ble negligence depended upon whether a particular test, which the 
doctor did not perform, would have warned the doctor not to use 
the anesthetic that allegedly injured the plaintifI.804 The trial court 
concluded that the defendant's verdict "was contrary to the clear 
weight of the evidence and ... if allowed to stand, would constitute 
a patent and grave miscarriage of justice. "805 
The appellate court's decision was ultimately based on its view 
that the jury's belief of the defendant's expert on the question of 
whether the omitted test would have prevented the harm to the pa-
tient did not demonstrate that the jury was "seriously mistaken." 
Thus, the jury's finding was not against the clear weight of the evi-
dence.806 The court noted the "modern trend" with respect to re-
view of the grant of new trials on the basis that the verdict is con-
trary to the great weight of the evidence.8o, It described the 
direction of this trend in a way it had not been described before: 
" [T] he trial judge's discretion, although great, must be exercised 
with due regard to the rights of both parties to have questions 
which are fairly open resolved finally by the jury at a single trial. "808 
The court relied upon Lind for this proposition, but Lind and 
other cases809 held that a trial judge may exercise greater scrutiny of 
dence). 
8oo. 683 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982). 
801. See ill. at 6. 
802. See ill. at II. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re-
manded, with instructions that judgment be entered in the favor of the 
defendant. See ilL 
803. See generally id. at 8-11 (providing the contradictory and complex evidence 
presented at trial). 
804. See ill. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit indicated that 
the failure to perform the eosinophil test constituted negligence; however, the 
question as to whether the test would have warned of the potential for the 
plaintiff to contract hepatitis was not considered. See ill. at 10. 
805. Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
806. See ill. at II. 
807. See ilL at 6. 
808. Id. 
809. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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the jury "[ w] here a trial is long and complicated and deals with a 
subject matter not lying within the ordinary knowledge of jurors. "810 
Coffran involved an Il-day trial and a great deal of complex and 
conflicting medical testimony.811 In limiting the discretion of the 
trial court, Coffran ventures beyond any other decision. 
Not all circuits have. restricted the discretion of a trial court in 
granting a new trial in the manner of Lind and its progeny. For ex-
ample, both the Fourth812 and the Tenth Circuits appear to apply 
the traditional abuse of discretion standard that does not differenti-
ate between the grant and denial of the motion for new trial.813 
Both have reversed new trial grants, but they have done so in cir-
cumstances that do not necessarily indicate adherence to Lind or its 
progeny.814 
The Seventh Circuit, which had restricted the trial court in 
granting a new trial on the weight of the evidence to circumstances 
when the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence,815 has 
now embraced a standard which gives more discretion to the trial 
judge.816 In relaxing restrictions on the trial court, the Seventh Cir-
cuit relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, Inc.,817 which in the words of the court in Medcom Hold-
810. Lind v. Schenley Indus. Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960). 
811. See generaUy Coffran, 683 F.2d at 6-11. 
812. See Lindner V. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985). 
813. See, e.g., id. at 168; Mayhue V. St. Francis Hosp. of Wichita, 969 F.2d 919, 922 
(10th Cir. 1992). 
814. For example, in Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. V. Webber, 841 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 
1988), the court reversed successive grants of new trial that resulted in three 
trials and reinstated the verdict of the first trial. See id. at 1246. The court ap-
plied what it perceived to be a rule against setting aside successive verdicts in 
anything other than the most exceptional cases. See id. at 1250. In Wilson V. 
Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 804 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1986), the court reversed 
grant of a new trial in a case under FEIA. See id. at 608. The court's action 
was based on the repeated Supreme Court admonitions in the context that 
"trial courts not substitute their judgment for that of the jury." [d. at 610 (cit-
ing Davis v. Baltimore & Ohio RR Co., 379 U.S. 671 (1965) (per curiam); 
Basham v. Pennsylvania RR Co., 372 U.S. 699 (1963) (per curium». Thus, 
the court's holding does not appear to have applicability outside the FEU set-
ting. 
815. See Superbird Farms, Inc. V. Perdue Farms, Inc., 970 F.2d 238, 249 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
816. See Medcom Holding Co. V. Baxter Tavernol Labs., Inc., 106 F.3d 1388, 1397 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
817. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
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ing Co. v. Baxter Tavernol Labs., Inc.,818 "held that an abuse of discre-
tion standard of review [did] not violate the Seventh 
Amendment. "819 
The Seventh Circuit's use of Gasperini in this way represents a 
misapplication of the Supreme Court's holding. The Court's refer-
ence to the abuse of discretion standard referred to application of 
such a standard by an appellate court in light of the Seventh Amend-
ment's re-examination clause.82o The qualms discouraging the grant-
ing of a motion for a new trial on the right to trial by jury do not 
pertain to the re-examination, or second, clause of the Seventh 
Amendment, but, rather, to the first clause, which preserves the 
right to trial by jury.821 Gasperini did not grant more latitude to fed-
eral trial courts to apply the abuse of discretion standard then they 
had before. The Seventh Circuit, on the basis of Supreme Court 
precedent, is free to give the tri,al court as much discretion in grant-
ing a new trial as in denying one. Such an approach, however, has 
become a distinctly minority view.822 
Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit's apparent return to a 
more traditional appellate review of the granting of a motion for a 
new trial, some generalizations may be made about the develop-
ment of a prevalent, stricter standard. Such a standard distinguishes 
between the grant and denial of a motion for a new trial, with the 
former subject to more rigorous appellate scrutiny. Further, the 
standard distinguishes between the granting of a new trial on the 
basis of the weight of the evidence (including contentions of exces-
818. 106 F.3d 1388 (7th Cir. 1997). 
819. Medcom Holding Co., 106 F.3d at 1397 (citing Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 533-34). 
820. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432. The question in Gasperini as to appellate jurisdic-
tion was whether there could be any review of whether a verdict was excessive 
by an appellate court consistent with the Seventh Amendment's re-
examination clause. See id. Indeed, the Court imposed a more stringent stan-
dard of review upon the trial court under New York law under the command 
of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 430-
31, 448. 
821. The Gasperini Court acknowledged that it had long. been understood that a 
trial judge's power to set aside a verdict does not run afoul of the re-
examination clause. See id. at 417. 
822. It is possible that the Seventh Circuit does not stand completely alone in its 
use of Gasperini. See Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335 (1st Cir. 
1998). In Kelley, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in re-
viewing a trial court's denial of a new trial, cited Gasperini as allowing a trial 
court to grant a new trial if the verdict is against "the weight of the evidence." 
[d. at 355 (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 433). 
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siveness or inadequacy of the amount of the verdict) and all other 
traditional bases for granting a new trial. Finally, the stricter stan-
dard requires some specific quantum by which the verdict must be 
against the weight of the evidence, ranging from the clear or great 
weight of the evidence to a serious miscarriage of justice. This stan-
dard is harder to meet in cases in which the trial is relatively short 
or the subject matter uncomplicated. 
In light of these developments, it is more difficult than it was a 
generation ago to posit that there is no constitutional affront to 
trial by jury in a court's granting of a new trial because, after all, 
such an order simply brings about another jury trial. The notion 
that the Seventh Amendment entails a right to some extent to judi-
cial sustaining of the first jury verdict would, or" course require ap-
proval by the Supreme Court, which has not yet considered the 
issue. 
B. New Trial and the Right to Trial by Jury in State Courts 
Surprisingly few states have explicitly examined a trial court's 
power to grant a motion for a new trial as a potential threat to the 
right to trial by jury. This stems from the notion that the impact of 
granting such a motion "is to send the case to a second jury. "823 
The potential that a verdict may be set aside by the grant of a new 
trial has been seen as a concomitant of the right to jury trial,824 for 
as the Supreme Court of Washington observed: "The right of a trial 
judge to set aside a verdict if he believes that substantial justice has 
not been done is probably as old as the jury system itself."825 The 
state courts that have addressed the interplay between the right to a 
jury trial and the motion for a new trial have expressed some reser-
vations about unfettered trial courts. Reversing a trial court's refusal 
to grant a new trial, the Supreme Court of Iowa noted: 
It is true trial courts have wide judicial discretion in the 
granting of a new trial but they ought to grant new trials 
whenever their superior and more comprehensive judgment 
teaches them that the verdict of a jury fails to administer 
substantial justice and that this Court is more reluctant to 
interfere where a new trial is granted than where it is 
denied.826 
823. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 4, § 12.4. 
824. See ill. § 12.4. 
825. Bond v. Ovens, 147 P.2d 514, 515 (Wash. 1944). 
826. Feldhahn v. Van Deventer, 115 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Iowa 1962). This greater lati-
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The Supreme Court of Illinois has also stated a view of the trial 
court's discretion concerning the verdict and weight of the evidence 
that is distinctly non-deferential to the jury: 
The Constitution, which provides that the right of trial by 
jury as previously enjoyed shall remain inviolate, does not 
make the jury the final judges of the weight of evidence, 
and, if a verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evi-
dence, it is the duty of the trial judge to set it aside and 
grant a new trial, and a failure to do so is error, for which a 
judgment must be reversed.827 
In the majority of jurisdictions adhering to views similar to that of 
the Illinois Supreme Court, there are few reversals of orders grant-
ing new trials.828 
A small number of states have restricted the trial court's power 
to grant a new trial to protect trial by jury-much like Lind and its 
progeny. In Hammond v. City of Gadsden,829 for example, a widow of a 
retired municipal employee whose medical insurance was to end af-
ter her husband died sued the municipality and a municipal entity 
for fraud, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation.83o 
tude concerning the grant of a new trial is contrary to the recent tendency in 
the federal circuit courts to exercise more scrutiny with respect to the grant-
ing of a motion for a new trial. See, e.g., Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 
79, 90-99 (3d Cir. 1960). For a discussion of Lind, see supra notes 709-37 and 
accompanying text. 
827. Donelson v. East St. Louis & Suburban Ry., 85 N.E. 914, 915-16 (III. 1908) (cit-
ing Lincoln v. Stowell, 62 III. 84, 86 (1871); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
RR v. Gregory, 58 III. 272, 277 (1871); Henry v. Eddy, 34 III. 508, 515-16 
(1864». 
828. See Ronald L. Hamm, Comment, New Trials and the Need for Unifurmityin Stan-
dards, 2 J. MARsHALL J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 158 (1968). The provision of New 
York law at issue in Gasperini required the appellate division to '''determine 
that an award is inadequate or excessive if it deviates materially from what 
would be reasonable compensation.'" Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418-20 (quoting 
N.Y. Cw. PRAC. LAw AND RULES 5501 (c) (McKinney 1995». This provision indi-
rectly requires trial courts to scrutinize jury verdicts more closely. See, e.g., Inya 
v. Ide Hyundai, Inc., 619 N.Y.S.2d 440, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that 
jury verdict's failure to "shock the conscience" should not have precluded 
trial court's granting the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict). 
829.493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986). 
830. See id. at 1375-76. The plaintiff believed that the insurance plan, which had 
been transferred from the City of Gadsden to a self-insurance plan, would 
cover her medical insurance, notwithstanding the new plan's provisions. See id. 
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The jury awarded the plaintiff $12,000.831 In reviewing the trial 
court's remittitur, the appellate court considered the city's assertion 
that the plaintiff's medical expenses during the period of the inter-
ruption of her coverage were no more than $2,200 in excess of pre-
miums she would have paid had her coverage remained in effect.832 
The trial court remitted all but $2,000 of the jury's award.833 
The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded,834 hold-
ing that a jury verdict may be disturbed in only limited circum-
stances-if it "is excessive because it is the result of passion, bias, 
corruption or other improper motive, [or if it includes or excludes] 
a sum which is clearly recoverable or not as a matter of law, "835 or 
which is totally unsupported by the evidence.836 As to the apparent 
discrepancy between the plaintiffs recovery and her computable 
damages, the court explained that" [a] trial court may not condi-
tionally reduce a jury verdict merely because it believes the verdict 
overcompensates the plaintiff. "837 
The court recited the incantation of the trial court's "advantage 
of observing all of the parties to the trial, "838 but indicated that this 
creates a duty on the part of trial courts "to reflect in the record 
the reasons for interfering with a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, 
on grounds of excessiveness of the damages. "839 The court suggested 
that when determining whether the verdict was justified, the trial 
court should consider the defendant's culpability, the desirability of 
discouraging others from such conduct, and the impact of the 
defendant's conduct on the parties.840 The limitation of the trial 
831. See itt. at 1376. 
832. See itt. at 1378. 
833. See itt. 
834. See itt. at 1379. 
835. Id. at 1378. 
836. See itt. As to whether a contention is totally unsupported by the evidence, it 
must be borne in mind that Alabama resolutely clings to the scintilla rule--
that an issue must be submitted to the jury if "the evidence, or any reasonable 
inference therefrom, produces the merest gleam, glimmer, or spark in sup-
port of the theory of the complaint." Handley v. City of Binningham, 475 So. 
2d 1185, 1186 (Ala. 1985) (citing Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So. 2d 985 (Ala. 
1980». 
837. Hammond, 493 So. 2d at 1379 (citing B&M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 
667 (Ala. 1979); Vest v. Gay, 154 So. 2d 298 (Ala. 1937». 
838. Id. at 1379. 
839. Id. 
840. See itt. Under the circumstances, this amounted to an invitation to the trial 
court to fashion an award of punitive damages to preserve the verdict or to 
justify why it did not do so. Such a process would probably not be permissible 
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court's discretion regarding the size of the verdict and the require-
ment that the trial court preserve the factors considered in either 
granting or denying a motion for new trial were imposed with an 
eye to the constitutional requirement that "a jury verdict may not 
be set aside unless [it] is flawed, thereby losing its constitutional 
protection. "841 ' 
In Colorado Springs & Interurban Railway Co. v. Kelley,842 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court displayed a similarly strong regard for the 
province of the jury. Here, the plaintiff won a personal injury ver-
dict against a tramway company in the amount of $17,000.843 The 
defendant argued that the verdict was excessive.844 Approving the 
trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict, the court noted: 
It may seem to be a large amount, perhaps larger than the 
average in similar cases, though it does not stand out as an 
exception, nor even· unusual. It may have been greater than 
the trial court would have awarded, or greater than this 
court would have felt justified in giving. But the power to 
make the award was within the constitutional and exclusive 
province of the jury, and courts may not invade that power, 
nor disturb it, except for injustice manifestly appearing.84S 
This language is reminiscent of some federal decisions following 
Lind. 846 Connecticut also has sharply limited the discretion of a trial 
under Maryland law. See Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 29, 35-37, 690 A.2d 1000, 
1007-08 (1997) (holding that to recover punitive damages, facts sufficient to 
show actual malice had to be pleaded and proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence, and specific demand for recovery of punitive damages had to be 
made); see also Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 469, 472, 601 A.2d 633, 
657, 659 (1992) (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard was 
applicable in assessment of punitive damages in any tort case). 
841. Hammond, 493 So. 2d at 1378. The court delineated the two ways in which a 
jury verdict may be flawed as: I) including or excluding a sum which, as a 
matter of law, is either recoverable, not recoverable, or totally unsupported by 
the evidence, or 2) because it results from bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, 
or other improper motive rather than from the evidence and applicable law. 
See ill. 
842. 176 P. 307 (Colo. 1920). 
843. See ill. at 308. 
844. See ill. 
845. [d. at 309-10 (emphasis added). 
846. See, e.g" Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(finding that the trial court overstepped its bounds and usurped the jury's 
function of judging credibility in granting a new trial), 
1998] The Motion for New nial .109 
judge in granting a new trial, as its state's supreme court has 
observed: 
One obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion 
of the court in such cases is the constitutional right of trial 
by jury, which in a proper case includes the right to have is-
sues of fact, as to the determination of which there is room 
for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded 
men, passed upon by the jury and not by the court.847 
This principle was applied more recently by Connecticut's inter-
mediate court in setting aside a trial court's grant of the plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial conditioned upon the defendant's rejection 
of an additur in Shea v. Paczowski.848 The court brushed aside the 
trial judge's recital in his memorandum of decision that a juror ap-
peared to be asleep during damage instructions.849 The court com-
mented that: "Only under the most compelling circumstances may 
the court set aside a jury verdict because to do so interferes with a 
litigant's constitutional right in appropriate cases to have issues of 
fact decided by a jury. "850 
The Shea court concluded that nothing in the evidence sup-
ported the trial court's conclusion that the jury's award "did not fall 
somewhere between the necessarily uncertain limits of just dam-
ages" or was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake, or corrup-
tion.851 Such a standard clearly is tolerant of a great deal of uncer-
tainty as part of the constitutional jury trial right. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that the 
constitutional right to trial by jury entitles the parties to a lawsuit to 
have verdicts in their favor given effect "unless some clear, lawful 
reason is made to appear why a particular verdict should be set 
aside and a new trial had. "852 In Hawk v. Seaboard System Railroad, 
Inc.,8s3 Florida's intermediate court set aside the trial court's grant 
of a motion for a new trial conditioned on remittitur. The trial 
847. Robinson v. Backes, 99 A. 1057, 1058 (Conn. 1917). 
848. 526 A.2d 558 (Conn. 1987). 
849. The court noted that neither the trial court nor the plaintiff took action at 
the time. See ill. at 559. 
850. [d. (citing Bambus v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 169 A.2d 265 (Conn. 1961». 
851. [d. at 560. 
852. Duboise Constr. Co. v. City of South Miami, 146 So. 833, 835 (Fla. 1933) (re-
versing an order granting a new trial where it plainly appeared that the ver-
dict was the result of a fair trial). 
853. 547 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
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court ordered a remittitur or new trial with respect to wrongful 
death verdicts in favor of the parents of two children.854 Reversing 
the trial court's action as an abuse of discretion, the court noted 
that "the trial court does not sit as a seventh juror with veto power 
and may not substitute its judgment on damages" for that of the 
jury.855 The court commented that the trial court, by setting aside a 
verdict as excessive, must support its conclusion with specific find-
ings that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evi-
dence.856 The court further observed that "[w]here the evidence is 
conflicting, the weight to be given to that evidence is in the prov-
ince of the jury. "857 
Among the states, Oregon has provided the strongest bulwark 
for its constitutional right to trial by jury against infringement by 
the granting of a motion for a new trial. Its constitution forbids the 
granting of a new trial in a jury case unless there is no evidence to 
support the verdict.858 This provision essentially strips trial courts of 
the power to grant a new trial in cases in which there is a jury ques-
tion.859 Its inflexibility enables the constitutional prohibition to be a 
mechanism of injustice, requiring that grossly excessive or inade-
quate verdicts be sustained.8OO 
Constitutional restrictions and appellate court deference are 
not the only avenues pursued by states in protecting the right to a 
jury trial. Four states prevent trial courts by statute from granting 
more than two new trials in the same case.861 Some states, however, 
854. See id. at 671. 
855. Id. (citing Laskey v. Smith, 239 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1970». 
856. See id. (citations omitted). 
857. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Altenbernd suggested that the defendant 
might better have settled the case. See id. at 674 (Altenbernd, j., concurring). 
The plaintiffs' children were killed when the automobile their mother was 
driving was struck by a train. See id. (Altenbernd, j., concurring). Judge Alten-
bernd speculated that the size of the verdict may have been caused by the 
jury's negative reaction to the attempt of the defendant to cast blame on the 
mother. He warned that a defendant may not depend on a new trial to limit 
the risk of litigating unless the verdict is "so inordinately large as to obviously 
exceed" the risk. Id. (Altenbrand, J., concurring). 
858. See OR CONSf., art. VII § 3 (amended 1996). 
859. See Williams v. Clemen's Forest Prods., Inc., 217 P.2d 252, 254 (Or. 1950) 
(holding that where jury had determined an issue of fact and there was evi-
dence to support their finding, the Supreme Court could not re-examine the 
issue). 
860. See id. 
861. See ALA. CODE § 6-&-104 (1993) ("No more than two new trials can be granted 
the same party on any cause of action."); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 27-2-101 (1980) 
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base their limitations on judicial economy rather than protection of 
trial by jury.862 
From an overview of state case law, constitutions, and statutes, 
the only clear generalization is that most have not focused on the 
issue. This is consistent with the federal appellate circuits prior to 
Lind.863 It is not surprising that such a variation should exist be-
tween most states and most federal courts with respect to jury 
tria1.864 Like the federal system, however, Maryland has taken a 
highly protective view of trial by jury.86S It is such a protective out-
look that has engendered Lind and its progeny. 
V. GUIDELINES FOR A SYNTHESIS OF NEW· TRIAL AND THE 
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN MARYLAND 
Unlike most of the federal circuits, Maryland appellate courts 
have never reversed a trial court's grant of a motion for a new trial 
on the basis that such grant deprived the litigants of a jury trial. In-
deed, Maryland appellate courts have never reversed a trial court 
for granting a new trial. Maryland trial courts have not shown a 
strong willingness to set aside verdicts; Maryland trial courts have 
("Not more than two (2) new trials shall be granted to the same party in an 
action at law, or upon the trial by jury of an issue of fact in equity."); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 8.01-383 (Michie 1992)("Not more than two new trials shall be 
granted to the same party in the same case on the ground that the verdict is 
contrary to the evidence, either by the trial court or the appellate court, or 
both."); W. VA. CODE § 56-6-28 (1997) (Not more than two new trials shall be 
granted to the same party on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the ev-
idence, either by the trial court, or the appellate court, or both."). 
862. This is true of Alabama's and West Virginia's statutes. See Liberty Nat'l Life 
Ins. Co. v. Trammell, 67 So. 2d 41, 45 (Ala. 1953) ("To be sure justice never 
tires, but the adoption of the statute indicates that there must be an end to 
litigation, and this though is may appear that a wrong has been imposed."); 
Watterson v. Moore, 23 W. Va. 404, 405 (1884) ("It was the evident purpose 
and policy of the statute that there should be an end to litigation."). The Su-
preme Court of the United States has recognized that the Tennessee limita-
tion on the granting of new trials was intended to preserve the right to trial 
by jury. See Louisville and Nashville RR Co. v. Woodson, 134 U.S. 614 (1890). 
863. For a discussion of Lind and its progeny, see supra notes 706-822 and accom-
panying text. 
864. Not all states have been as protective of the right to trial by jury in the con-
text of mixed legal and equitable claims as the federal courts in Beacon Thea-
tres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See Richard W. Bourne & John A Lynch, 
Jr., Merger of Law and Equity Under the Revised Maryland Rules: Does it Threaten 
Trial by Jury 7 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 46, n.295 (1984). 
865. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 542, 530 A2d 724, 728-29 (1987) (discuss-
ing Maryland's history guaranteeing the right to jury trial). 
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shown just the opposite tendency.866 Maryland trial courts have gen-
erally permitted even anomalous verdicts to stand.867 Very few appel-
late cases involve appeals of the granting of a new trial; most in-
volve appeals of the denial of a motion for a new trial.868 The court 
of appeals has suggested only in the most general way that trial by 
jury limits a trial judge's discretion with respect to disposition of a 
new trial motion.869 
It is clear that this broad discretion is an historical complement 
of the right to trial by jury.870 Restricting this discretion would, to 
some extent, amount to an enlargement of the scope of jury trial. 
Like the federal judicial system, Maryland has evolved to new con-
ceptions of the scope of the right to trial by jury in contexts other 
than disposition of a new trial.871 
In the federal system, restriction of the discretion of a trial 
judge to grant a new trial to reflect the jury trial right has involved 
greater appellate scrutiny.872 Thus far, the Maryland appellate courts 
have not strictly scrutinized the disposition of motions for new trial 
on the basis that the verdict is excessive or inadequate or against 
the weight of the evidence873 other than to insist that such discre-
866. See supra Part II. 
867. See, e.g., Brinand v. Denzik, 226 Md. 287, 173 A2d 203 (1961) (allowing a ver-
dict to stand despite improper remarks regarding tabulating damages); 
Thodos v. Bland, 75 Md. App. 700, 542 A2d 1307 (1988) (upholding the trial 
court's denial of a motion for new trial even though the trier of fact found 
negligence of either one or the other driver involved in the accident was the 
proximate cause, but returned verdicts for the defendants). 
868. See generally Kirkpatrick v. Zimmerman, 257 Md. 215, 262 A2d 531 (1970); 
Grabner v. Battle, 256 Md. 514, 260 A.2d 634 (1970); Perlin Packing Co. v. 
Price, 247 Md. 475, 231 A2d 702 (1967); State v. Gray, 227 Md. 318, 176 A2d 
867 (1962); Leizear v. Butler, 226 Md. 171, 172 A.2d 518 (1961); Hill v. Cole-
man, 218 Md. 1, 144 A2d 694 (1958); Rephann v. Armstrong, 217 Md. 90, 141 
A2d 525 (1958); Riley v. Naylor, 179 Md. 1, 16 A2d 857 (1940); Von Schlegell, 
Inc. v. Ford, 167 Md. 584, 175 A 589 (1934); Chiswell v. Nichols, 139 Md. 442, 
115 A 790 (1921). 
869. See In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988); 
Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 46 A.2d 607 (1946) (suggesting that great 
weight be given to jury verdicts and that they not be overturned simply be-
cause the judge would have found differently). 
870. See Baltimore & Ohio RR Co., 65 Md. 198, 9 A. 126 (1886) (noting that 
courts and juries have separate spheres of responsibility and that it is not 
within the power of one to encroach upon or restrict the power of the other). 
871. See supra Part III. 
872. See supra notes 392-543 and accompanying text. 
873. See Leizear v. Butler, 226 Md. 171, 178, 172 A2d 518, 521 (1961). 
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tion be exercised in a knowledgeable way.874 
Lind and its progeny accord great weight to the trial court's dis-
cretion, but they insist on more. Those cases following Lind have 
applied greater appellate scrutiny in cases involving the grant of a 
new trial than in those involving the denial of a new trial. This is 
consistent with a protective view of trial by jury because the denial 
of the new trial motion upholds the jury's verdict. 
Some federal and state cases have required that the trial court 
articulate specifically its reasons for granting a new trial.875 Maryland 
does not appear to have imposed such a requirement in this con-
text. If greater appellate scrutiny were to be applied to some dispo-
sitions of new trial motions, specific findings would facilitate such 
review. The requirements imposed in federal and other state courts 
in this regard are not unlike that imposed on trial courts sitting 
without a jury under the Maryland rules.876 
The greatest difference among state and federal courts that 
have imposed more stringent appellate review over grant of a new 
trial has been in the degree to which a trial court must find a ver-
dict is excessive or inadequate or against the weight of the evidence 
before he or she is permitted to set it aside. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit, for example, prohibits setting a verdict aside for exces-
siveness unless "it is so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the 
maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may 
properly operate. "877 Other circuits allow the grant of a new trial to 
prevent a "miscarriage of justice."878 Yet another standard permits 
I 
874. See Grabner v. Battle, 256 Md. 514,519,260 A.2d 634, 636 (1970). In Washing-
ton, Baltimore & Annapolis Elee. RR, v. Kimmey, 141 Md. 243, 118 A. 648 
(1922), this meant that the trial court should have considered evidence that 
raised "serious suspicion as to [the] validity and merit" of the judgment chal-
lengeq on the new trial motion. [d. at 253, 118 A. at 652; see also Angell v. Just, 
22 Md. App. 43, 321 A.2d 830 (1974). 
875. See, e.g., King v. Davis, 980 F.2d 1236, 1237 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Hawk v. Sea-
board System RR, Inc., 547 So. 2d 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Crook-
ston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 n.9 (Utah 1991). 
876. See MD. R CIY. P. 2-522(a) (requiring court judges to enter into the record a 
statement of the reasons for the decision or basis of determining damages); 
Pearson v. Wiltrout, 17 Md. App. 497, 498 n.l, 302 A.2d 678, 679 n.l (1973). 
877. Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (quot-
ing Graling v. Reilly, 214 F. Supp. 234, 235 (D.D.C. 1963». For a discussion of 
Taylor, see supra notes 755-84 and accompanying text. 
878. See, e.g., Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 211 (3d Cir. 1992»; 
McGee v. South Permiscot Sch. Dist. R-V, 712 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983) (quot-
ing Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aalco Wrecking Co., 466 F.2d 179, 187 (8th Cir. 
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grant of a new trial when '''it is quite clear that the jury has 
reached a seriously erroneous result. '"879 In light of the traditional 
latitude given trial courts in Maryland with respect to the disposi-
tion of a motion for a new trial,880 as well as the deference of trial 
judges to jury verdicts,88t none of these standards would fit very 
comfortably into established Maryland jurisprudence. 
A fourth standard, however, allows more deference to a trial 
court in granting a motion for a new trial. This standard allows the 
granting of a new trial if the verdict is against the great weight of 
the evidence.882 Such a standard allows the jury significant latitude 
in fulfilling its fact-finding role, yet does not unduly restrict "the trial 
court in deciding whether the jury has strayed too far from what 
the evidence will support. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Until recently, most American jurisdictions viewed grant of a 
new trial as posing no threat to the right to trial by jury.883 This is 
because the grant of this motion was followed by another jury trial. 
Trial courts had enormous discretion in setting aside a jury's work 
and making the judicial wheels spin yet again in the same cause. 
There is no indication that trial courts in Maryland have capri-
ciously used this power to obtain results consistent with their own 
predilections at the expense of the jury's proper role.884 
In the last generation, particularly in the federal appellate 
courts, increasing authority has developed for the notion that al-
lowing unfettered discretion to a trial court in setting aside a jury 
verdict is at odds with the right to trial by jury.8SS To some extent, 
such a notion entails re-examination of the right to trial by jury. 
Notwithstanding that the boundaries of the jury trial right in the 
1972». 
879. Coffran v. Hitchcock Clinic, Inc., 683 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting Borras 
v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 586 F.2d 881, 887 (1st Cir. 1978». For a discussion of 
Coffran, see supra notes 8()()'14 and accompanying text. 
880. See, e.g., Brinand v. Denzik, 226 Md. 287, 173 A.2d 203 (1961); Leizear v. 
Bulter, 226 Md. 171, 172 A.2d 203 (1961). 
881. See supra notes 5&-58 and accompanying text. 
882. See Hardin v. Hayes, 52 F.3d 934, 938 (11 th Cir. 1995). 
883. See supra notes 702-865 and accompanying text. 
884. One co-author is familiar with an instance in which a well-known trial judge 
in a court, (thankfully) not in Maryland, informed a plaintiff's lawyer that he 
would grant new trials successively if the lawyer's client obtained verdicts in an 
amount in excess of the defendant's settlement offer. 
885. See supra notes 706-822 and accompanying text. 
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federal courts and Maryland are rooted in history,886 both systems 
have evaluated such boundaries in light of contemporary procedu-
ral developments and exigencies.887 There does not appear to be 
any constitutional impediment to imposing at least a modest check 
on the discretion of a trial judge in granting a new trial.888 Requir-
ing the trial judge to weigh the impact of granting this motion on 
the right to jury trial itself would be an effective way to resolve the 
inherent constitutional tension between jury trial and the motion 
for new trial. 889 
886. See supra notes 392-701 and accompanying text. 
887. See supra notes 392-701 and accompanying text. 
888. See supra notes 866-82 and accompanying text. 
889. See supra notes 866-82 and accompanying text. 

